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FOR INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

MORALITY
AND
FOREIGN POLICY
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“Morality and Foreign Policy”

What provokes this essay is the sense of a radically changed world, with a convergence of dramatic new forces at large which require correspondingly radical changes in perception, resolve and strategy, none of which in my view will be possible without heightened moral consciousness. (1)

I have been curious for a long time about what I felt to be a gap between our ostensible approval of general principles and norms concerning moral philosophy, spiritual values, political ideals on the one end and on the other the relative absence -- call it insufficient presence -- of it in our behavior, in this case as revealed in our foreign relations. The two realms seem to be uncomfortable with each other, tolerant but wary of excessive intimacy, each more secure in a separateness which doesn't threaten the purity of the philosophical or the reality of the practical. Why this void exists is not entirely a mystery, but my sense of the reasons for it and awareness of the differences of opinion surrounding it have not calmed my discomfort. I have a stubborn belief that various manifestations of flawed strategy and incompetent performance internationally could benefit from a greater moral in-put. I will try to explain why, not seeking instant transformation here, but rather urging a gently stronger moral pulse in the policy action.

We have plenty of material for reference and motivation. Aristotle on virtue and service to others; Bentham and Mill on the greatest good for the greatest number; Kant relating a moral imperative to both universality and pragmatism; Hobbes seeing the world as “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” but advancing moral principles based on attributes of human nature; Locke envisaging a state of nature as one of “peace, goodwill, mutual assistance, and preservation.” More recently, Reinhold Niebuhr wrote that “the children of light. . . must know the power of self-interest in human society without giving it moral justification”; Martin Luther King, Jr. declared from a Birmingham jail that “An unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal and natural law”; Nelson Mandela combined a patient, tenacious battle against injustice with forgiveness; and even George Kennan, a champion of “realism”, referred in an impassioned attack on McCarthyism to “the spiritual equilibrium of one’s fellow men.” So there is an abundance of literature, a richness of thought available, which examines, tests and charges moral reflection.

Before going further, I need to provide some indication of what I mean by moral or morality, some definition; not requesting agreement from readers, but just so that my point of departure can be better understood. It is important to me that such an explanation not be too explicit or dogmatic because that would be opposed to the basic thesis of this article, which will argue that encouraging a more integrated relationship between the moral and the political depends upon simultaneously avoiding both abstract and absolute pronouncements and invigorating people to discover their own moral compass, to determine their own moral prescriptions. This is not to overlook such effort already going on inside and around us, sometimes not easily seen or obviously exhibited; a purpose here is to stimulate more of it and insure that such searching is undertaken

respectfully, not antagonistically, seeking to find agreement rather than to enhance differences. Such a permissive approach, being so ambiguous and wimpish, is not very satisfying to anyone, but might have relevance both to reality and to concord.

Conventional use of “moral” refers to accepted notions of right and wrong behaviour. (2) My personal definition of moral and morality can be found within the following ideas: Believing in something transcendent of oneself. To be unselfish and to nurture empathy. The pursuit of the common good. Fairness and kindness. Agape, love, translated into the well being of the other. Confucianism’s learning to be human. The powerful protecting the weak. A compassionate appetite for social justice. These hallmarks encompass my definition. Others are encouraged to decide for themselves, which is the idea.

Given that there is a good deal of the kind of moral content suggested already present in the way we live our daily lives, in the way our institutions function, and embedded in our public policies, “How much?” and “Enough?” are questions of subjective judgment, and that is what our responsibility of searching for moral truth is all about. My own working conviction, without seeking perfection, is “Not enough”. I recently reread an article which appeared in 2003 in the journal “Foreign Affairs” entitled “The Rise of Ethics in Foreign Policy”, in which it was written that “Morality, values, ethics, universal principles . . . have taken root in the hearts, or at least the minds, of the American foreign policy community.”(3) I applaud the authors for their admirable argument that things had changed and continued to improve in this respect (and it’s only fair to acknowledge that given what has happened in the intervening five years they may have additional thoughts on the matter); but the article is in any event too optimistic and elitist for me, perhaps premature, and thus my working conviction survives.

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The central ideas of this essay are that the radical changes in the world we are currently living in and can reasonably project into the future make the injection of greater moral energy into our foreign policy more critical, and that if our aspirations in this respect are shaped with a recognition of the constraints of reality and of our limitations as human beings, more opportune.

