Army Manpower and the War on Terror

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Abstract

Army manpower is a key factor in the military’s ability to fight the War on Terror, which includes sustaining the combat missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet manpower is a subject that is often misunderstood and misreported. How does the status of Army manpower affect the nation’s War on Terror? What if the manpower demands of concurrent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have sapped the country’s ability to deploy to the next hotspot on the globe? What if recruiting shortfalls leave combat units only half filled? What if frequent deployments for long periods cause professional soldiers to leave the service? And what if the demands of mobilization on the Reserve and Guard mean that those forces are used up and unavailable for a new contingency not yet on the radar? Debating the pros and cons of intervening in Syria, Darfur, and Iran, or even a prolonged presence in Iraq is nothing more than an academic exercise if no troops are available for the operation. This paper provides background material on Army manpower that is meant to inform journalists who might cover the issue.

Biographical Note: General Kevin T. Ryan has supervised U.S. government security programs with various foreign militaries and served in Germany, Russia, and Korea. He has participated in security negotiations at the national level and facilitated cooperative programs with the Department of Defense, the George C. Marshall Center, and the National Defense University. In his most recent assignment, General Ryan was responsible for Army strategic war plans, policy, and international affairs. Ryan was a Shorenstein Center fellow in the fall of 2005.

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The Bottom Line up Front: Why is the Army’s Manpower Situation Important?

As you know, you have to go to war with the army you have, not the army you want.¹
—Donald Rumsfeld

When Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld told a soldier in 2004 that America had to go to war with the army it had and not the one it wished it had, he was chastised as being insensitive. However, he was speaking to the question above: Why should the public care about the manpower system? The basic reason is that the system is not giving us the army we want. In the case of the current set of missions (Iraq, Afghanistan, Horn of Africa, Balkans, Korea, Homeland Defense, etc.) the army we want is one that can keep over 269,000 personnel² deployed around the world indefinitely. Our manpower system is in danger of failing to allow us to do that.

Today there is a crisis³ in manpower management in the United States Army. This crisis is the direct result of the sustained high tempo of operations in our nation’s global war against terrorism. The manpower system is failing to bring in enough new soldiers and to get the ones we already have into the fight where they are needed.

The manpower system consists of three components—recruiting, retention, and mobilization. Recruiting is the most publicized, but retention and mobilization must also work, or the system will fail. In 2005, largely because of the impact of the war in Iraq, the United States Army failed to recruit enough new soldiers in the active Army, the Reserve, and the National Guard. The Army exceeded its goal for retention of active-component soldiers in 2005, reenlisting 69,350 troops—5,350 more than required. In order to achieve that goal however, the Army had to allow soldiers from the 2006 and 2007 reenlistment window to reenlist earlier than usual.⁴ In doing so the Army may have only forestalled a gap in retention. As for mobilization, according to Lieutenant General James Helmy, chief of the Army Reserve, because of “dysfunctional” personnel policies the reserves are “rapidly degenerating into a ‘broken’ force.” Thus their capacity to meet operational requirements is of grave concern.⁵ Taken together, these trends could coalesce into a perfect storm of manpower problems: reduction in the number of units available for operations, limited options for policymakers, and forced reductions in overseas deployments irrespective of the strategic impact of such reductions.

How Many People Does the Army Need?

In the debate over quality of troops versus quantity of troops, quality is always better. Especially in large quantities.
—Unknown

In Title 10 of the U.S. Code, Congress prescribes the minimum number of active-duty Army soldiers necessary to “successfully conduct two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies”: 482,500.⁶ The number is based on Defense Department and Army input, and Congressional wisdom. If the U.S. Army were recruiting to fill an active-duty force of 482,500, the number of enlistments in 2005 (73,375) would have been sufficient, and there would have been no recruiting shortfall. But the nation is engaged in more than two wars, simultaneously fighting two major ground wars and a global war against terrorism. At the same time, the Army
is transforming itself, reorganizing to increase the number and size of combat brigades and
changing how it fights to meet the new challenges of today. Under this workload, the Army
needs much more than the minimum number of troops cited in the U.S. Code.

