<u>HARVARD UNIVERSITY</u>

JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT

JOAN SHORENSTEIN CENTER ON THE PRESS, POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY

EXECUTIVE SESSION ON DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS

TERRORISM AT HOME: CHALLENGES FOR THE MEDIA COVERING AMERICA'S SECURITY

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Kennedy Room Charles Pavilion Charles Hotel Cambridge, Massachusetts

BEFORE: FRANK HARTMANN

Executive Director

Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management

Kennedy School of Government

79 JFK Street

Cambridge, MA 02138

ALEX JONES

Joan Shorenstein Center on Press, Politics

and Public Policy

Kennedy School of Government

79 JFK Street

Cambridge, MA 02138

ARN HOWITT

Executive Director

Taubman Center for State and Local Government

Kennedy School of Government

79 JFK Street

ADVANCE SERVICES Franklin, Massachusetts (508) 520-2076

<u>EVENING</u> <u>SESSION</u>

6:36 p.m.

MR. HARTMANN: This is an idea that really is born in the work of the Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness. For us an executive session is an ongoing working group dominated by practitioners in which we try to pull down, off to the side, three or four days at a time, a few times a year, and in which there is some synergy they can listen to each other, and we can listen to them and say what are the lessons here.

And we started the Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness, I guess, almost four years ago. And it was interesting that the very first work that we did was trying to anticipate what laws we might want if, in fact, we were, when we were, not if we were, we always operated on the premise that we didn't know where and when, but it wasn't whether, we were going to. But when we tried to go through that exercise of what laws do we want it never had the bite that Samuel Johnson talked about when he said there's nothing that gets a man's attention so immediately as the prospect of being hanged tomorrow, and so it lacked an urgency. But after 9/11 the urgency came with a vengeance.

We had several journalists in and out of

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that meeting, in and out of those working meetings, but there wasn't a consistent presence of journalists and that was a lack in some ways. That was a vacuum because there's no question that journalists are an essential part of the way the American public learns, thinks, is educated, forms opinions. And so it was out of the executive session, and the journalists who were not there, in sort of a core fashion, that people said why don't we try to actually pull together a group of first responders and journalists in a way that we could try and understand each other a little bit better, and anticipate in a way that didn't fully work with regard to laws, because there wasn't the urgency, how you might talk to each other, how you might work with each other.

We began this meeting with the premise that all the journalists now, certainly American journalists, are likely, or may well experience acts of war, that is acts of terrorism. Journalists in this sense are now, in some manner or fashion, domestic war correspondents as might have happened in the Civil War. So war correspondent, that's a different nature with the burdens and the questions, and the responsibilities that are adherent in a war correspondent. And the first responders go on in a very essential way to take

on a much broader and greater responsibilities than they ever have in the past. But in a time of great uncertainty what is it we're being asked to do. Where are the resources and, in fact, without probably sufficient training and knowledge.

And so it's a time of uncertainty on both sides, and yet if either of you tries to work without the other it's a two-legged milking stool in many ways. You say it's not likely to stand up or to do the job that we ask it to do, and yet as we bring you together, and knowing that there is need for somehow a better working relationship, I have to think that in our group here there are people who have experienced, maybe many or all, who would say damn, if only those guys would share information with us. You just can't trust them.

And then on the other side you hear maybe, damn, if only those guys would get the story straight. You just can't trust them. And so there's a wariness that we shouldn't sort of pretend doesn't exist because there are different jobs and different sets of responsibilities. But within that context is it possible to talk, to listen to each other, and work forward to some principles, in advance, not in the midst of a crisis.

During the working conversation, mostly

tomorrow, we don't want you to abandon your principles or your concerns, or your experiences. We want you to bring them to that conversation, but we would like all of you to take time to find better ways in which you can work together to save lives, possibly including each others. We hope that by the end of tomorrow we'll have begun to arrive at specific actions that both the media and first responders all over the country can take to generate cooperation between you.

It's conceivable that what's at stake here, it sounds dramatic, but it's quite conceivable that literally life and death could be an issue in certain cities if communication is correct and right. And we want to begin our conversation, half informally, by going around the room and asking each of you, not the Harvard people, the Harvard people can say I'm Frank Hartmann, I'm from Kennedy School, that's enough; amazing power to keep Harvard people saying only that. (Laughter)

MR. HARTMANN: But the rest of you, for the rest of you, we really ask you to prepare a little bit an anecdote that might illustrate for you what's at stake in this relationship. What principles and issues are at stake.

So, I'm actually going to be fairly

compulsive in terms of keeping you to two-plus minutes and in fact when you, I've got a stop watch, and when you're at your two minutes, I'm going to say two minutes; and when you're at one minute, I'm going to say one minute, and then I'm going to say please wrap up. I'd be a lot happier person if I didn't have to use these signs.

So, let's begin. Our role model,

Kathleen. Why don't you begin us and we'll work to

your right, around two-plus minutes, and we're trying

to hear from you, principles of, basically via an

anecdote, about what you think is at stake here in this

relationship between first responders and the media.

Kathleen.

MS. TOOMEY: I'm the Georgia State Health Officer which means I run the other public health agency in Atlanta, and it means I keep CDC running because we keep the CDC employees healthy.

There is, without a doubt, the single most disturbing experience I had, post-the anthrax situation, was an anthrax event at Fort Mack, which is a military facility fairly near the airport. I found out about it on Friday evening, sitting at my desk, when somebody from out of state called one of my staff to tell me, to tell him that CNN is broadcasting an

anthrax situation in Fort Mack, the facility near me. I knew nothing about it.

I turned on CNN. I saw people being hosed down which is not the protocol, that I had worked so hard to get out to first responders across the state. And I think that's the piece that's so important is I had really spent virtually 100 percent of my time reaching out to first responders to try to get information about the public health role in bioterrorism, but particularly how these protocols should evolve.

And when we couldn't get any information. We couldn't get on top of it. We found out later that, in fact, it was, even though the test was initially read as positive, it was misread. The control positive was read a positive, as a true positive, as this unfolded and my real concern was because our protocol didn't call for hosing down, we were setting up this situation with the public, with expectations that if they felt if they had an anthrax letter, they would want to get hosed down or there would be a two-tiered response.

And so I felt that we were really in a terrible dilemma. CDC was unaware of the event, and they were also trying to figure out what was going on,

so that we couldn't get a handle on it. I was eventually cornered by a reporter several days later and asked, and told what I thought had happened, not trying to be critical at all of the fire and other first responders involved in the event, but he tried to get the information out, but this wasn't the appropriate way to respond. In fact, how that was clipped, came out sounding very, very negative, both of the military and first responders in general. It took me quite some time to develop, again, the strong rapport that I'd had built so assiduously over the prior months, and it was very disturbing.

MR. LANZA: Hello, I'm Chuck Lanza. Until three weeks ago I was the director of the Miami Dade Country Office of Emergency Management, and I have a 25-year career in public safety, specifically the fire service. I have two stories I'd like to relate, both of them dealing with my job as emergency manager.

The first one is I've always referred to myself as the county's pessimist. It's my job to always be pessimistic and think of the worst case scenarios so that when they happen we're not surprised. So over the last eight years I've read everything there is on terrorism, and felt very comfortable, especially with anthrax, that when we were starting to get

information out of AMI and Palm Beach at, well, it probably was not what we thought it was because everybody was telling me the Department of Health was telling hey, look, downplay this, it's not that big a deal, it's probably not anthrax. And I kept with the party line on that for quite awhile, and then was surprised when low and behold it turned out to be anthrax. And I was sitting there saying well, I thought I was right but I wasn't.

Diana Gonzales from NBC-6, Ike Seamans' colleague, we worked very closely on that because soon after that we had a full blown anthrax scare, and I'm sure everybody in the nation suffered the same thing with numerous calls for fire-rescue services. But what happened with that is, being open-minded, we were out there trying to share information, but we found, and I think there's a quote going around now that old generals never die, they just go work for CNN. (Laughter)

MR. SEAMANS: They're embedded.

MR. LANZA: They're all over the place.

Similar things happened during anthrax, that the media went out, and I think it was probably local, state, and federal officials were not as good at getting out, and getting the message out that they went

to so-called experts. They weren't the generals, but they other people who had like web sites that, some of them were: Are Bugs Bugging You: Call Me, and they were, people that were sometimes on the fringe that saw con-trails and thought they were chem-trails in the sky, and they were the ones that were being interviewed. So they were hyping up the anthrax situation in our community to the point that even my mother called and said Chuck, I need gloves. And I said what do you need gloves for? Well, I'm getting my mail, I can't take a chance. I said Mom, I don't think the terrorists are out there to get Sadie Lanza. (Laughter)

MR. LANZA: But just in case I'll give you some gloves.

But it did snowball until we got out, and went to every one of our media outlets. We had a small group of experts; local experts and some state experts. We went and sat down, and we talked to them about what the real threats of anthrax were, what the potential for our community was, and we were able to bring down the rhetoric significantly, and I believe calm the community. We have that same plan now if something happens.

We need to make sure that in government

we're sharing much more with the media than we have in the past. We never found enough, I don't think we were always afraid of them, I think it was a time limitation. When we're out there doing our first responder stuff we're not thinking of the media as part of our first response, and they really are the biggest part of our first response.

MS. MESERVE: I'm Jean Meserve from CNN, and I now know I was invited here to get beaten up. (Laughter)

MS. MESERVE: We are the hungry beasts. You all know we're 24 hours a day and we gobble up everything we can get, and we need information. We need it faster. I know a lot of the journalists here work for newspapers, they have deadlines that fall at specific times of the day. My deadline is every minute. I need to know what's happening now, and you have to get me information even if it's not complete. You may think I want to wait until I have the whole story, until I have the full complexion of what I'm dealing with; uh-uh. Give us pieces of information if you can, even that can be useful.