The shrinking, globalizing, increasingly interdependent character of our evolving world is conflating peoples and problems everywhere into more complex, dynamic, intersecting, invasive and intimate relationships. There is promise and opportunity here, and also trouble and danger. (4) There is a mutual, reciprocating vulnerability which is new, heightened by multiple technological advances and other man-made impacts and embodied in such phenomena as: climate change and environmental degradation, nuclear proliferation, international terrorism, a global economy which is increasingly contagious, spreading ethnic and religious conflict, trafficking in drugs and humans, and continent-crossing diseases such as HIV/AIDS and avian flu. Traditional geographic and political boundaries are not getting their traditional respect. (5) Things are out of control. In order to respond to these concurrent forces so as to assure our future survival, not only must we

recognize them, and upgrade our political and institutional competence to deal with them, but employ our spiritual resources as well. The material tasks require the moral ally. Foreign policy need not forsake altruism, even as it must be disciplined and tough-minded.

Especially in the absence of a social and political mobilization the necessary size, commitment and coherence of which we can yet see no sign, we need to develop an understanding of the power and gathering intractability of these converging phenomena and the difficulty inherent in bringing them into a less menacing relationship with our future. It closely follows that we must also recognize that the evolution of the human species is not only monumentally slow, inertial, including the flourishing of any moral element in that growth, and that the complex nature of human beings limits us to inchworm improvement.

We humans are truly mixed-up. Of course we vary in physique, intelligence, talent, motivation, temperament, etc., but within each individual there are inconsistent and changing qualities which frustrate stereotype. In moral terms, we are often “bad” and “good”, selfish and unselfish, loving and hating, greedy and generous, intolerant and respectful -- at the same time. But what is the proportionality of our different, and sometimes conflicting, characteristics and, not being static, how much do they vary? There is a lot of disagreement among the brave experts as to what the answers are to questions such as: “Do people have moral motivation?” “Is there a genetic predisposition to transcendence?” “Is doing the right thing hard-wired?” The revolution in neuro-science has a ways to go. Not knowing whether the moral aspect of our being comes from metaphysical or biological origin needn’t restrict our progress. But lacking a human nature which is better understood -- making it difficult to plot a trajectory of an enhanced moral presence in the behavior of institutions and the design of policy -- it is important for us to keep in mind this “mix” in our human character, the complexity of human nature and the limitations of what human beings are capable of. (6) While nurturing our moral qualities, we must fully appreciate our overall selves, and respect all of the jumbled aspects which comprise us. Presumably, we can do morally better building on what’s already part of us stimulated by the world’s new challenges; and we must demand more of ourselves -- but not hugely more than we have so far become. Hence the modesty required in this endeavor. I realize it’s heretical to ask that we act more morally yet marginally so. But we can’t overdo it; our psychic traffic won’t bear it. We won’t get very far by pretending the human species and the world it lives in are more malleable than they are. And since recognition of these dual constraints would tend to pre-empt utopian overreaching, our chances of making actual progress could be advanced.

In addition to recognizing the inherent limitation of moral progress in human beings, there are three other preconditions, in a sense prior restraints, which need to be appreciated given the goal of effecting a better integration of the moral and the existential realms. The first is the need to avoid separatist thinking, the tendency to think in opposites, the inclination to focus on differences ahead of affinities. Manicheanism is an extreme version of this -- dividing into “good” vs. “evil”. We often try to simplify and deconstruct complex matters into ostensibly more manageable and understandable

categories and compartments. This is familiar behaviour, often useful, in both academic and political activity, but sometimes it can create false dichotomies. Consider two competing schools of thought in international relations, “realism” and “idealism”. Of course it is useful to conceptualize and analyze the character and conduct of foreign policy with these models. But the truth of the matter is that in practice any serious foreign policy has got to figure out how to combine both critically valuable elements. (7) This is where the challenge is, to understand the interplay and reinforcement, and to devote our intellectual and political energy to that. So separatism is generally speaking a bad habit, given the size, complexity and intensity of the interacting problems of the world we now live in; and in times of stress and anxiety it contributes to polarization. We require instead more commitment and effort to find ways of matching and linking, of connecting ideas and interests, solutions and people.