There are a number of factors the Army considers when determining its personnel needs. Beginning with strategic requirements laid out by the president and secretary of defense in
documents like the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy, the Army
Operations Directorate, G3 (named for Ground Staff, Section 3), leads the staffing to determine
the number of units the Army needs and how they should be organized. The process is partially
classified because it is based, among other things, on the war plans of combatant commanders
and intelligence assessments of threats to our nation’s security. Suffice it to say that the process
considers the number and scope of anticipated operations, as well as the way in which the Army
will organize for combat.

The Army Personnel Directorate, G1, then uses highly trained analysts (the team includes
two PhDs) and massive computer modeling programs that consider over 2 million variables to
determine how many people the Army needs to man the units the G3 says are required. Their
calculations detail the ranks and types of soldiers needed and include allowances for those
soldiers in training schools, on sick call, in transit, and many more categories. The G1 model
draws on historical data and current trends to project the number of soldiers who will leave the
Army in the coming year and the number of soldiers that can be expected to reenlist. The
difference essentially is the number that recruiting must make up. The number to be reenlisted
and the number to be recruited are prescribed in a memorandum from the G1 and sent to the field
as a task to be fulfilled.

Although it is the intent of the Army leadership to return the size of the active duty
component to 482,500, the impact of Army transformation, two ground wars, and a global war
against terrorism has forced the Army to grow in real numbers. The leadership has asked the
secretary of defense to temporarily increase its active duty component from 482,500 to 512,000
in 2006 (and possibly 522,000 in 2009). Congress has approved the secretary’s request for 2006.
To support an active component force of 512,000 in 2006 the G1 says the Army must recruit
80,000 new people into the active component and 25,500 into the reserve component. The Army
National Guard, which recruits and manages its troops separately, must bring in an additional
70,000 troops.

What is the Relationship between the Components: Active, Reserve, and National Guard?

One weekend a month my butt. — sign on a Reservist’s truck in Iraq

For historical reasons both the federal government and the states have the responsibility of
raising and maintaining military forces for the defense of the nation. The federal ground force is
the United States Army. The Army has both an active-duty component and a reserve component.
The active-duty component comprises units which are always ready for deployment. They are
the nation’s most ready Army forces. The reserve component is composed largely of support
units at a lower state of readiness, normally training once a month and for an extended two-week
period each year. For the most part, units in the Reserve are training and support units. They
provide the strategic depth for a large-scale or lengthy conflict.
The Army National Guard is also considered a reserve force but has a special relationship with the federal force. During peacetime, each National Guard unit answers to the governors of the 50 states, three territories, and the District of Columbia. During national emergencies, however, the president can mobilize the National Guard, putting it in federal-duty status. Once mobilized, the Guard, consisting primarily of combat units, can be deployed and tasked as any other federal force. According to chief of the National Guard, Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, about one-third of the National Guard force has currently been mobilized.

In the wake of the Vietnam War the active and reserve components were structured in a way that ensured that any long-term, major war would require the participation of reservists from units throughout the United States. The idea was to ensure national support of any major conflict and to make the use of the military without that support more difficult politically. The concept of the Guard and Reserve as a strategic reserve force for the United States has been altered today by the sustained operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the globe. It is now more accurate to say that the Reserve and Guard are an “operational,” as opposed to a strategic, reserve, the difference being that they must deploy more often and more quickly than previously expected.

What is the Status of Recruiting?

Soldiers are not in the Army. Soldiers are the Army.

—Gen. Creighton Abrams

Recruiting means bringing new men and women into the army, replenishing the lower ranks thinned by departure, promotion, and, in times of war, combat losses. By the end of fiscal year 2005, the Army’s three main components—the active Army, the Reserve, and the National Guard—had all fallen short of their recruitment targets. The Army had recruited 73,373 people into the active component, 92 percent of the goal. The Reserve had received 23,859 new recruits, 84 percent of its goal. The National Guard had done the poorest of the three, bringing in 80 percent (50,219) of its goal. Should we be alarmed at these numbers? According to the Army’s senior uniformed officer, General Peter Schoomaker, the figures represent the most serious recruiting challenge facing the Army in over a decade, a challenge he predicted would likely continue into 2006.

No one argues that the war in Iraq has not had a negative effect on the number of young Americans willing to join the Army. Surveys show that among those contacted about service in the Army, the main reason cited for declining to enlist is the war in Iraq. Research firm Millward Brown notes that the Iraq situation is increasingly the basis for not considering military service, and GfK Custom Research says that the fear factor is twice as strong among today’s recruits as it was in 2000.