A particular case in point, the shuttle.

When the shuttle disintegrated over Texas, immediately everyone in my organization thought is it terrorism,

and the phone rang. I called the Department of Homeland Security and they were able to say, and this is rare for them I must say, but in short order they could say we have no particular reason to believe this is a terrorist act and, that was useful, but the and was even more important, it was out of the range of a shoulder fired missile. We could tell you now what it's not. And telling us what it's not takes down a whole lot of speculation which would have gone on for hours on my network had they not had the foresight to provide me with that piece of information.

There were dramatic pictures. Whenever there's a catastrophic event, be it a chemical plant in North Carolina that goes up in flames, or whether it's the closing of the Brooklyn Bridge three weeks ago because three drunken guys are staggering around on there, we're going to put those pictures on the air. And we've got to know as quickly as we can what you're dealing with. So, please, more information, sooner. That's my message.

MR. MORAN: Mike Moran from MSNBC. You may have seen yesterday, or the day before, that the National Institute of Health, or somebody came out with a report that said that more television viewing means that you're less healthy. I'd like to say that MSNBC

has the healthiest audience of all the cable news channels.

(Laughter)

MR. MORAN: We're thinking of spinning that into --. But actually I work for the dot.com mostly. I'm the senior producer for international and special reports.

And my anecdote has to do with September 11. I was on the George Washington Bridge when it happened and literally stopped in the middle, and saw, and was watching the first plume come from the first tower when the second one hit. And the traffic was stopped, and I was in typical traffic, and I was looking at it and recalling a story I'd done a few years ago about the '93 attack which had included the Lincoln Tunnel, the Holland Tunnel, the United Nations and the George Washington Bridge, and here I was stuck in the middle of it. And I thought to myself, I should just get out of my jeep and walk to New Jersey, this is stupid.

As it turned out the guys who worked for the Port Authority, the Port Authority Police, came out on the bridge. I was pretty insistent about getting into New York because there was already, you know, telephone communication with my newsroom, get in, get

in, get in, and they wouldn't let me in. I talked to them and was getting a little bit, kind of reporter ugly with them, when I realized they were crying because the Port Authority Headquarters was almost exactly where the first plane had hit. And I was just kind of, I realized it because I also -- I'm an Irish Catholic, come from New York. I mean I actually also was starting to compute that my little tribe was on its way over there too.

It was really an amazing thing. I suddenly became a human being talking to these guys, and we started, it was the best reporting I did all day. The rest of it was really just standing there in shock. But those moments gave me my piece of that day, and an important, human part of that story which was here were these guys stopping literally thousands and thousands of people from getting into New York on a day which could have been much worse. We didn't know what was unfolding at that point, and here was this wiseguy reporter trying to barrel his way in and pull rank. And I, at some point, stood back and it was one of the few times in my life when I really didn't just push.

I guess my anecdote is about talking to the people on the front line, not necessarily barreling in. I wish to God I'd gotten in, to this day. I tried

several times through the ferries in Jersey City, and I spent the whole day trying to get in, didn't. But what was more important to me, as it turns out, was those conversations on that bridge, those people.

MR. HARTMANN: Thank you, Mike.

MS. DRISCOLL: I'm Amy Driscoll. reporter at the Miami Herald and I'm here as a Nieman Fellow for the year. I covered 9/11 in New York, and I covered anthrax in Boca Raton in South Florida, and the discovery that the terrorists had been living in South Florida with us. So I was on the receiving end of Chuck Lanza's information, and he actually sent a, they sent a crew of people to come talk to us in the newsroom. You may have felt that you calmed us down but you scared the bejeezus out of us. They were describing what chemical weapons could do and it was informative but scary, but we appreciated that effort tremendously because at that time we were starved for information.

In that sense, also, I'd like to point out that newspapers are also 24 hours a day these days. We all have websites and we need that information too, not just television. And we also want it when you have it, not when you think it's complete, not when you think it's ready for us but when you've got it. My plea on

that is most government people are used to looking at the media as the enemy. That may be perfectly reasonable at times, but in times of crisis like anthrax or terrorism, and other forms, we serve the public in a way that nobody else can and so I think that's the time when government officials expect the extra effort.

I would also like to say that they should probably train some additional people to act as spokespeople for them. In the case of anthrax we had post offices that were reporting white powder all over the place. After a while you can't get the postal inspector on the phone, people are calling you and asking can I go to my post office, and you have no information to give them. That's a point at which we could really offer the public a service, and the lack of information prevents us from doing that. So, that is the essence of what I have to say.

MR. SAMUEL: I'm Terrence Samuel. I cover Congress for *U.S. News and World Report*, and I'm here at this semester as a Shorenstein Fellow.

I want to talk, I guess, a little bit about the crying and the being scared. I was talking to Tom Daschle a few months after 9/11 about the election in South Dakota which, at that point, was

being touted as the toughest election in the country. At some point I told him that I had been in his office the Friday the letter arrived, it was not the day it was opened, it was opened on Monday. And we started talking suddenly about what it felt like realizing, on his part, that somebody wanted to get you, and on my part almost being in a place, and suddenly there was kind of an empathy that doesn't always exist.

My mother was on a subway in New York when the first tower came down. And I think we live in a time, now, where fear is part of the equation, and it's not just fear that we write about a report on the fear that we feel. I think we need to deal with that in a slightly different way than we always have which is to say that we ought to pay attention again to objectivity which is about how you handle your own sympathies which is, I think I'm now talking about empathy here, which makes for better journalism, but sympathy which doesn't have any business in what we do, and we should keep it out and be careful to do that.

MS. CHANDLER: I'm Liz Chandler. I'm a reporter with the *Charlotte Observer*, and I have not yet covered a terrorist event, although I imagine I'll be a player at some point at one of these events.

My anecdote has to do with sort of, I

suppose the main disaster we end up covering in the Carolinas are hurricanes. My biggest concern when we are sort of shipped down the opposite direction of all the traffic that's evacuating is that we sort of get to the coast and all the emergency folks are at the bridges, and trying to sort of keep you out of the real eastern edge. And basically it can sometimes be a two hour sort of, you know, wait or five hour wait, or something to that effect. There seems to be almost no recognition either before or after the hurricane has swept in that, you know, we are front line trying to get information back.

My job is to get down and do sort of a blow by blow, beach by beach, you know, what's happened to people's property on the shore, and how many blocks back, and what is sort of the end result. What has resulted is we get sort of a difficult back and forth relationship. The journalists will take ridiculous chances, you know, get in boats and sort of try to cross over to some eastern tier, even going through waters where there are ridiculous waves, or wood, or whatever floating around. And I know that the emergency folks want to keep us out for a variety of reasons, but I wish there was a way we could respect, you know, that we would feel more respect for the job

we're trying to do.

MR. ADAIR: I'm Bill Adair. I'm a reporter at the Washington Bureau of the *St. Petersburg Times*. Two short anecdotes about chaos.

The first one is about covering 9/11. I was coming into the office that day, listening to the radio as I was driving in, actually saw what had happened. I was at a doctor's office, driving in, listening to the radio, and an all news station in Washington, WTOP, reporting that a car bomb had gone off in front of the State Department, that the USA Today building was on fire, which I guess Mindy knew first hand, being there, and a variety of other things that ultimately were not true. The truth was the first casualty of terrorism.

And it amazed me, as a print reporter, that they would just put this stuff out there without any verification, that it was: `We have reports of a car bomb has gone off in front of the State

Department.' And you know, gee, maybe you should check it out before you put it on the air guys.

Second anecdote also about chaos, but a slower chaos, I covered anthrax as it evolved over the first, I mean the whole way actually. St. Pete, like everybody, everybody else had its own connection. One

of the letters to Tom Brokaw had come from St. Pete, so we had been involved very early.

And I had been up on Capitol Hill for the initial press conferences when Daschle had gotten the letter, and was at Daschle's press conference when he talked about how he believe that, he had been told by the Capital police that the anthrax had been passed by people hugging. And I remember thinking at that moment, I'm standing here, you know, listening to this, and I don't know that I'm safe. It was amazing, and to have Daschle say that really hammered home how quickly this whole thing could be spread.

This was a day of total chaos when, as you may recall, the House had shut down and said we don't think it's safe. And Dennis Hastert had said we think that its been spread through the ventilation system so we're getting out of here. And the Senate, tough guys that they are, only elected every six years, they were sticking around, and they were showing, you know, that the government was still operating. And there was just this sense that nobody was in control, and this went of for days.

And then the next day the briefing was in the White House Briefing Room with Tommy Thompson and the guys from the CDC, and there was still this sense

that nobody was in charge, nobody really knew what was going on. I think the President was out of town, and Ari was gone, and it was like they had left the B team to sort of brief us on this.

And finally on day four, day five, there was a briefing with Ridge where suddenly there was a sense that somebody was in control but it took that long.

MS. WOLF: So many anecdotes, so little time, we're all feeling that way. Lindsey Wolf with the City of San Jose.

I've been a PIO for 35 years now, 16 years with San Jose. When I came there the mindset of the city was we've hired a PIO and they talked to me about being the person on point when you have a crisis. And they had a dedicated desk, and a dedicated phone in their emergency operations center. Today, 16 years later, we have 45 people in the city that we can field when we have a crisis, and they have their own dedicated phones and their own dedicated desks.

We had, in 1998, about five years ago, a full day drill on a chemical release in the city hall. We invited reporters to attend. We had about two dozen outlets that came and participated all day. The drill was so realistic that we actually had one reporter

faint dead away and had to be cared for in one of our ambulances. It was pretty realistic. We had about 20 PIOs there that day and, as I said, about 30 reporters, but that was five years ago.