The second key requisite which emerges here is the relationship between morality and pragmatism. One is more abstract, the other is more proximate. Our instinct is to keep each from corrupting the other and we perceive risk and difficulty in conceiving and managing a synthesis which could benefit both -- a prodigiously delicate balance. I’ve already asserted that good policy needs more moral content, that effective strategies have a better chance if they are less segregated from moral values. But the other side is perhaps more profoundly true: without application the moral imperatives have no active life, they remain pristine, uncorrupted by the nasty, instrumental pressures of being put into practice, and therefore essentially inert, worthless. To be moral is to be operational. (8) We understand that the two are not antithetical, but they will effectively be so if they are not active collaborators.

Third, it follows from an understanding of a reinforcing connection between the moral and the pragmatic that an absolutist or fundamentalist approach applying moral values in dealing with real challenges will not work. Intolerant extremism or rigid dogma can be destructive to the purpose. There are too many moral imperatives, and too great a complexity in the environment of need and action. Consider the huge differences in human circumstances and the huge varieties in human cultures which exist across the globe, and which must somehow be reconciled. We need tolerance, flexibility, compromise in the search for common ground in our public discourse and public policy. Starting with our own American culture and beliefs we can see there are tough trade-offs -- competing and sometimes even colliding altruistic convictions, moral principles, political and social “values” which need somehow to be both respected and accommodated especially when contemplating the survival of a shared international community. (9)

Several examples of competing moral principles are available in the field of humanitarian assistance and intervention from the recent past with which I have had some direct personal exposure. Should NATO bomb Kosovo, using military force against massive violations of human rights but causing extensive “collateral damage” (what an evasive euphemism) to innocent humans and civilian life? Should we impose sanctions on the de facto military government in Haiti when they will exacerbate the already grinding despair of the Haitian peasantry? Should we abandon a humanitarian mission in

Somalia which had saved tens of thousands of lives because of a misguided intervention in a civil war? Should desperately needy Rwandan populations in Eastern Zaire continue to be assisted when that enables militants in control of the camps to terrorize the inhabitants and marshal military forays back into Rwanda? Should refugees in neighboring southeast Asian countries be forcibly repatriated to Vietnam as a way of alleviating desperate circumstances and a resettlement stalemate in their camps? Should a Soviet-Saudi airlift to feed the isolated, besieged population in Kabul be foiled in order to aid the Mujahadheen surrounding the Afghan capital to liberate it from the Communists? Should the refugee assistance budget be cut for Mozambicans clothed in bark to increase the resettlement budget for Jews freed to leave the Soviet Union and flooding to America? What was more important in the post-genocidal political and legal life in Rwanda: social justice -- punishment, or peaceful reconciliation -- forgiveness?

There are many more such dilemmas across wide-ranging areas of policy and geography even more profound and recalcitrant today. In order to deal with them soul-wrenching choices must be made and nerve-rattling compromises must be attempted. Moral certainty isn't the way to do this, whereas moral search is. And in that very distinction, there is the necessity for adaptation, flexibility, respect and risk to get a result probably somewhere in the middle which doesn't fully satisfy anyone but which may be a way to begin to get out of trouble and head toward a viable future. It occurs to me that my opinion here may be vulnerable to accusations of "moral relativism". Maybe so, depending on the definition of that abused term. But it's more a matter of moral application. It isn't that I like giving up the dream of pure, uncompromised moral principle, it's that I don't think it works, and if it doesn't work it isn't validated. Moral absolutism can be self-indulgent, even delusional, and ultimately harmful. We've seen that moral imperatives often contend with one another. There are too many strong moral constructs for any one of them to own the truth by itself, or for there to be only one truth. Morality isn't something that's owned but something which is sought; it isn't to be imposed but to be shared; its spirituality doesn't exist apart from but is joined with the material reality where it operates. To try to get it all at once or all by itself will fail and confound moral progress which might take hold.

So far I have concocted a co-existence of three factors: (1) a radically narrowed planet projecting intimations about our survival; (2) moral commitment and content which are not fully enough embodied in our response to new challenges; (3) a still-evolving human species of mixed qualities and limited capacities unable to advance very rapidly. There is arguably a paradox here between the scale of the crisis we are heading for and our ability to respond to it. The answer to this seems to be to recognize the realities and constraints involved, mobilize our full talents and assets, including stronger moral drive, and commit ourselves to the long haul expecting trouble and setbacks along the way. We shouldn't expect too much too fast; there are no quick or tidy fixes here, the complexity of our environment and ourselves prevents it. The point is that our best hope, painful, gradual progress, will itself require major change. Either the failure of sufficient commitment or the delusion of quick transformation will lead to demoralization, cynicism, and shrinking further back into selfishness and hostility.