As General Schoomaker reminded Congress in June 2005, recruiting enough young men and women into the Armed Forces is not just an Army problem; it is the nation’s responsibility to raise the Army it needs. However, among the Army’s leadership, there is no doubt where the buck stops when it comes to fixing the current recruiting shortfalls. In 2005 the United States Army spent 1.3 billion dollars on recruiting. The Army’s recruiting operation is so important, in fact, that a separate command—the U.S. Army Recruiting Command—exists to manage and execute the work of recruiting for both active and reserve forces.
The U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC), headquartered at Fort Knox, Kentucky, consists of carefully selected and specially trained soldiers, sergeants, officers, and civilians, whose mission is to find and enlist young men and women. Specifically, recruiters look for young people to serve in the Army’s active component, as full-time soldiers, or in the reserve component, as part-time soldiers, unless and until they are mobilized to active duty. USAREC recruiters are organized into five brigades covering fifty states and five overseas locations: Germany, Guam, Japan, Korea, and Puerto Rico. There are over 13,000 Army and National Guard recruiters working out of over 1,600 recruiting stations. According USAREC mission statement:

The United States Army Recruiting Command recruits Soldiers, both officers and enlisted, to meet the needs of an expeditionary Army, begins the transformation from civilian to Soldier, acts as the Army’s liaison with the American people, and does all with integrity and a professionalism that clearly demonstrates the warrior ethos and Army values. We remain relevant and ready to provide the strength for our Army, today and into the future.

Missing the recruitment goal has both long-range and immediate impacts. In the long run, lower numbers mean a smaller pool of sergeants from which to select future senior noncommissioned officer (NCO) leaders. It is an immediate issue in the sense that the Army is now short of the junior soldiers who conduct patrols and operate equipment. A shortfall of 7,000 recruits, as in 2005, represents the junior-enlisted manning for two to three brigades and could result in cadre-led units where only the senior leadership is present. If the Army cannot man all its maneuver brigades, existing brigades will rotate longer and more often to overseas missions.

The most recent figures on recruiting, though, indicate that the Army may be closing the recruiting gap. In 2006 the Army must recruit 80,000 new people into the active component and 25,500 into the reserve component. The National Guard must bring in an additional 70,000 troops. The enlistment numbers for the month of September, the last of the 2005 fiscal year, showed that the active and reserve Army had exceeded their recruiting goals, while the Guard came close (98 percent). The numbers for the start of fiscal year 2006 are also encouraging, with all components of the Army exceeding their goals in the first three months.

Is the Army Lowering Standards to Solve Its Recruiting Problems?

Discussions about recruiting standards can be as confusing as debates about global warming: the facts are not in dispute, but their interpretation is. Congress sets minimum standards for entry into the Armed Services (citizenship, education, age, health, etc.), but the Defense Department, Army, and other branches of service have established their own policies—usually with more demanding standards—within the congressional limits. The Army has not lowered the standards set by Congress, but it does adjust its own self-imposed standards from time to time. This, however, does not mean the Army is bringing in unqualified recruits.

Take, for example, the educational standard for entry into the Army. According to the U.S. Congressional Code, “…of the males with no prior military service who are enlisted or inducted into the Army during any fiscal year, the number who are not high school graduates may not exceed, at the end of the fiscal year, 35 percent of all such persons.” The Army’s
requirements are much higher than those set by Congress. For entry one must have either a high school diploma or a general equivalency diploma (GED). The Army’s goal is that at least 90 percent of recruits would have high school diplomas and no more than 10 to 15 percent would have a GED. In 2005, 87 percent of the new recruits entering the active component had high school diplomas (89 percent for the reserves). The remaining recruits all had GEDs.

Another example is the score new recruits must get on the mandatory Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery—Armed Forces Qualification Test (ASVAB-AFQT). The AFQT measures “trainability” and compares the score of the new recruit with the score of a control group of young adults taken in 1980. A score of 50 means the examinee scored better than 50 percent of those who took the control test in 1980. Congress has mandated that no one who scores below the 10th percentile be admitted into the Armed Forces and that only 20 percent of those scoring below the 31st percentile be eligible for admission. The Army, however, requires recruits to score in the 31st percentile or better, although some waivers have been granted for those scoring as low as the 26th percentile. Even higher scores are required for more technical jobs, such as signal corpsman or engineer. Additionally, a new recruit must score 50 or better on the test to be eligible for an enlistment bonus.