In the last ten years San Jose has spent 10, no, the last ten years we've spent about \$4 million teaching people how to recycle. We've spent about \$40 thousand teaching people how to act and behave when there's a flood in downtown. We've spent very little money, mostly done through the news media, about how to do earthquake preparedness. The point is there's an awful lot of internal communication that we need to do among ourselves. A lot of work, probably 50 percent of my time is done in terms of training our staff, and our elected officials, and our executive staff, how to work with reporters. And it is a constant strain, and term limits haven't really made it any easier, sorry.

MS. DEMME: I'm Nancy Demme. I'm with the Montgomery County Police Department, and after reading Mr. Emerson's article I think that the one thing that really stood out is, and Jean you said it, the highly competitive, global market, 24/7 news, and the need to move quickly and get that information out.

During the sniper incident, the tarot card went out and it went out and said I am God, and that

was a piece of information that we needed so that when the bad person called in and said I am God, we knew we had the right person, but after that went out everybody was God. I mean they were all calling in wanting credit for it.

Our joint operation center was across the, it was across the parking lot actually, fourth floor. And at some point, it was very late one night, I came out and, I'll leave the name out, one of the networks called and said I want to confirm that there are six people under surveillance, white Ford written in red, and I just slammed the phone shut because where were they, I knew, I had just left the joint operation center. I go upstairs, I've searched the room, it's busy, it's a huge room, it's a couple of rooms basically, but I find it and I look around and there it There is something hanging on one of the blinds, and it's dropped down, and it's a quarter, you know, a half inch open, they have something up where they can see in what's going on. People were hiding in the bathrooms, hiding in the elevators, trying to get that extra one piece of news before everybody else. And it was compromising the investigation, and their safety, you know, the apprehension of these people and the public safety.

But a quick note on what Michael said, on the human aspect. The longer it went on, I think, the more the people in the Camp Rockville area, some were beginning to feel that they were potentially at risk as well. They would ask before they were about to put something out, do you think this will cause him to shoot. I mean they were concerned too, that they were the catalyst in what was going on in that situation.

MR. ODERMATT: Hi, I'm John Odermatt from New York City, OEM. I probably have your press pass-- (Laughter)

MR. ODERMATT: --I took from you.

Primarily after 9/11, I worked in 7 World Trade, and after getting dug out from underneath a truck, was responsible for the command center up at pier 92, for the most part those of you who covered it.

I've had a confusing career with the press particularly because I was an assistant chief with NYPD, and during crowd control and situations like that, I used to have to, I'm not going to say contain, or pen in, but we used to have to deal with them a lot in, you know, in trying to balance the level of access during those situations is very difficult. But during 9/11, I'm extremely complimentary towards the press simply because they were, I think, at that point in

time very responsible in reporting, very level-headed, and really didn't put out a lot of speculative information as opposed to being more helpful, especially during those times.

When anthrax occurred, again I'm complimentary, because we really needed their help. In fact, put in place with CDC, a system called point of dispensing, and we had the ability to mass treat people. What was different about it was that in terms of mass treating people a lot of speculative information went out that did not help us. So that's the reason that we weren't able to really release a lot of information about the letters.

And then finally, you know, as I developed and I became the commissioner of OEM, I really started to develop a deep sense of respect for the press up until the point where I had a meeting with all the executives, high executives of the year. That way I could take them into the fold and kind of get their assistance, and it was a very highly secretive meeting. And the next day in the paper, it wound up in the paper that, you know, the OEM commissioner had a highly secret meeting with the press. So you learn to become tempered, and once you become tempered you realize that you have to be careful what you say when in reality

there really are no secrets, but you do need the press, we continue to work with them.

MR. HARTMANN: Thank you, John.

MR. BLENDON: Bob Blendon, Kennedy School faculty.

MR. HARTMANN: Why don't we use that moment to actually go around the outside. We haven't heard from outside, Bob has given us the Harvard opening.

MR. JONES: I'm Alex Jones. I'm the Director of the Shorenstein center. I'm sorry I was late, I was in the hands of Delta Airlines.

(Laughter)

MR. JONES: Welcome. I'm very glad you all are here. A lot of people have been involved in putting this together but I want to just say personally how glad we are to have you, and how important we feel that this is.

The one thing that I wanted to mention is not one that is as vivid or dramatic as a moment on the bridge at 9/11, but it does bring home to me what this really is all about. I was very pleased to see that last spring, in the wake of 9/11, the Kennedy School, which has what they call a spring exercise, every year to make a very, not an exercise in a sort of phony

sense, it is a school-wide effort to do a serious piece of analysis about dealing with a public policy issue that all the first year students at Kennedy School take part in.

And the topic last year was an outbreak of smallpox, and what I found really astonishing was that at some point, and it was rather late in the game, they came to me and ask me to make a, you know, to talk to them about something, about the issue of the press in this kind of a situation. And this was, on the one hand, a bit of an afterthought because these were people who were talking about policy questions. They weren't thinking about the press.

But as I found myself speaking with them more, and making the, basically posing some of the questions, which is mainly my job to them, what I discovered was that the idea of what you do if there's an outbreak of smallpox, I mean if I said hypothetically, you are the administrator of a hospital, and you find that a doctor comes to you and says we have one case of smallpox, we think, maybe, what do you do? What do you do if it's two? What do you do if it's five? Who do you call? Do you let people know? Do you hide it from them? Do you try to protect them from themselves to avoid panic? Do you

let people know what the truth is so they can, theoretically, have some basis for making a judgment?

I know these are the kinds of things we're here to discuss. The think that I want to tell you is that these folks looked at me blankly. They had never even thought about it. And I think, frankly, one of the things that Peter has been very, very instrumental in bringing to our attention, and you know, to a larger attention, and we hope that this gathering will do as well, is that we need to think about these things at least in hypothetical terms. Obviously, the moment, when it comes, we'll have all of this, all kinds of unexpected elements. But it's very, very important to think as much as we can about what, not just what the procedural questions are but what the moral questions are about things like this.

So, thank you.

MR. EMERSON: I'm Peter Emerson, Kennedy School. Welcome.

MS. CHANG: I'm Patty Chang. I work with the Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness and Research.

MS. HOLWAY: Edie Holway, Shorenstein Center.

MS. PALMER: Nancy Palmer. I'm the

Executive Director of Shorenstein Center.

MR. HARTMANN: Don, let's turn back to you.

MR. HAMILTON: My name is Don Hamilton.

I'm Deputy Director of the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, in Oklahoma City. I started my professional life as a journalist, and then after six or seven years went bad and joined the foreign service, and ended up, I've spent almost my entire adult life either as a journalist or as a spokesman of one sort of another.

A couple of anecdotes comes to mind. The connection between journalists and their sources that has popped up at least twice under the radar rare thing, is that I thought a lot about that when I was the embassy spokesman in El Salvador in the `80s. I once made the observation that if you took all the reporting officers out of the embassy and moved them over to the Camino Royale Hotel, where most of the international press corps was, and put the reporters over in the embassy, it's quite likely that the editors and desk officers back in Washington, and New York, probably wouldn't notice the difference for several weeks because people came out of the same background, and had basically, basically the same world view, only

moderately affected by where they happened to sit.

The other anecdote that strikes me arose and was highlighted in the last executive session, which I was invited to attend, and honoring the off the record nature of that thing I'll just say that a number of people with histories as elected officials or as emergency managers is that they're actually getting frightened about running exercises, and then honestly reporting the results of those exercises because, as one former elected official said, what I'm thinking is when my police chief and fire chief come to me and say we ran this exercise, and we discovered we've got this problem, and that problem, and the other problem, I'm already thinking now what am I going to say when the media finds out what you've just told me.

That is, that part is a solvable problem. That's where your public information officers just have to go out and do their work long before the exercise begins and say exercises were designed to solve problems, and we're going to run this exercise, and we're going to find problems. If you do that there's a reasonable chance that only about 15 percent of the reporters who find out about this will then go for lurid headlines, "City Unprepared for"; but this is a serious running problem.

The other part of it that will probably require legislation to solve one way or another is the fear of tort actions. If you run an exercise and you honestly document, we have a vulnerability here and we've got to figure out something to do about it. And then in the real world of trying to run things, you say yeah, that's a real problem and we're going to fund it just as soon as we can, but something happens in the interim. And it's a matter of public record this is a known vulnerability that the jurisdiction did not address soon enough, then the tort lawyers line up right away.

MR. HARTMANN: Thank you, Don.

Don's raised an issue that I'd like to surface for us, and you'll notice that we're transcribing, and it is the rule of the Kennedy School as we transcribe this that our conversations are off the record; that no one, observers, participants, whomever, is allowed to quote anybody else, or attribute to anybody else a specific remark or opinion without that person's permission. So it's perfectly okay to ask and then to say well, can I Chuck, can I quote what you said. You have the right to say no.

On the other hand we also know that we have journalists here, we have people, the idea in a

conversation like this is not just to effect 35 people in the room, but clearly to be a pebble in a lake and say get the ripples out. So we would assume and hope that people are writing could have access to the transcript but observing the rules about quoting and attributing only with that person's specific permission. Because we want people to have wild thoughts in here too in terms of saying what if, and not to be hampered by the transcripts. We've never had that dishonored and we just take for granted that you won't dishonor that confidentiality either. Please.

MS. SEELYE: I'm Kit Seelye. I'm a reporter for the *New York Times* in Washington. I'm an IOP Fellow here this semester. I cover politics, and most of the disasters I've covered are presidential campaigns.

(Laughter)

MS. SEELYE: However, I live in Washington and, you know, like Bill, on September 11 and on the days of anthrax was deployed in various ways around that.

I couldn't agree with you more about the utter, utter chaos of elected officials, particularly, on the days when anthrax was building on the Hill.