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As we begin to examine what all of this means for our foreign policy, for advancing our goals in the international context, we must acknowledge at least in passing that what we are domestically, what is happening here at home, is fundamental to any foreign policy. (10) Among the important moral implications of this relationship between the domestic and the foreign, a basic one is the degree to which our highest ideals are honored in our own public policies and in the way we practice our own politics.

The 2008 Presidential nominating process hasn't provided much reassurance. Although there has been an unusually large participation by voters, there is an alarming indulgence of reality denial with regard to both our role abroad and our economy at home, not to mention the unprecedented money spent and the reassertion of narrow, nasty politicking. References to morality in the campaign are mostly rhetorical, pre-emptive more than reflective. "Values" are appealed to abundantly in campaign discourse -- family, religious, national values -- but usually as either reassuring placebos or exploitative code words. Now and then, one encounters less partisan references such as "moral waivers" in U.S. Army recruiting or "moral hazard" in government efforts to fight the credit crisis; but even then the import of the adjective is left opaque and unfronted. Although there are some powerful emotional and ideological flashpoints, the political invocations and exhortations about morality are largely abstract and superficial, and its overall influence in voting and importance as a discriminating factor for the electorate is hard to discern. (11) Is serious, respectful moral examination and discussion in the political campaign truly too much of a problem -- the candidates being too scared, the voters too suspicious, and both too cynical?

Since we are a democratic republic we need a polity which is more seriously engaged in self-government. In order for this to happen it needs to be better informed, which in turn requires an overall, multi-media, multi-level educational system which teaches everybody -- in school, on television, with the internet, in our national discourse -- more about the scared new world we live in. Hopefully, this would result in a broader, less nationalistic redefinition of our "national interest" so that it encompassed the "international interests" of people very distant and different from us. (12) Also, the process by which official policy is made should be bucked up by: more truth-telling, candor and honesty; focusing on a much longer time-frame; and more inclusive participation to achieve better choices and greater consensus. Ideally, the policy-making process should also incorporate some frame of reference for policy-makers to use -- perhaps in the form of an inventory of searching questions which could focus on the given policies being examined -- to assure that moral goals not be ignored in the deliberation. There are various models available for this, a prominent one being "Just War Theory" which articulates standards to guide decisions on the use of military force. (13)

Although the U.S. is the world's only hyper power, there are now many problems in the world which affect our interests with growing influence over which our strengths

as presently constituted and deployed are inapt, powerless, or at least not powerful enough to have a reliably salutary and lasting impact. Effective American power is waning. This is due to a number of factors, including: the gathering forces enumerated previously which are part of the new and multiple interdependency which individual states and the “international community” do not now have the will or means to handle; emerging nations such as China and India forming new distributions of power in the world; and a U.S. not having yet figured out just what is going on and how to deal with it both in terms of political consensus at home and coherent strategies abroad. Thomas Homer-Dixon sees global threats converging in such a way as to require us to prepare in advance to deal with the “simultaneous multiple stresses” which tend to interact and reinforce one another. (14) It’s a daunting challenge, the way isn’t clear, and in our thrashing around we may be discovering some answers, but we’re falling behind the curve.

There are five big issues in foreign policy which I have selected to discuss briefly as examples of the kinds of tough problems we face which carry great urgency and yearning for a moral leadership which does not deny the formidable realities, but rather seeks to navigate and elevate what practically might be done. The characteristics of each represent the framing and criteria which I’ve been wrestling with. They are all dynamically interactive. These sketches may be disappointing not only for their brevity but because they are not dispositive. No solutions, merely continuing efforts. What we can do, the U. S. in concert with others, remains open-ended -- intimidating, murky, inherently exciting, necessarily hopeful.