An interesting point is that the ASVAB-AFQT was “re-normed” in 2004 to account for the fact that “…scores [among today’s youth] on educational achievement tests such as the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) are up [from 1980].” The average student today is in fact doing better than twenty years ago. As a result, the Coast Guard lowered the minimum allowable score for its new recruits, from 40 to 36. The Army has not. Today’s enlistees must do better on the exam than their predecessors in the 1980s and 1990s. If the Army does reduce the minimum test score in the future, any claims of lowered standards should be judged in the context of the changed AFQT norms.

The U.S. Code for armed service requires that anyone admitted into the Armed Services be an American citizen or permanent resident at least 18 years of age (17 with a guardian’s permission) and be neither an insane person, a felon, nor former deserter. Department of Defense policy (not law) establishes the maximum age for recruits at 34, but the Army has received permission from DOD to conduct a trial of extending to 40 the age of new recruits into the Army Reserve. This change, if adopted after the three-year trial, would apply only to the Reserve and is intended to widen the pool of available recruits.

The Army has a vested interest in maintaining high standards for enlistment, and while pressure to meet goals can cause some recruiters to cut corners, the standards for graduation from basic training and for retention act to weed out unqualified recruits.

Do We Need a Draft If We Can’t Meet Our Recruiting Goals?

Do we need a draft? The short answer is no. In October 2004 Congress considered a bill introduced by Representative Charles Rangel to reinstate the draft. It was voted down 402–2. The question of whether to man our military with a draft is really a philosophical one and not one driven by necessity. After the experience of Vietnam our nation chose to move to a volunteer system, which has been rightly credited as a fundamental reason for the quality of our current force. However, the draft army of World War II was also, by the end of the war, a highly capable army, and there is no reason we could not make a quality force from a mixture of draft
and volunteer servicemen and servicewomen. The German Army, a highly respected force, for example, was manned during the Cold War by both conscripts and volunteers.

Mandatory service is championed by some as a means of ensuring that all who benefit from the freedoms of a country contribute to its protection. However, the changes which would have to be made to reintroduce a conscription force would be significant and would force major change in how the Army itself trains and fights. A draft would address only the recruiting aspect of our manpower system, an aspect that is not fundamentally broken. It would do little or nothing for retention or mobilization. Frankly, the gap in recruiting would have to be much wider and last much longer to force a change from our volunteer system.

Stop-Loss: A Backdoor Draft?

Stop-loss is a policy that prevents soldiers whose enlistment ends during the period of a deployment from leaving the unit while it is still deployed. Stop-loss has nothing to do with resolving recruiting shortfalls or boosting numbers. It is a command tool which improves the readiness of deployed units. Soldiers affected by stop-loss are usually discharged soon after the unit has completed its mission and redeployed to its home station.

What is the Status of Retention?

Failure to keep in uniform those quality men and women who have already been trained and educated would pose the greatest danger to our professional Army in the long run. Retention has been a strongpoint for the Army over time, an indicator of general satisfaction among the troops and their families with life in the Army. The goal for retention of active-component soldiers was exceeded in 2005, with 69,512 troops reenlisting—5,350 more than required. The Army Reserve retained 102 percent of its target of 16,485, and the National Guard surpassed its goal of 33,804 by 1,233. Despite these numbers, the Army’s leadership watches retention trends closely for any signs that service people may begin departing in unexpected numbers.

Retention is a broad term which encompasses different trend lines and populations. Figures such as those quoted above usually refer to the gross number of reenlistments by soldiers and sergeants—enlisted personnel, that is, those who serve for a contracted period of time. The numbers can be broken down by rank and specialty but generally are not when published for the mass media. The gross numbers can inadvertently hide some important details. For example, a Government Accounting Office (GAO) report in 2005 noted that although the Army was meeting its overall retention goals, 65 percent of the specialties (jobs) had more people than needed and 35 percent had too few.