I'll never forget this press conference when Denny

Hastert and some of the others are standing out in front of microphones, and you know, were asking them so is this weapons, you know, this is a word we've just learned, is this weapons grade anthrax. And half of them blurt out yes, and half of them blurt out no and, you know, what's a person to do. I mean it kind of becomes a political story then because, as you described, the House says, you know, this is, we can't live with this situation, and the Senate is saying oh, well, we're, you know, macho, and the Daily News, The New York Daily News comes out the next day with this huge headline that, a big picture of Denny Hastert saying weeps across the bottom.

(Laughter)

MS. SEELYE: So, you know, it's instantly converted into a political story, a struggle between the Senate and the House, and who's right and, you know, it wasn't for some days until Bill Frist, among others, started taking, you know, taking control of the news conference level, and bringing in experts and, you know, that was an enormous help.

But my one bit of advice from this experience would be don't let the elected officials be the ones out there making pronouncements. As we move to an elected official.

(Laughter)

MS. SWIFT: My name is Jane Swift, and I am the former Governor of Massachusetts, and served as Governor of Massachusetts on 9/11 and through the anthrax scares, that didn't come here. And I guess my perspective -- am I the only elected official here, I can't be, okay, good. My perspective, I hope it dovetails with yours, is that like many issues when you're an elected official the stated short term objectives that the press needs, and that we can totally understand, come at the peril of our long term political health. And I think Kit did a good demonstration of that.

I think there needs to be a better understanding than my perspective is. I mean, then a governor, no one talked about 9/11 as much as shortly thereafter, before anthrax there, it might even have been the weekend after, it might have been two weekends after, there was this chatter picked up on the terror networks where three cities were potentially being targeted, one in the south, Boston, and I forget who the other one was. And John Ashcroft called me, not a call you want to receive, in my office to tell me that he didn't have any specific information but it was credible enough that he felt he needed to share it with

me so that we could enhance our defenses.

And I guess my point is as the governor, particularly who's covered every single day in the intense media and political state, you have always had pre 9/11, an expected degree that I think is healthy, a transparency with the political press. And I found myself, after 9/11, struggling most with my relationship with the press and now having different responsibilities than I'd ever anticipated or planned I was not a public safety expert. Enormous responsibilities that I felt very strongly to keep state employees and high rise office buildings safe, to keep citizens across the Commonwealth and the drinking water safe because that is where the responsibility, at the end of the day, falls. And doing it in a context of knowing that maybe for six hours, or six days, the political reality between myself and the media would change but it would not change long term.

And that whatever your best feelings of empathy, and understanding, maybe borderline sympathy are, you were going to eventually make judgments and handicap my performance during this time. Under rules that now are different than they've ever been before, where my responsibilities are different from what they've ever been before, and I think that that's one

important conversation that needs to happen.

I think that reporters at the Pentagon have always understood there are certain things that those folks know that they're not going to tell you, and that's not taken as a breach of trust. I don't think state house political reporters have ever been in a situation where they think there's anything important that a governor knows that they shouldn't be able to share or asked, answer honestly. I found that there were many occasions when that was the case, and because you were in the middle of it there was no ability to have an intelligent conversation, so maybe they happen now before it happens here.

MR. FUREY: I'm Major Eric Furey. I am the Deputy Commander for the first Civil Support Team, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and we are a National Guard asset to the State of Massachusetts as well as to the surrounding states in New England. We've worked for the governor during those anthrax, and more recently the Essex County scares.

My background is Special Forces, so I come from the shadows of avoiding the press, and avoiding my fellow soldiers in doing what I used to do, to now being in a unit that we're not well known to either other units in the National Guard, not even other units

in the Massachusetts National Guard.

In 1998 there were 10 teams established in each of the 10 FEMA regions, and that grew suddenly to 17, additional ones to 27. After 9/11 five additional ones were added to 32, two being in the State of California. And last year President Bush signed in, without funding though, to establish 23 more, so each of the 50 states will have one, the three territories, The problem is how do we fund and Washington, D.C. the other 23. And the unique position we're in is when we were formed back in `98 none of the first responders wanted to work with us because they looked at us as, oh, here's the federal government, they're coming to help, and with all the implications that implies, when actually we wear the same uniform as the soldier but we're a state militia, and belong to the governor, couldn't get anywhere.

After 9/11 we got a phone call from Boston saying if this happens you're going to come, right. I said well, we've got to start working together because I don't want to meet, we don't want to meet you the day of the event. Since then, I think all the CSTs across the country, all 32, have got themselves quite tasked in going out and doing exercises as well as training first responders to go beyond, which they've already

done a great job in just the typical HAZMAT. And Massachusetts is lucky because they have district HAZMATs to cover all the regions so there is some redundancy.

But I would invite anybody in this room to come out and see us because we're in the stage where we're trying to meet people and make friends because we want people to be aware of what we do, and how we do it, because what will happen in an event, if it's not a high yield explosive such as what happened on 9/11, it's going to involve a case where there's going to be a very long lull of boringness, where the incident commander, the governor as well as the press, is going to be pressing our science officer, one guy, as well as the HAZMAT team that we have redundancy, what is it, what is it. And the answer is not going to come. it may not come for several hours, or it may not come for a day or so. And meanwhile the press around the country, if it's the only event, is going to be sitting there, as well as the governor.

So we're in a unique position that we need to have people be aware of how we function so that when the event does happen, when that wall happens, they understand it's part of the process of what we have to do to get a presumptive analysis.

MR. HARTMANN: Thank you, Eric.

I thought Jennifer and Arn might introduce themselves in sequence rather than the outside.

Jennifer.

MS. LEANING: Jennifer Leaning, Harvard School of Public Health and Harvard Medical School, and I am delighted to be here, I work with Arn on a variety of disaster related things.

MR. HARTMANN: Thank you. Neal.

MR. PEIRCE: I'm Neal Peirce, Washington Post Writer's Group.

I had an interview with Michael Rogers, the head of the Washington Metropolitan Council of Governments at that time, shortly after 9/11. He took me in his office at the end of the interview and showed me what he could do on his computer. And he brought up a sample of neighborhoods and areas, all the water systems, all the transportation systems, all the utilities hidden underground, things that relate to weather and wind patterns, and all sorts of things, just illustratively.

And I said to myself, you know I'm interested in this stuff, I've written about GIS, whatever that means, I thought I understood it, and it's terribly complex. And how is an average me, or

any other reporter, ever going to understand what these interrelationships are in the midst of a crisis. Is this all going to be mumbo-jumbo behind a wall that we learn about later, or do we have a way about finding out understanding what is really happening in this sense.

So that related to my other interest which is all of the lines crossed municipal boundaries, none of them stopped within a single county or city, and some of them went right under the river, the Potomac River, and the Anacostia River. And that has lead to my other interest in, which was a prior interest, which is regionalism, and how do all of these first responder teams, and all these public safety agencies manage to create a cohesive response in the real region, which is the metropolitan region, rather than a single municipality. And with backup teams from one municipality to the other they made a beginning, but it seems to me there's a huge amount still to be done and that the press's responsibility before incidents take place is to really be friendly tough. What are you guys doing? How well are you coordinating? What are your plans? What are you going to do if this evac kind of thing takes place?

Because those kinds of questions, and then

some of the coverage based on, I suppose would be the beginning, would be the base for better preparation, and a more informed public, and a better press operation at the moment of any incident.

MR. HARTMANN: Thank you, Neal.

MR. PLAUGHER: I'm Ed Plaugher. I'm the fire chief of Arlington County, Virginia. I was the individual in charge of the response to the Pentagon incident and had been preparing for a weapons of mass destruction incident in the nation's capital area since As a matter of fact, in March of 1995, prior to the Murrah Building attack in April of 1995, we had realized then, and that is then, is the incident that occurred in Tokyo, in the subway, that Arlington County, which is laced with the subway system from the Washington, D.C. area, that we are extraordinarily vulnerable to a like attack. The vulnerabilities of a transportation system that is wide open will forever be part and parcel to that nature of the entity.

And so we started, in earnest at that time, developing through the Council of Governments, through that entity, a team designed to provide response for the medical consequences of a weapons of mass destruction incident because there will be survivable citizenry if there is the proper medical

equipment, and the proper procedures, and this was labeled for the Guard and the civil support teams and all that sort of thing. And we created an entity at the time that was called the Metropolitan Medical Strike Team, which has now been replicated around the United States in over a 100 cities called Metropolitan Medical Response Systems.

My anecdote, however, has nothing to do with any of that or the response to the Pentagon. Last week, or the week before, because time flies by, I was interviewed by a Washington Post reporter about what's happened since her last interview. And it was talking about the various presentations that I'd done around the world to provide communities and countries with how do you respond to a terrorist incident. What mechanisms do you use to do unified command, and all the parts and parcels to an effective response. And we have a dog and pony show that we use to talk about how we've coordinated a regional response in the area.

And when she asked me the question I said, okay, I'm going to brace you and in 30 seconds I'm going to ask you some questions. And so we did the interview, and then I said I'm going to ask you some questions. And I said we just recently had the whole thing about duct tape; I want you to tell me what you

learned about duct tape. Then she said you have to go the hardware store, and you have to get it, it only works if you have plastic with it, and that sort of thing.

And I said let me ask you a further question, what does shelter in place mean? She says I don't have a clue. I said case in point. You, the press, blew it big time. The story is not about duct tape, the story is not about plastic; the story is about the concept of shelter in place. You missed a golden opportunity to educate our public about a critical response effort that they, the individual, can do. Why did that happen? And she said I don't know, tell me. I said well, I'm soon going to be going to Harvard and talk with some of the press people, and maybe we can figure it out.—

MR. PLAUGHER: Because it is an opportunity for us to learn from our previous experiences.

I also sat on the Senior Advisory

Committee for the Homeland Security Council that
advises the White House on policy issues for homeland
security. And one of the things that the White House
is not happy about is the press's response to the
incident about duct tape. And so we are getting White

House pressure to fix that whole thing because it has absolutely nothing to do with increasing the stock value of the company that sells duct tape, which is a sideline, which is the sideline of the whole thing, okay. That company said, yeah, talk about duct tape. Our stock went way up.