The first and most all-encompassing challenge is the gap between the haves and the have-nots, the rich and the poor, congenitally immoral. (15) Gaping and grotesque and growing, it intensifies many other crises we share, including ethnic conflict, disease, energy distortions, inequity, environmental degradation, and terrorism. It is poverty unleashed, a breeding-ground for hostility and despair. Logically, it is a spectacular manifestation of moral and material confluence, the two realms inseparable, in the existential reality and in any prescription. We will not comprehend the danger of this gap to our more selfish and material interests without moral imagination. The U.S. and other nation-states who are hypothetically capable of making the huge investment required to narrow the gap do not yet understand its meaning for their own survival and the future of the planet. When the stronger recognize that their interests lie with the weaker, then there’ll be a change. But for now, our current concern and ongoing efforts are reluctant, puny and self-absorbed. For its part, the developing world would have to make prodigious effort, although of a different type, to gain the needed stability, discipline and time -- and that’s just as long a wager. It may be that all this is beyond our reach, and that it is too late to reverse the trend. With a revelatory perception might come the necessary priority, producing major sacrifice and prolonged, virtually permanent commitment. Given our nature, it seems this is unlikely to happen without being driven simultaneously by deep fear and moral shock.

The second foreign policy category is the environment. Caring for the free gifts of nature is a manifestation of both unselfishness and self-interest. At the Rio Summit on the Environment and Development in 1992, as a disgruntled member of the U.S. delegation

squirming under instructions from Washington, I became painfully aware of the relationship between environmental dangers and undevelopment. The third-world delegations had earlier refused to discuss only environment and not development -- under their pressure the latter had been added to the agenda and the title -- and they turned the conference into a teach-in against the proposition being foisted on them that they needed, in effect, to curtail their development in order not to contribute further to the environmental crises produced by the development which had already taken place for the rich nations. The summit did some negotiating and some papering over was incapable of responding to the full import of this impasse, and the plans and commitments it coughed up eventually largely petered out. The ubiquitous nature of environmental dangers and the urgency shared by everyone for dealing with them to the common benefit have not yet stirred us to change our ways, to control our appetites and inspire our resolve. More recently, man-made global warming has become more severe and more accepted, and it has become clearer that the negative impact of climate change affects the poor more than the rich. The connection between the rich-poor gap and environmental crisis is established: the latter exacerbates the former. (16)

The third illustrative area is foreign assistance, including for my purposes: official development assistance from well-heeled to deprived members of the international community; ongoing U.N. programs by its operational and specialized agencies largely under the Security Council radar; humanitarian intervention including military force to relieve massive suffering and human rights violations; and nation-building in all of its many parts -- humanitarian relief, peacekeeping and security, political and diplomatic rehabilitation/reconstruction/reintegration/reconciliation (“the four Rs”), institution-building, longer-term development, and so on. This is a humongous hodge-podge of need and response, requiring elevated investments, priority-setting and resource-allocation, synchronization, and matching the type of assistance which the donor can muster to the kind of incapacity which the beneficiary suffers. Foreign aid by nature can be regarded as a good thing if it isn’t principally intended to benefit the provider and if it does no harm and some good to the receiver; benefits flowing to the provider don’t in themselves make the transaction bad and will likely make it more probable.

Discipline and ingenuity in getting foreign assistance right lag behind some very good analyses of what’s wrong with it. A specific challenge within this component of foreign policy which is particularly vexing is how to undertake development amidst insecurity: the security-development nexus. It’s not enough simply to say, however true it is, that security comes first and without it development isn’t feasible -- because there are so many desperately poor countries which are conflict-prone and require development for them to get out of insecurity. Direct experience with provincial reconstruction teams, a serious operational initiative in Afghanistan, exhibited to me major structural and political obstacles -- the development and security components do not mesh, and military priorities take precedent and often undercut the socio-economic programs. Yet this model is a serious effort to integrate conditions, actors and resources in the field where conditions of violence and undevelopment co-exist.

The fourth case is “the global war against terrorism” -- a phraseology I use only to be able to call attention to its strikingly inane and harmful mischaracterization. Terrorism, while not new, is perhaps the most dramatic and fearsome current example of humankind’s pathologies. In origin, manifestation and remedy, terrorism is a moral phenomenon. Looking into the eyes of Islamists in a cold, poorly-lit room in a refugee town on the West Bank or of Tamil Tigers in the shade of a banyan tree in Kilinochchi an undeniable truth emerges: this hostility and danger will not be relieved without the action of the human heart being part of the effort. Our anti-terrorism policies have tended to emphasize many wrong things: pretending it is an isolatable and conventionally defeatable enemy; acting as if we can oppose it unilaterally; not taking care to understand its culture and motivation; pretending its sponsors and troops are “beyond politics” -- outside the human species; and believing that terrorism has no relationship to poverty and social injustice -- that we don’t need to confront its root causes politically and economically over an indefinite period as we confront its immediate destructive threat politically and militarily.