As noted above, retention figures generally do not include officer statistics. Officers serve on an “indefinite” status, meaning that they continue to serve until they ask to separate or reach a mandatory retirement date. Attrition among junior officers is closely watched by the Army, because the departure of too many junior officers could threaten the health of small units and the force’s future senior leadership. Rand Corporation determined that, up until 2002, frequent deployments had not caused reduced retention among junior officers. In fact, immediately
following 9/11, the retention rates for junior officers rose. However, between 2003 and 2005 about 10.7 percent of junior officers left the Army—about its pre-9/11 level. Although the success of enlisted retention helped offset some of the damage from the recruiting gaps in 2005, the achievement may have been costly. During 2005 as the Army struggled with recruiting shortages it also began to encounter retention problems. As a result, in May, the Army included among those eligible for reenlistment not just the normal group of soldiers whose enlistment was up in the next 12 months but also those whose service would expire as far out as 24 months. In addition, soldiers deployed in Afghanistan, Kuwait, or Iraq were permitted to reenlist regardless of when their service contract was due to expire. While almost all soldiers receive a bonus for reenlisting, those who reenlist while serving overseas in a war zone get their bonuses tax free, making reenlistment very popular among this group. The resulting surge of reenlistments put the Army over its goal for 2005, but it remains to be seen what impact that will have on reenlistments in 2006 and 2007.

The impact of the war in Iraq on retention has not yet been fully understood. Trends in retention are what the experts call “trailing indicators.” In other words, by the time it becomes clear that soldiers or officers might be leaving, they have already gone. The fact that so far the retention rates among junior officers and enlisted personnel have met or exceeded projections testifies both to the patriotism of our service people and to the strength of the Army as an institution.

However, the Army may have sown the seeds for a retention problem back in 2003/2004 with the decision to go with one-year rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan rather than six-month tours. As it became more likely that the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan might continue for several years, the Army Operations strategic planning staff struggled with a double-edged problem. All conventional wisdom and experience indicated that a shorter six-month tour was important to the retention of troops. The Marine Corps, in fact, chose that path, as have most coalition partners. But the Army, much more than the Marines, depended on the continued presence of its reserves and National Guard forces. Data clearly showed that, if reservists and active-component units were mobilized only for six-month deployments, the Army would eat through its reserves in just a couple of years. In order to extend the presence of vital reserve units in the conflict, the Army accepted risk in the stress its longer deployments might cause. Up to now the decision has paid off, but the next 18 months will be critical.

What Role Does Mobilization of Reserves and National Guard play?

Mobilization is the mechanism by which the reserves are made available to fight alongside their active-component comrades. The ability to mobilize forces when necessary has the most immediate impact on the War on Terror. In the winter of 2003–2004 the strategic planning division of the Army Operations Directorate, within the Pentagon, grappled with an emerging realization: the need for ground troops in Iraq was growing—not shrinking, as anticipated. As the Army’s war plans staff, the “Harvard Captains” and “Iron Majors” (so called because of their specialized training and long work hours) counted up the pool of useable units and projected several years of rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan, they laid out a disturbing fact: the Army would run out of deployable reserve and National Guard forces within a few rotations. If rotations lasted six months the units would be exhausted twice as fast as if rotations lasted a year.
The decision to require one-year deployments was driven by manpower considerations; specifically, mobilization concerns trumped concerns about the impact of one-year tours on retention. The decision bought the Army and policymakers a couple more years of flexibility, which are now about to run out.

The “reserves” is a broad term encompassing both the Army Reserve and the National Guard. It is composed of units at a lower state of readiness, normally training once each month and for an extended two-week period each year. Maintaining a portion of the military’s force in the reserves reduces defense expenditures while retaining important capabilities. For the most part, units in the reserves are duplicates of those in the active component and provide the strategic depth for a large-scale or lengthy conflict. In some cases, however, the majority of those with a specific skill or capability—such as civil affairs or military police—reside in the reserves. While the active-component units are fighting the initial battles, most reserve units gather, mobilize, train, and deploy as follow-on supporting forces. About 62,000 members of the 205,000 Army Reserve component are currently mobilized and deployed around the world. According to the Chief of the National Guard, Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, about one-third of the Guard’s 350,000-member force had been mobilized as of January 2005.