But anyway, I agree we've got a long way to go, and I'm very excited about being here with the opportunity to do that.

MR. HARTMANN: Thank you, Ed.

MR. HOWITT: I'm Arn Howitt from the
Kennedy School. I have the dual role of being
Executive Director of the school's State and Local
Government research center, and also the Director of
the Program on Domestic Preparedness.

We join Frank and Alex in welcoming you all tonight, and thanking you very much to give up a full day of your lives to be here. My experience as a career academic leads me to know one important, empirical fact which is not to stand between a large group of people and their dinner at 7:35.

(Laughter)

MR. MASIELLO: Tony Masiello, Mayor of Buffalo, New York, the hometown of Tim Russert and Wolf Blitzer.

(Laughter)

MR. MASIELLO: I want to talk to you about a crisis and how the media helped respond to it.

Obviously my anecdote deals with a snow crisis, and while it certainly isn't life threatening, like a chemical or biological or nuclear crisis could be, I think there are some similarities in how you handle that.

Bill mentioned the importance of somebody being in control, being in command, very, very important. Frank mentioned about media relations, relationships, very, very important because in a crisis you're going to need each other. The media's going to need you, you're going to need the media.

Case in point, even for Buffalo, New York.

November 20, three days before Thanksgiving, November 28, 2000, three o'clock in the afternoon a massive snow storm hits the City of Buffalo, lake effect snow, with ultimately 37 inches in about 12 hours. Now why is that different. There were no two snow storms, I believe, now I'm from Buffalo, New York. No two snow storms are ever alike, nor will any crisis, terrorist attack, nuclear attack, whatever, no two are ever alike. It depends on what time of day it is, what day of the week it hits, what season it hits. We're going

to have to respond to these kinds of things under very difficult circumstances.

On that day, three o'clock, it actually started snowing at one o'clock, our weather people, and all the stations were getting 50 inches, 20 inches, 40 inches. Everybody's competing with one another, scares the heck out of everybody. As a result, I let everybody out of city hall at three o'clock. The county, unbeknownst to me, let everybody out at three o'clock. Unbeknownst to me all the banks and all the financial institutions, all the employees got out at three o'clock.

(Laughter)

MR. MASIELLO: Case in point, the Peace
Bridge closes down, all the trucks get backed up on the
thruway. The thruway closes down, the thruway, nobody
can get on or off it. Nobody can get out of downtown.
That's case in point.

So everybody is stranded in their automobiles trying to get out, but guess what? School let out at three o'clock. Five thousand kids stuck on buses in neighborhoods. The transmitter gets blown out by lightening so you can't communicate with the bus drivers. So what do we have? We have thousands of people stuck in cars, husbands, wives and children with

no way to communicate to them, and terrible weather conditions. I mean obviously it's frigid, it's snowing, it becomes dark. You've got parents calling me up, I'm going to kill you, Mayor-- (Laughter)

MR. MASIELLO: --oh sure, come on down if you can get to me.

(Laughter)

MR. MASIELLO: I was brave that day.

To make a long story short, what we did was we set up a main office in my office, and we used the radio stations, and the TV stations to get the message out as to where their children were, where they could communicate with their children, where their children could be found, to let people know what was going on as far as the emergency recovery, how we were moving people around, how we were getting food to people, how we were getting medicine to people, how we could get people picked up off the Skyway which was, you know, a very large bridge in the city which is, you know, swinging you back and forth.

So the fact of the matter is we used, very effectively, the media, TV and radio, to people on their cellphones in their cars, on the radio, obviously, people in their homes, on TV so that they

could communicate with us, through the media, every hour on TV, every half hour on radio so that people had the information as to what was going on, and where their loved ones were located, and where they could be safe.

MR. HARTMANN: Thank you, Tony.

MR. SEAMANS: I'm Ike Seamans. I'm a reporter for WTVJ, that's the NBC owned station in Miami, and I also write a column for *The Miami Herald* talking about mostly the Middle East, terrorism, and homeland security.

When I was with NBC I was always going to war zones, El Salvador. Donald, by the way, I snuck into the embassy, you never even knew I was there.

MR. HAMILTON: It happened all the time. (Laughter)

MR. SEAMANS: I really got interested in it, terrorism in Israel when I saw how people were preparing but the network wasn't interested in those stories because there was no threat to us at the time. When I came back to local television I started doing these stories, about five or six years ago, and nobody cared either. I only found one person in Miami Dade County that knew anything about it and that was Chuck Lanza. A year and a half after 9/11 I only found one

person in Miami Dade County who knew anything about it and that was Chuck Lanza.

I'm hearing a lot of interesting mega issues here. I hear reporters say we need instant information. I hear Washington reporters who have access to the highest leaders. I hear public officials talking about their problems, but I have, except for the chief down here, I've only heard one person talk about what I think is the biggest issue, which we're all overlooking, particularly government officials, and that is the public. You blame the media, you said The Washington Post blew it for not reporting. Well, I would challenge you on that and say you blew it, and all of us blew it because we're all concerned, you're concerned with getting your command center ready, others are concerned with getting your police ready, but nobody's concerned with getting the public ready.

In Miami Dade County they have something called the Citizen's Corps Council. And I did a column on this, and I called Chuck, and I said what's that council doing? How come we don't know -- well, they've got all these plans that will educate the public. How come we haven't heard about it? Well, we can't get our public relations in order. Well, Chuck wouldn't say this but I found out that the reason they couldn't get

their public relations in order, there was so much turf fighting, a battle over turf, and so much in-fighting by politicians wanting the credit for this. As a matter of fact, when they created the Homeland Security Department for Miami Dade County they cancelled the news conference. They never announced that. Why was that? Three commissioners were really pissed off because they weren't invited that day because they wanted credit.

The current term we're hearing today because of the war is boots on the ground. That's what I see you government people doing, you're putting boots on the ground. You that you if you put police officers outside the federal building, and the National Guard at the airports they're going to stop terrorism. In fact they're not. You've got to have people that are better than that. You just can't expect the -- Mohammad Atta, living like a normal person is not even going to blink an eye and they're not going to blink an eye at him.

We're not doing the job. We're concerned with these mega issues and we've got to get on the air instantly with information, but we're not educating people. No one knows what to do. When I asked the chief of police in Dade County, who is the de facto head of homeland security, how come you're outside the

federal building but you're not thinking about the shopping centers because in Israel that's what they blow up. They blow up those things because they know that it's going to effect me, or it's because my boss is telling me they want the visual presence.

So I think that we're all missing the boat here with our mega issues, wanting to be the first on the air, wanting to get the big time politician, wanting to show that we're doing something, but we're not telling the public what to do. And I think that's the real, real shortcoming. It's really serious because nobody I know knows what to do because no one has told them. And maybe that's because it's only a year and a half in, maybe it takes time to do that, but that's the real shortcoming. It's not these mega issues, and what the big time politicians say, or what I say on a report, it's what are we telling the public on how to prepare themselves. And I don't hear it from me, or from any of those of you who are involved with it every day.

MR. HARTMANN: Thank you, Ike.

MS. MCKENNA: I'm Maryn McKenna from the Atlanta Journal Constitution. Atlanta is the home base for the Center for Disease Control and Prevention.

I've been the main reporter on the CDC beat for the AJC

since 1997.

Like a lot of folks here I covered the anthrax attacks, and I've been writing a great deal about the ramp up to the smallpox vaccination campaign.

But I what I want to talk about is the other side of my job which is non bioterror public health. I've been writing a great deal lately about Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, which is the mystery pneumonia that's been sweeping the world. As Dr. Blendon observed at the start of the cocktail hour is the only story that has repeatedly broken through the war news the past few weeks.

At four o'clock last Friday the White
House released an executive order by e-mail to the
White House press corps list. Just to set the stage,
last Friday we had about 100 cases of SARS in the U.S.;
Canada had quarantined, at that point, about 1,500
people at home; Hong Kong was on the verge of moving
240 families to forcible quarantine in campgrounds in
the suburbs of Hong Kong. And at that point two or
maybe three airlines were on the verge of declaring
bankruptcy, I think a fourth has added it today because
there's so much less traffic to Asia. And people in
the U.S., of course, are wondering how much am I at
risk? Where is this disease coming from and to what

degree is it going to be as serious in U.S. as it is in these other countries?

So this executive order, which was released essentially without notice said that the president had just given the federal government the authority to quarantine Americans if they were diagnosed with SARS. I think our White House correspondent got this at about 4:30, he forwarded it my editor. I'm not on the White House, as you know, list. I got it at 4:45, pulled up the wires, and every single story, and at that point there were about 15 already, said U.S. will quarantine SARS patients, household contacts and so forth.

This is not, in fact, correct. The president was giving the government the authority to quarantine SARS patients at some future date, or SARS contacts if it was necessary. And in about another half an hour, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Director of the CDC came out and said so.

However, the damage was done. It was a classic Washington maneuver to release this just before deadline on Friday afternoon when everyone is on their way home. And the story was in the entire first round of AP, Dow Jones, Reuters, the other major wires, and

on a couple of TV broadcasts. I'm sure it was on CNN or CNN.com, or MSNBC.com, before it was corrected in the second round. And there was instantly tremendous public concern about this.

My point, and I do have one, is that at this point, after 9/11, after anthrax, we really ought to be beyond such game playing between the politicians and the press. There's nobody here from the executive level. The need for information about various levels of threats, among the public, and the need for education of the press is so enormous that I think we ought to be working together in a much more cooperative fashion. And if we do not, then incidents like last Friday are going to happen with increasing frequency, and they are likely to have a more dire effect than last Friday's did.

MR. HARTMANN: Thank you, Maryn.

MS. FETTERMAN: I'm from USA Today. I'm Mindy Fetterman. I'll be brief.