Moreover, we have failed to recognize the integral connection between our strategy’s international and domestic realms, that is to say terrorism hasn’t moved us to nurture the protection of our civil liberties, shore up our social contract, or remind our government to be honest and transparent; and we haven’t refurbished our infrastructure or engendered a public attitude of sacrifice. These are all bulwarks of not just “homeland security” but necessary armament in the interwoven cause. And we tend toward the tragic mistake of believing that the first and perhaps the principal means of combat here is the exercise of military power, which can lead us, for instance, to a corruption of our commitment to the Geneva Conventions and against torture. I want to clearly state that our military power is an essential component in the response to terrorism as well as for other circumstances. The application of “soft power” does not eliminate the need for hard power. In some cases, the latter can make the former more influential. But one of the most deeply embedded features of human beings is our violent nature, and our future will be significantly defined by how well we diminish that quality rather than enhance it. Therefore it is a critical matter to apply moral rigor in deciding how and when to use our military strength, part of the recognition of war as a last resort.

The fifth issue I’ve chosen is multilateralism, which is inherent to each of the other categories, and related in some dimension to every aspect of foreign policy. This does not mean just the U.N., but many other international institutions, NGOs, alliances, partnerships and programs. And it does not mean that unilateral action has to be sacrificed, prohibited; quite the contrary. But it does mean that we’ve got to contain our nationalism and recognize the huge importance of multilateralism to our national interest by consistently supporting it. This view is not new but it is not honored. Professor Gene Lyons recently wrote that we are sidestepping the question “whether it is in the interest of the United States to go further and strengthen the range of institutions and processes that make up international society.” (17) Working at and with the U.N. -- in refugee assistance world-wide, negotiating the first unanimous anti-apartheid resolution for South Africa in the General Assembly, reshaping a five-year development plan for sub-Sahara Africa, banning drift-net fishing, helping to design justice systems in poor countries

recovering from war -- it was clear to me every day not only that these urgent problems could not possibly be seriously approached except multilaterally but also how well the U.N. helped serve U.S. interests. And if you are working with others in pursuit of the common good -- as long as it is not so narrow a good that it by nature harms others excluded from it -- then it is a moral effort.

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Given the bind we are in -- having no one we can affect but us human beings to successfully engage truly prodigious challenges which now confront all of us and are gathering speed and convergence, and when the limitations of our nature and the time it takes for us to evolve morally and to change in the face of new forces are so prominent -- what do we do? How do we take advantage of these prodigious challenges and use them to inspire our moral commitment? My own feeling is that, while being vigilant about the realities we face and our own limitations, our moral course is to connect redemptively with our fellow humans across the globe, using our best resources applied continuously and unendingly. Doggedly slogging. Strangely, we need to effect bigger changes than we have yet proved that we are capable of in order to keep on taking small steps. We need to mobilize our intellectual, material and spiritual assets together to work the trade-offs, the compromises, to be patient with our imperfections and respectful of our weaknesses, constantly seeking a dynamic equilibrium among the contending qualities and interests.

Elliot Richardson wrote that “. . . only by the constant pursuit of balance among the elements of change can we induce the flow of events to bring us closer to where we want to go: a society in which all of us can be and become our whole selves.” (18) Our foreign policy must be moral enough to outwit Yeats’ warning -- to hold the center our conviction is essential infused with passion but not consumed by its intensity.