The Defense Manpower and Data Center notes that by the end of fiscal year 2004 almost one-third (32 percent) of active and reserve personnel deployed on combat missions overseas had already been deployed more than once. Half of all active duty personnel have been deployed at least once since September 11, 2001. Less than two years after its last deployment, the 4th Infantry Division, whose soldiers deployed for the Iraq War and apprehended Saddam Hussein during their year of occupation duty, is returning to Iraq. Those statistics would have been far higher had the National Guard and Army Reserve not deployed such significant numbers. The Army Reserve, which consists primarily of support troops, and the National Guard, primarily combat troops, together counted for nearly 50 percent of the 150,000 troops in Iraq in January 2005. Some overseas missions, such as the stabilization forces in the Balkans, are handled entirely by the Guard and Reserve. Because of these extensive deployments, most of the Guard and Reserve are no longer available to be called up for duty. Unlike active-component units, like the 4th Division, which can be easily redeployed when needed, the reserves cannot be easily remobilized. The Guard says it has about 86,000 soldiers left for deployments—fewer than it has sent to Iraq in the previous two years. The Reserve has about 18 percent (37,500) of its force left.

In December 2004, Army Reserve Chief Lieutenant General James R. Helmly sent a memo to the Army’s senior officer in which he anticipated the trends in deployment coupled with the problems with mobilization: “The purpose of this memorandum is to inform you of the Army Reserve’s inability—under current policies, procedures, and practices governing mobilization, training, and reserve-component manpower management—to meet mission requirements associated with Operation Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom and to reset and regenerate its forces for follow-on and future missions.” LTG Helmly’s complaint was not that he didn’t have enough soldiers in the Reserve, but that mobilization policies and practices were preventing him from getting access to them. “The Army Reserve is hamstrung in its ability to effectively manage its force,” he said. To understand why LTG Helmly was frustrated, we can examine the mobilization process.

ii For a discussion of the relationship between the Reserve and the active Army see the additional reading section at the end of this paper.
The secretary of defense is authorized by the president to mobilize reservists and deploy them to Iraq by Title 10 of the US Code.iii This section of the US Code allows for reservists to be mobilized when the president has declared a national emergency, such as he did after September 11th. This authority limits the number of call-ups to one million and restricts the length of active duty to 24 consecutive months. It does not, however, provide guidance to the Defense Department on how to manage the mobilizations. That guidance is contained in DOD policies, and these policies both facilitate and hinder the Reserve’s ability to mobilize the right soldiers.

One example which illustrates the complexity of mobilization policy is the problem that troubled the Harvard Captains in 2003. Once a reservist has been mobilized and then demobilized, DOD policy prevents him or her from being mobilized again for at least 5 years. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, to remobilize that particular soldier for the current effort. In the initial reaction to 9/11, many reservists were mobilized and sent to airports and other sensitive areas within the country to bolster security. Often these reservists served for less than a year before being demobilized. Despite the growing demand for reservists to go to Iraq, DOD policy precluded tapping these personnel who were mobilized early on. Eventually, demand for troops became so great that DOD allowed the Army to remobilize selected reservists—as long as they volunteered for remobilization and their cumulative (not consecutive) service did not exceed 24 months. Now, though, the Army has begun to ask that some units be involuntarily remobilized, because it lacks volunteers in certain specialties.45

LTG Helmy’s December 2004 memo specifically mentioned the 24-month cumulative cap as being bad for unit cohesion. The cap frequently forces units mobilized for an upcoming rotation to find substitutes for personnel who, having previously accrued mobilization time, cannot serve for the unit’s full deployment. What often results is a unit that arrives at its mobilization station having never trained together before. A strict interpretation of Title 10 would allow the Army to remobilize a soldier and use him or her for 24 consecutive months, as long as that soldier hadn’t previously served a full, consecutive two years. Theoretically, a reservist could be mobilized, serve for 23 months, be demobilized, and then be called back again an infinite number of times, each time for 23 months. No one advocates this position, and everyone recognizes the need to find a fair and equitable policy. But the fact remains that, as the GAO said in September 2004, given the problems in mobilization the Department of Defense could conceivably “run out of forces.”46

If the assessments of LTG Helmy are correct, and the number of troops required overseas does not come down drastically, the Guard and reserves will not have troops of the right number and kind for rotations being planned for 2006 and 2007. This shortage will force changes in policy that will either significantly reduce the military presence in Iraq or remobilize many personnel who have already served a full tour overseas. It could also limit the nation’s ability to deploy reservists to new conflicts that may arise in the next several years.