I just wanted to tell a little story about what we're up to now which is a group of reporters and editors who are being trained to be a go team, to go uncover the next group of, whatever terrorism happens.

And in that regard, I placed a call -- we always point at you like you're the CDC but, you know, you're not to

blame -- to the CDC and I said so, you know, we have this team, and we're curious about smallpox vaccination for reporters and editors who are on this team. And there's this pause, and Lauren says, gee, journalist safety is not really top on our list. I said well, gee, it's at the top on our list. So she said well, you know, call around the country and see if you can get some somewhere.

So we called around the country, and in Los Angeles the public health official there said oh, yes, we've put journalists on our list as first responders to get the vaccine as part of this program. And I said, why? And she said, well who do you think is going to spread the smallpox. Reporters, they're going to be at the hospitals, then they're going to go talk to the families, then they're going to go to the schools, and she said we want the reporters vaccinated first.

So, I just think it's a difference in how people are viewing the reporters, and you know, our feeling is, you know, we want to protect our employees much like Governor Swift said, all of a sudden my responsibilities are not just gee, what's a good story and how should we cover it and, you know, what's the layout, and what should be on page one. It's how do I

send a reporter to cover something in which they actually won't know what's going on, and they could die while they're doing it. And with 9/11, you know, people grabbed their notebooks and they ran down there as fast as they could, on their cellphones going I'm at 54th. And you just can't do that in the future. We can't act that way in the future. So I think it's a whole new world order for newspaper people, and the media, and how they work in this kind of thing.

MR. HARTMANN: That's a great way to hear those stories, the anecdotes which illustrate principles. We're repare to go have dinner. It's not a working dinner but you might keep in mind the beginning of the conversation tomorrow which is covering an attack in progress. What should government expect of press relations during a crisis? What should media expect from government? Not a working dinner as such but it might be part of the conversation, so please enjoy dinner. Thank you for coming.

(Whereupon, at 7:50 p.m., the session was adjourned.)

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This is to certify that the preceding transcript is an accurate record based on the recordings of the proceedings taken:

Before: FRANK HARTMANN, Moderator

In the Matter of:

TERRORISM AT HOME: CHALLENGES FOR THE MEDIA

COVERING AMERICA'S SECURITY

Date: April 10, 2003

Place: Cambridge, Massachusetts

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JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT

JOAN SHORENSTEIN CENTER ON THE PRESS, POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY

EXECUTIVE SESSION ON DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS

TERRORISM AT HOME: CHALLENGES FOR THE MEDIA COVERING AMERICA'S SECURITY

> Friday April 11, 2003

Kennedy Room Charles Pavilion Charles Hotel Cambridge, Massachusetts

BEFORE: FRANK HARTMANN

Executive Director

Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management

Kennedy School of Government

79 JFK Street

Cambridge, MA 02138

ALEX JONES

Joan Shorenstein Center on Press, Politics

and Public Policy

Kennedy School of Government

79 JFK Street

Cambridge, MA 02138

ARN HOWITT

Executive Director

Taubman Center for State and Local Government

Kennedy School of Government

79 JFK Street

MR. HARTMANN: Let's begin. There were three people who were not able to join us last night, so I'll ask Gerry Leone and Darrel Stephens to introduce themselves the way each of you did last night, a very, very succinct, two minutes or so, anecdote or set of principles that come out of your experience in terms of government responsibility and at the same time, working with the media. So a brief story. Why don't we start with you, Gerry, and then Darrel and then Juliette Kayyem can introduce herself.

Gerry?

MR. LEONE: Thanks, Frank. It's a pleasure to be here. Right after 9/11, I was the Chief of the Criminal Bureau of the Attorney Generals Office here in Boston. I'm a prosecutor. I am now the First Assistant at the US Attorneys Office in Boston. On September 17th, Attorney General Ashcroft directed the anti-terrorism task forces be formed across the country in every district and I was tabbed to be the first anti-terrorism task force coordinator here in Massachusetts.

Over the course of the next several weeks, I worked with several people, including my friend,

Governor Swift, and the people who fell within her responsibility to bring together law enforcement, public safety, emergency management and health and human service professionals to try to put together a comprehensive approach to terrorism and all hazards crises. So that's where I've come from over the course of the last 18 months and I'm hopeful that our discussion today or during the discussion today I can learn a lot more about your perspectives to put in the right things here in Massachusetts.

MR. HARTMANN: Darrel?

MR. STEPHENS: My name is Darrel Stephens. I'm a police chief in Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina. I understand that part of the conversation last night was anecdotes with the relationship with the press and unlike a lot of my colleagues, actually my experience with the press has been by and large pretty good. I have been amazed at the interest at times and their focus on professional athletes. They kind of gather around the incidents involving them much in the same way that they would a terrorist incident, or a riot or whatever. There is a lot of interest in those and they kind of get in the way of those cases. But for the most part, as I look at the medium, it's a way of communicating that I have to communicate with

public, and I think about it that way and it's been a pretty relationship.

MR. HARTMANN: Thanks, Darrel.

Juliette?

MS. KAYYEM: I'm Juliette Kayyem of the Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness and I'm here at the Kennedy School.

MR. HARTMANN: Thank you. Did I miss anyone? Anyone who is with us who was not with us last night? Rebecca, why don't you introduce yourself briefly.

MS. STORO: I'm Rebecca Storo. I also work with the Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness.

MR. HARTMANN: Good, thank you. A couple of things, the process today is basically if we had three or four of you together, the media, government, different points of view and so forth, and you were sitting around over coffee and trying to work out these issues just among yourselves, and just three or four. You are having a conversation, it's mutually helpful, it's honest and you're going back and forth, you would probably arrive at some local principles, agreements on how to prepare.

We are going to do the same thing but with

30 people, which means I have to guide the conversation a little bit. And what we'll do is start with actually Bob Blendon giving us the context because Bob is the Kennedy School and School of Public Health survey person, operating with NPR, and Bob can explain that a little bit more in terms of where is the public on this kind of thing. So if we remember the anecdotes last night, several people literally said it's the public that we are concerned with, it's our obligation to inform the public.

Bob has a better sense I think than anyone of where the public is on this, what is it they hear, how do they prepare? So we want to have the contextual comment from Bob as we begin.

Then we want to turn to Arn Howitt who is going to give us a hypothetical that we can react to. Here is a particular situation, and we are going to start the conversation then with those questions about let's assume there is an attack in progress as outlined by Arn. And then the question is what does government expect from the press? What does the press expect from the government?

And we are going to work that conversation, call on you, raise your hand. I sort of keep a sense of who is in line, in terms of wanting to

talk, but I also try to drill down on some things, so I might say are you piggybacking on that previous remark? So we just don't have every flower bloom, we are drilling down a little bit at the same time, so it's a balance.

And then, at the end of each session or the end of the morning, we will ask somebody to summarize. Summarize not in the sense of saying that Ike said this, and Don said this and Nancy said that but in the sense of saying what cream rose to the top? What are the things that we heard which resonated and which we might think of as principles that people kept coming back to again and again? So that's the process that we are going to do.

Please, Bob, could you start by giving us the context of the public?

MR. BLENDON: Quickly, if I can be helpful. This is sort of a change in technology that many of you are not familiar with. Back in World War II, after the war started, the pollsters, out of respect for the president, stopped polling for the war, so you would not in any way interfere with executive decision making with a polling result. We are now in a situation where of course we go all night long. CNN and USA Today have joined the instant polling side.

But it turns out I'm part of the consortium that both looks at everyone else's surveys, which are done very quickly, and we also have a series that we run.

What I thought I would do is just make a couple of comments, based on last night's discussion, from what we've been tracking and looking at. But a technological point is if your phone lines don't go down, you are able to find out what the general population is doing relatively quickly and the point I'll make is the town population turns out to be different than the people that you are calling on the phone and the people that television finds. And so you really, and I'll get back to this in a moment, that the media has what an academic would call a denominator problem. That is that they give pictures of things that are actually occurring.

An example is after the attacks, pictures over and over again about people buying guns. Well three percent of Americans bought a gun. Now that's six million people, to go back to that. That is a lot but 97 percent of people never took a step to buy a gun. We had pictures of people buying gas masks; two percent of Americans bought gas masks. We had pictures of people standing in line in Mexico to get Cipro. Well it turned out, except if you were in the affected

cities where you went where people were attacked, it's two or three percent of people who got a prescription for an antibiotic as a result of that.

That wasn't all true but pictures of people in pharmacies over and over again. If you didn't know, you would think that everybody was in Walgreen's trying to get a prescription. So let me just briefly, and we are releasing, which we've agreed to do continually through this sort of well equipped take on after the website went up for homeland security, what people are taking away or not. And let me just see if I can address that pretty quickly.

People obviously get nervous, particularly with the Iraqi war. They are able to identify what the colors mean but not what to do, so they get the red, orange, the heightened. However, there is a lot of research, going back to earthquake warnings. What happens is when these alerts, you get anxious, they do the very simple thing and they do nothing else. The public does not respond to do anything complex unless there is an incident. And so I'm going to back to that but the most important public education thing has to be prepare the minute there is an incident because that is the teaching moment. The people that we survey just are not going to do a lot, so let me deal with what

came up last night.

The duct tape was everybody's humor but it shows to the denominator problem. It turns out only three percent of people went out and bought duct tape after the warnings but that's six million people. You can clean out a lot of stores for that. It turns out three-quarters had it at home anyhow, so hardly it, but what came up last night is what we will release next which is two-thirds of people, when we said we want to talk to you about sheltering in place, said I have no clue what you are talking about. Then we described it to them and then they said I don't know where you live, I don't have a windowless room. What would you like me to do?