END NOTES for “Morality and Foreign Policy”

1. At the outset the author would seek to diminish expectations of scholarship or intimations of arrogance in what follows, intending to treat this grandiose topic modestly, with an entirely personal philosophy drawing from his own experience and reflection over years of work in, broadly speaking, the foreign policy area.
2. A definition of “moral” in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1993) is: “of or relating to principles or considerations of right and wrong action or good or bad character.”
3. “The Rise of Ethics in Foreign Policy”, Leslie H. Gelb and Justine A. Rosenthal, Foreign Affairs, May-June 2003.
4. Recently Yu Keping, Director of the China Center for Comparative Politics and Economics, wrote that: “During the age of globalization, ties among different nations are being intensified and interests of nations are becoming more complicatedly interlinked. And people now face more common issues and share a common fate.” (Financial Times, May 10, 2007)
5. Even religious boundaries -- a somewhat frivolous example of which is the trip across the Atlantic by an Anglican prelate from Nigeria in order to provide ecclesiastical support for an insurgent movement within the U.S. Episcopal church without the permission of the Archbishop of Canterbury!
6. “This just might not be humanly possible because we’re human.” -- Pdraig O’Malley, speech on “Sharing the Peace: Northern Ireland, South Africa and the Middle East”, University of Massachusetts Boston, May 17, 2007.
7. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. argues that “The old distinction between realists and liberals needs to give way to a new synthesis that you might choose to call liberal realism,” and suggests a vision which balances “ideals with capabilities” and combines “feasibility with the inspiration.” (Harvard Magazine, March-April 2008, p. 36)
8. See p. 7 of Introduction to Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention; Jonathan Moore, editor, Roman and Littlefield, 1998.

9. The exploding global food crisis exemplifies the discordant interplay of disparate phenomena and remedy. Policies intended to deal with such phenomena as growing populations, maldistribution, climate change, energy demand and reform, and dropping financial markets are frequently in competition or conflict. One result of this dissonance is soaring food prices (e.g., wheat, rice, corn and soy) causing extreme want and instability in many countries spread across the globe.

10. Richard Haas has written that it is necessary for the U.S. to get its own house in order to reduce “the chances that a nonpolar world will become a cauldron of instability.” (“The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow U.S. Dominance”, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2008, pp. 52-53)

11. A TV snapshot poll taken in the middle of the 2008 Presidential primary season pretending to measure issue salience of the American voter included five categories to be rated: the economy, Iraq, health care, homeland security, and “moral and family values”.

12. “Unless we act on others’ behalf we have no future as a species.” -- Pdraig O’Malley, speech on “Sharing the Peace: Northern Ireland, South Africa and the Middle East”, University of Massachusetts Boston, May 17, 2007.

13. See discussion on p. 182, “Deciding Humanitarian Intervention”, Jonathan Moore, Social Research, Spring 2007.

14. The Upside of Down: Catastrophe, Creativity and the Renewal of Civilizations, Thomas Homer-Dixon, Island Press/Shearwater Books, 2006.

15. There are many sets of appalling statistics available from many sources which measure the size and nature of the gap. The following few are from the United Nations 1999 Human Development Report:

- The combined wealth of the world’s 200 richest people equals the combined annual income of the world’s poorest 2.5 billion people.
- The income gap between the top fifth of the world’s people and the bottom fifth was 74 to 1 in 1998, up from 30 to 1 in 1960.
- Three billion people live on less than \$2 per day; a little less than half of these live on less than \$1 per day.
- 1.3 billion people lack access to clean water...
- Eighty per cent of the world’s people live in developing countries; and global population is expanding at 80 million each year.

16. A strange manifestation of this is seen, again, in the food crisis: efforts to improve our environment by reducing greenhouse gases through support of the production of bio fuels is a factor contributing to the severe elevation of food prices which poor people can't pay. (Of course environment and energy strategies cannot be effectively undertaken separately, and this is another example of the fiercely inter-impacting character of the world today.)

17. "Rethinking American Foreign Policy: Toward Realistic Multilateralism", Gene M. Lyons, American Foreign Policy Interests, Vol. 29, 2007, p.73.

18. the Creative Balance, Elliot L. Richardson, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976, p. xxviii.

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Publications of Ambassador Moore:

Among other publications, he is the editor of *Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention* (Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), and author of “Deciding Humanitarian Intervention” (*Social Research*, Spring 2007); “Peace Building in an Inseparable World” (*N.E. Journal of Public Policy*, Winter 2004–2005); “Independent Study of U.N. Coordination Mechanisms in Crisis and Post-Conflict Situations” (U.N. Development Programme/ERD, October 2000); *The U.N. and Complex Emergencies: Rehabilitation in Third World War Transitions* (UNRISD, Geneva, 1996); and “Morality and Interdependence” (Rockefeller Center, Dartmouth College, 1994).