**Conclusion**

“What keeps me awake at night is, what will this all-volunteer force look like in 2007?”

—General Dick Cody, vice chief of staff, U.S. Army

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iii The vast majority of reservists are currently called up under Paragraph 1209, Part II, Subtitle E, of Title 10, in what is commonly known as a partial mobilization.
The war in Iraq and the global war on terror have shown us that our manpower system is not well equipped to conduct lengthy, high-intensity operations of the magnitude we see today. Of the three aspects of manpower, recruiting is an important challenge, but one which the Army has “fixed” before and for which proven solutions exist. Failure in the second component, retention, could be most dangerous for the long-term health of the professional Army, because there is no source to replace experienced military tacticians, logisticians, or leaders. Mobilization problems, however, pose the most immediate threat to our success in the War on Terror and limit the flexibility policymakers need to design strategies for the future.

The high tempo of the War on Terror, especially in Iraq, has illuminated the inefficiency of our Cold War mobilization policies for prolonged combat and reconstruction operations. The Army and Defense Department recognize this problem and are working to correct it. For example, the Army has developed the Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN), a new process for generating active and reserve forces that promises improved regularity and predictability to soldiers and units. General Schoomaker told Congress that 80 percent of the model will be instituted by 2006. But the fruits of those changes will probably not come in time to provide the reserve forces the Army needs for the next few rotations.

The manpower system both enables and limits what the Army can do. Its impact is felt not only by the Army but is reflected in U.S. policy and strategy choices around the globe. The system is in crisis, but it is fixable. The answer to General Cody’s question—what will our volunteer force look like in 2007?—will depend on how successful we are in fixing our manpower system.
Sources for Understanding Army Manpower

Following are some suggested items for use in further research on Army manpower.

Books


Institutes

**Rand Corporation**
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decision-making through research and analysis. See also Rand Arroyo Center, the U.S. Army's only federally funded research and development center. RAND Arroyo Center conducts objective analytic research on major policy concerns, with an emphasis on mid- to long-term policy issues; helps the Army improve effectiveness and efficiency; and provides short-term assistance on urgent problems. www.rand.org/

**U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences**
ARI is one of the lead research institutes for training, leader development, soldier research, and development. The institute handles survey research and occupational analysis. ARI provides the Army with technical expertise and analytical support, along with decision-making techniques for soldiers and leaders. ARI keeps track of information on soldier and leader attitudes and concerns. The employees range from research psychologists to PhDs, military officers, and graduate students acting as research assistants (taken from ARI’s website). //www.hqda.army.mil/ari/

**Legal Information Institute (LII)**
The Legal Information Institute (LII) is an internationally known nonprofit organization under Cornell Law School that provides of public legal information. The web site has the law regarding the United States military, Title 10.
www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode10/usc_sup_01_10.html
Articles/Publications


Congressional Testimony

Congressional hearings held by the Armed Services Committee of the Senate or House of Representatives are good sources of facts and figures on topical issues.

Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Airland Forces Subcommittee.

Subject: Army Transformation.

Chaired by Senator John McCain (R-AZ), March 16, 2005.

Witnesses: Claude M. Bolton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, General Richard A Cody, USA, Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, Paul J. Francis, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, GAO, David R. Graham, Dep Director, Strategy Forces and Resources Division, Institute for Defense Analysis, Kenneth F. Boehm, Chairman, National Legal and Policy Center.

Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Subject: Military Strategy and Operations in Iraq.

Chaired by Senator John Warner (R-VA), June 23, 2005.
Witnesses: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld; General Richard B. Myers, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; General John Abazaid, Commander, U.S. Central Command; General George Casey, Commander, Multinational Forces Iraq.

Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Subject: Status of the US Army and Marine Corps in Fighting the Global War on Terrorism.
Chair by: Senator John Warner (R-VA), June 30, 2005.
Witnesses: David SC Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for personnel and Readiness, Charles S. Abell, Principal Dep Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Gen Richard B. Myers, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, US Army, Gen Michael W. Hagee, Commandant, US Marine Corps.

Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Subject: Improving Security in Iraq.
Chair by: Senator Richard G. Lugar (R-IN), July 18, 2005.
Witnesses: Dr. Kenneth M. Pollack, Director of Research and Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution: General Barry R. McCaffrey, President, BR McCaffrey Associates, LLC; Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair for Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Other

Department of Defense Issuances & OSD Administrative Instructions.
The Web site is a useful resource for those searching for DOD issuances and directive-type memorandums. http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives

Department of Defense Home Page
Defenselink, the DOD home page contains information on military topics and links to key sights such as the National Guard and the Army Reserve. Register to receive news releases via e-mail. www.defenselink.mil

Globalsecurity.org Home Page
This web site tracks numerous facts and statistics on manpower and other military issues. www.globalsecurity.org/index.html
Endnotes

3 Author’s Note. There can be debate over the characterization of the manpower situation as a crisis. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (© 2000) defines “crisis” as: a. A crucial or decisive point or situation; a turning point. b. An unstable condition, as in political, social, or economic affairs, involving an impending abrupt or decisive change.
6 US Code Title 10, Subtitle A, Part II, Chapter 39, Section 691
7 Harvey, Francis Secretary of Army. AUSA Speech, 3 Oct 2005
8 Schoomaker, Peter J. Gen. Hearing of Senate Armed Services Committee, 30 June 2005. (According to testimony by Gen R. Cody, the total number on active duty in November 2005, which includes mobilized reservists and those held beyond their separation date by stop-loss, exceeded 650,000 in March 2005. Senate Armed Services Hearing, 16 Mar 2005.)
9 Information Paper: Recruiting Update. DAPE-MPA, 7 October 2005
11 Army National Guard Home Page. (http://www.arng.army.mil/)
12 Crawley, Vince. Guard Chief Seeks $15,000 bonuses. Army Times, 7 Feb 2005.
13 Abrams Creighton, quoted in A Better War by Lewis Sorley. Pg 370. (Harcourt, Inc. 1999)
16 Tyson, Ann Scott. Two Years Later, Iraq War Drains Military. NY Times, 19 Mar 2005
20 Note: The National Guard recruits separately, primarily from inside the state in which units are located. The Guard has traditionally relied heavily on soldiers leaving the active component to join the Guard in their home state.
21 USAREC Home Page. Recruiting stations exist in United States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and at U.S. facilities in Germany and Asia. (http://www.usarec.army.mil/)
22 USAREC Home Page. (http://www.usarec.army.mil/)
23 Information Paper: Recruiting Update. DAPE-MPA, 7 October 2005
26 US Code Title 10, subtitle B, Part II, chapter 333, para 3262
27 Information Paper: Recruiting Update. DAPE-MPA, 7 October 2005
28 Note: For a good explanation of how the ASVAB-AFQT works visit About.com and select military.
30 US Code Title 10, subtitle B, Part II, chapter 31 and 333
32 Moniz, Dave. House overwhelmingly stombs out bill that would’ve reinstated draft. USA Today, 5 Oct 2005.
36 Moniz, Dave. Incentives beefed up to keep young officers in the Army. USA Today, 6 Nov 2005.
MILPER Message: 05-121, FY05 Retention Program Update, 05/12/2005 at Army Human Resources Web Site (https://perscomnd04.army.mil/milpermsgs.nsf)

Author’s Note. I was the Director of DAMO-SS which was responsible for staffing the decision on tour lengths and was one of the Army leaders pushing for one-year tours.


Crawley, Vince. Guard Chief Seeks $15,000 bonuses. Army Times, 7 Feb 2005.

Crawley, Vince. 1 Million Served; One third of 969,301 troops deployed more than once. Army Times, 24 Jan 2005.


Schmitt, Eric. Army Reserve hamstrung by its Policies. NY Times, 6 Jan 2005. (see also endnote 6)

Schmitt, Eric. Army Reserve hamstrung by its Policies. NY Times, 6 Jan 2005. (see also endnote 6)

Chu, David SC. Hearing of Senate Armed Services Committee, 30 Jun 2005. Dr Chua testified that one unit had been involuntarily remobilized for duty in Iraq.

Schmitt, Eric. Army Reserve hamstrung by its Policies. NY Times, 6 Jan 2005. (see also endnote 6)