So we are devoting all this time to batteries, and food and water, which is all there, when you really wouldn't have to explain it. Then we tell homeland security as others to get an evacuation plan. Well only 12 percent of the people did it. They don't actually know what it means. Most people said, when the government tells you to get an evacuation plan, is it leaving the home? Is it leaving town? I don't know what they mean when they tell me to have an evacuation plan.

And we asked them what the 12 did, some

have a plan to get out their front door, some have called the school. They want to know what you want me to do and they can't take this away. So if you are going to do something that is more complex, all the education has to be focused on just one or two issues. There is no possible way to give people a long list and it's only because they don't pay attention and this is in the paper we had ahead of time. There is such an argument, if it's possible to work out, to do what Israelis and others do, just have a prearranged media education right away.

SARS is a different instruction than sarin than is smallpox and you are not going to pre-educate people to all the possible threats. They are not going to listen, I don't care how much you do. And so to show you how disturbing it is, because we did the extensive work on smallpox, after many of you ran extensive pieces on smallpox, we found out the following: a) they think there are recent cases, there are not, b) that there is a cure, there is not, c) that if I once was vaccinated, I never have to go back again because it always works.

There was a lot of coverage. Why is it they don't read the second paragraph? There is nothing wrong with that. They are not Harvard students, I mean

we would require them to read the second paragraph. (Laughter)

MR. BLENDON: So there is nothing wrong with that but if there is a smallpox case, then across the country you went bam, the best media that you can do that takes you step by step, and if it's sarin or something else, that's when they will learn. We are not going to get a lot otherwise. This is a very sensitive thing to say and I'll duck and walk out, it turns out, if it is a biological attack, people switch in who they want to hear advice from, they want to hear from doctors.

When it's talking about caring about your own kid, they just don't like politicians, or generals or whatever. We tested this. If you are telling me to go back in a building, and I could get infection and I could bring it home, they want to have, even if the answer is I don't know, they would rather have it from someone who sounds like they had been on infectious disease their whole life and everything else. At that moment, they want to do that. I suspect other kind of risks that are there but I think that's really important.

If we are going to tell people that they have to get vaccinated and somebody is dying but they

still have to do it, it would be better I think if it was a medical scientist. Remember, Koop had an incredibly powerful effect doing things with AIDS for that, so it would really be helpful if the stations used somebody and people in politics used somebody to do that.

I think that's pretty much about the message at the moment on the homeland security thing. If we are serious about evacuation, we really have to tell people step by step what they would do under different circumstances and it has to be reality. Most people caught in traffic jams are going to every day think it sounds absolutely inane if you are just telling them how they are going to leisurely drive around the Washington Beltway to get out of town. They can't get home on a normal day so they are going to turn you right off. So whatever the advice is, it really has to be related to the reality of people's driving and transportation or they won't pick up anything from that.

The last point I'm going to make, and this is really true if anything here involves anything that happens that has some scientific component, if you are an expert or you are a person in politics surrounded by experts, they start out their discussion with you by

saying we don't know what this particular thing is.

The problem with the general public is they always have a chip in their head, they reason by analog, so they'll actually have something they believe is going on. It's usually wrong but they will believe it.

AIDS, when we tried to be helpful with people when this came out, all the stories were of parents pulling their children out of school and the experts would say there would be no reason to do that. There is no reason, the kids aren't going to transmit that. Sure there is, the parents thought that AIDS was transmitted like polio so of course you pulled your children out of school. So one of the things that would be very helpful if the media could run little small focus groups with people and say when you hear about sarin gas, what do you think it is?

And you'll discover, even though the CDC and the military says we are not sure, this is a very deep scientific question, which is true, somebody is going to say it's like the gas in my stove and so I'm not going to light a match because they are going to believe it is related to something else in their life. And so the media could be very helpful if they could just figure out, from a small group, what did you

believe, what these people actually believe, and then address some of the news stories about what it is. But it's a mistake to think they don't have views. People we interview reason laterally, they find some other experience like this, put it in their head and they start behaving.

From this point you make, let me quickly say it has to do with all the coverage of influentials, so we are all on board. People are very distrusting, particularly of the minority community, of authority figures. And if there is some event that occurs and influential people aren't doing what the experts are telling them to do, the person won't do it either. So if members of the House will not go back in their buildings, take my word, if you survey postal workers, they are not going to be reassured to go back in their buildings if the members of the House don't.

The history of epidemics are that we would give advice, in the old ones, and the rich would flee the city, and guess what happened? Everybody followed, so it's very important to understand this. If the mayor won't get vaccinated for smallpox, don't expect little Johnny to be vaccinated. And that's what the media --. People will cue off of you, not what is the message of the day to do. They will see if the public

figures are doing what it is. Their families are being protected and that's what they will watch very carefully. And if the word is we have to move everybody out of Washington that's worth a damn, everybody is going to follow, regardless of stay in your home and drink soup. That's not what they are going to do.

I'll close again with this denominator problem because it's so overwhelming. If a half million people or a half percent of the public call your lines, that's one million people simultaneously calling. They can close your lines down and they don't represent anybody. And you really need some way to figure out what is going on because the effect of television is, and this is what you have to answer very quickly, are people watching in Topeka, behaving as if the attack was in Topeka or not, even though the attack was in Chicago?

Or maybe they are not, maybe they are just watching this as if it was distant television but you have to find this out very, very quickly and your telephone lines are never representative. My friends at CDC have this problem all the time, they get thousands of calls and the e-mails that just swamp.

Well I can't find, in a national survey, the people who

are calling them, it just is too small. So a half a percent of people could think it's a martian landing, they could be overwhelmed and run in to see Governor Swift and say they are reporting that the martians are landing, but 99 percent of your state don't believe that the martians are landing.

And all you are doing is responding to this denominator of people calling and e-mailing, calling and e-mailing, and something has to be done to feedback into you to be reassured that most people don't believe this, they are not taking this activity because everybody is operating with a skewed view that what they see in the action is what's happening. And then the people in Topeka see this on television and they say maybe I should believe this because they are reporting this as if this is a common event. This is all you can get out of this new technology wave.

The thing I would say to you, and I know many of the media people are now using this much more frequently, you now have a technology for your polling that could help you get at information that you never did before. So forget the academics, you're polling unit that is normally out there, or how do feel about Bush and his tax cut plan, can answer your questions very quickly for this. And your stories could be

affected and shaped by your own polling unit if you just ask them to ask these questions in the middle of a crisis.

They can tell you how many people are doing any of these things. It's very quick, they can turn it around for you, and it really could help the news coverage by essentially using this technology, not historically, how did Americans respond in World War II, prospectively, this is actually what the denominator is doing and our news includes a denominator report. Most people aren't buying duct tape, they had it, and people don't have a clue about what this thing is and we are going to explain it to you over and over again because that's what it is. And this comes out of this sort of work that I think your polling community has been doing and we've been trying to do.

MR. HARTMANN: Does anyone want to press back on Bob to clarify anything he said?

MR. ODERMATT: Yeah, I'm not going to let him get away.

MR. HARTMANN: Clarifying.

MR. ODERMATT: Bob, you made a couple of comments, first of all, in the ciprofloxin regarding the anthrax, that only a certain percentage people went

out and got ciprofloxin. The reality of that is when anthrax hit in New York, they couldn't get it because they couldn't get their doctor to prescribe it. So whatever methodology was used in trying to track that has to take that into account. The other thing, in terms of the media and the relationship between that, is that the media really never really reported that dioxycillin was also a treatment for that particular strain of anthrax. So cipro became the antibiotic for the day and nobody realized that dioxy was susceptible at that point.

The second point, you mentioned something about during a disaster, the teaching moment is at that point, which I believe is absolutely true. I think Chuck was also squirming in his seat too. But the reality is that we do have an opportunity to prepare people and I've just spent a year, and I'm about to publish a guide that New York has not published in 50 years on how to prepare, in general household preparedness. Even if you get a small percentage, one percent, two percent, of households to have a home survival kit, to have a go bag or something like that, that's a lot, especially in New York City, especially anywhere in any city.

So I subscribe to yes, it's a teaching

moment, but I really think you can prepare people and that's our obligation. If we can't do that, then there is no point in having pre-preparedness. So those are just the two points relative to that. I think truly there is a teaching moment and that is correct but people can prepare. It's similar to coastal communities and things like that, you have the ability to pre-prepare people for evacuations and to tell what to do.

But in terms of having that room with the glass, and things like that and the duct tape, the reality is that you can do something like that. We don't recommend it of course because you can asphyxiate yourself because, in the past, there have been cases where families have asphyxiated themselves. But that's the reality of it all.

MR. HARTMANN: Thanks, John. Pressing back for clarifications?

MS. TOOMEY: Much of what you said resonated with my experience and particularly the need to have a medical spokesperson. And critically, that's often not possible because I found that people in charge often want to be the spokespeople or not delegate this to a subordinate medical person. But the other issue is having the same medical spokesperson

because the other thing that I noted during the anthrax situation that there was a series of talking heads, even from the federal government. Even though they were all physicians or had medical backgrounds, they were different people every day.

A slightly different way to frame things, a slightly different way to work with the media, and I think that was equally ineffective. And I just wondered if that came up at all, that it was the same person consistently, or is it simply M.D. behind your name gives you the credibility?

MR. BLENDON: We didn't do enough testing but we have a lot of media research. We know that anchors, you can rank them by trustability, that's been done before. Koop became one of the most highest trusted figures so there is no question if I was in a world where the people with tenure never run for office and always have these suggestions, if I was in the world, I would build up a few very prominent scientists and they would appear. Or, as many of the television stations have done, they have gotten a single sort of physician scientist, Dr. Tim, very well known for that.

So the more credible it is, the more people feel trusted, the more they are. So it's not just the degree, there is no question about that. And

so if I was in Massachusetts, I would like to have a single person that talks on this all the time so people feel reassured when they go. I want to tie back --.

Oh, excuse me, Governor, go ahead.

MS. SWIFT: I don't want to be contrary but, then again-(Laughter)

MS. SWIFT: The only problem with that is you are talking about a world where you get through the crisis and you reassure people which is all well and good. In the political world, the political reality is every political reporter and a lot of folks who aren't political reporters who are covering the crisis are going to clamor for and demand that the highest ranking elected official say something and say something immediately. And once you're done polling about whether or not people got duct tape, you're going to quickly move to polling about whether or not the governor handled the crisis well and that's going to become a subset of stories.

So I think if our societal prerogative or choice is we want to utilize the media in a way that simply helps the public, gets them good information, gets them to respond appropriately, then you need to have political reporters besides Kit in the room who

agree, and I don't think you'll ever get there, that they sort of set aside this whole measurement of the chief political person's performance.

And candidly, after 9/11 and the fact that Rudy Guilani's performance has made him very wealthy, and totally reversed everybody's opinion of him and made him a national figure, I doubt, in the real world, that's ever going to happen.

MR. SEAMANS: Just another clarification then, in Miami, during the anthrax scare, the best interview was the head of Infectious Diseases at the University of Miami, who is one of the leading experts, and his message, and he is certainly a very identifiable person, and his message was strong and it was somewhat alarming. And he was told to tone it down and let the political message come through. And the next time we went to interview him, there was an entirely different message and once the camera was off, it was like what happened? And he said I've been told to tone it down and defer to the political message.

We have a very active mayor of the county who will step forward and he is good. I don't criticize him for his message, he does come forward in every emergency and tries to calm the public. But that was a situation where we went to the right person and

his message was right on target but then it had to be toned down for political considerations. So that's another dilemma you run into in these situations.

MR. MASIELLO: I think, from my experiences--

MR. HARTMANN: Is your question back in clarification? Not discussion, clarification?

MR. MASIELLO: I'll reserve my comments.

MR. HARTMANN: Thanks. Could you turn your cards so I can see them? For example, Amy, I can barely see yours. It would be helpful to me, thanks.

I want to go to the hypothetical because we are already in the kind of starting to lead into the conversation about who would be the spokesperson and so forth. So I just want to give us a common context.

Before I do that, let me ask Jim to take two sentences to introduce himself because he was not able to be here earlier. Just two sentences.

MR. WALSH: Thank you. First of all, thank you for calling on me just before I stuck bread into my mouth, that would have been bad.

(Laughter)

MR. WALSH: I'm Jim Walsh, Executive

Director of a research program here at the Kennedy

School called Managing the Atom, and I chair a group

here at Harvard called the Harvard International Working Group on Radiological Weapons. I get paid by the word and that's why I participate in those things. (Laughter)

MR. HARTMANN: That's why I said he could only have two sentences.

(Laughter)

MR. WALSH: And so my focus is radiological, nuclear, weapons of mass destruction and terrorism in general. And I actually do a lot of work for the media on the side so I'm sort of betwixt and between.

MR. HARTMANN: Thank you, Jim.

Arn, please?

MR. HOWITT: We thought, in organizing the day today, that even though in some ways, chronologically, it made sense to start with the issue of how should preparedness be covered before anything happens, that in fact we'd get much more interesting response to that question, and to some of the prescriptive things we'll get into this afternoon, if we actually talked about the heat of the moment and an incident going on, and in talking about how to get into that, we thought perhaps, at least at the very beginning, that we wanted to focus it with a short

scenario. So with due apologies to the experts that I haven't checked with in writing this brief scenario, let me just read you a little hypothetical situation.

It's a chilly day in April in the City of Metropolis, only three days after the NCAA women's basketball championship has occurred in the city. Four hospitals in the surrounding area have reported a seasonally high number of emergency room visits by patients who are exhibiting flu-like symptoms, but many seem to have unusually high fevers, even for the flu. The health department, alerted by data analysis and its new computerized monitoring and surveillance system, disease monitoring and surveillance system, has started to investigate and ask some questions about what's going on.

And one hospital has pointed out that 65 percent of the people who were presenting themselves at the emergency room had also been present at the basketball game three days before. The city health commissioner, concerned by the information collected so far, has started to consult colleagues in the state health department and begun to check CDC information sources. In an era of SARS sensitivity, moreover, she has decided to inform the mayor's office that there seems to be a number, an apparently large number of

severe flu cases showing up at the hospitals.

Meanwhile, a reporter for the major daily newspaper in Metropolis has been called by a physician who works in one of the emergency rooms, and who was alarmed by the number and character of the flu cases and by the anecdotal information that a number of them seemed to have been at the basketball game. And the reporter therefore calls the city's health commissioner for comment.

MR. HARTMANN: Mindy, can I bring you into this conversation?

MS. FETTERMAN: That sounds like the right thing to do. First, call the mayor and ask how are they handling the crisis and how come they've messed it all up.

(Laughter)

MS. FETTERMAN: Which would be the blanket assumption.

(Laughter)

MS. FETTERMAN: Where the hell have you been?

MS. SWIFT: How dare you not go to that game?

(Laughter)

MS. FETTERMAN: And why did our team lose?

(Laughter)

MS. FETTERMAN: It's a reality-based situation, a reporter is just going to start calling around. One of the things we are doing is trying to become more educated and one of the reporters said, in a scenario like that, said gee, sounds like a phoner to me, I'll just get on the phone, and start calling everyone, and whoever answers the phone and whatever they say and that's a reality. You might be stopped from going down to the hospital, you're not allowed to show up there. So you might be dealing with reporters who know something about medicine, like the medical reporters like the woman who is here from Atlanta Constitution, they know all about the flu. Or they might be a political reporter and they don't know anything about the flu. So, as the official on the other end of the phone, you are going to be dealing with a wide range of knowledge and so you have to be --

MR. HARTMANN: What do you expect of the person? What do you expect from government? What do you want from government at this stage?

MS. FETTERMAN: Well you want to be told what they know at this point. We know that we have these many cases, we're not sure what the cause is, we don't know if there is any infection of everybody at

the NCAA. You'll be asking all kinds of questions like what is this disease? What causes it? It's like SARS. Is it cockroaches? I'm listening to CNN this morning, is it cockroaches spreading it? So all the rumor and innuendo will be all swelled up in this reporter's mind, and editors will be running by them going what about this? And what about that?

So it depends on the level of expertise of the person you're calling what questions they will ask. And so what we would be interested in is obviously everything that you can tell us that you know for sure and to answer the question, I don't know, we don't know. Here is what we are doing, we're doing this, we're doing this. Sometimes people are afraid to say they don't know and we try to make a point in our stories saying it is unclear so far, it is not known if, to answer the question we don't know.

MR. HARTMANN: So it sounds like a situation in which you have multiple callers in to multiple sources.

MS. FETTERMAN: Correct.

MR. HARTMANN: You're going to call the nurse in the emergency room because she lives next door, and so forth and so on. Does government want to try to tell people, in the way that Ike just described

a little while ago, nobody's allowed to talk except X. So are you guys, on the government side, happy with the fact that suddenly you've got multiple people sort of talking for government almost?

MS. TOOMEY: I think that one of our responsibilities is immediately not only try to give you information, as well as what we are doing to try to identify this organism or what the cause is. And Maryn can keep me straight here, see if I practice what I preach here. But also, at the same time, simultaneously, get this information out to every physician, through an alert network, to every hospital because the worst thing that can happen, and this happens all the time, is when reporters ask me something, and then ask a physician in the field and we contradict each other. Then, already, there is controversy when in fact we are all trying to find out the same information at the same time.

So I think I have a dual responsibility not only to report to you what I don't know and what I do know but try to get the same information out so everybody in the medical community is operating off the same page.

MR. HARTMANN: Tony?

MR. MASIELLO: What I try to do in a

crisis would be, first and foremost, organize the information and don't be afraid to say I don't know because I think the worst thing you can do is give false information or the wrong information.

I think the leader of your government, wherever that may be or whoever it may be, sets the tone. So the first thing for me is organizing information but then delegate a person to respond to specifics. It could be police, it could be fire or a it could be a doctor but have somebody ready to address the specifics because what I like to do is organize the information, set the parameters and the strategy, then have others speak with specificity about whatever the issue is.

MR. HARTMANN: How quickly can you do that? Jeanne, last night, said look, I'm 24 hours a day, bam, bam, bam.

MR. MASIELLO: Right. For me, in my situation anyway, if it was a medical situation, I know the top people in the medical field that I would call in, whether it's the health commissioner or the head of certain hospitals, to speak to a specific issue or they would give me an expert to do that. So you have to have relationships, you have to be able to think quickly on your feet and also reach out to those people

that you know can have the kinds of answers. But you have to have credibility in those people.

MR. HARTMANN: Maryn?

MS. MCKENNA: I was thinking that government should want is for the person who makes — the reporter who makes the call to be medical reporter and not a political reporter or a cop reporter because the likelihood is that, certainly in my newsroom, that call leaking the information might come to me from an emergency doc that I know but it might also come from somebody in emergency medical services to the night cops reporter who happens to know somebody in the ambulance crew.

What I would want, imagining if this information came into my newsroom through some other channel than me, is for the government officials to be prepared to piss the reporters off by pushing information at them and to be willing to assume that the reporters don't know that much about flu or don't know that if we are in April, then it's the end of flu season and so the background rate of flu ought to be X.

And to say to the reporter I want to be sure that you have context for this because I think it would be much more useful, at that point, for the politician to take a little extra time and run the risk

of offending the reporters ego by telling them things that they may already know than just answering the questions and ending the conversation with neither of them realizing how much background information is missing.

MR. HARTMANN: Don?

MR. HAMILTON: The idea of who should speak is I think a little more complex than we've gone to because if anything lasts more than a few minutes, you need three levels of spokesmen, you need the principal, you need the governor, you need the mayor, to talk about the policy and how the organism is responding in generic terms. You probably need the press secretary function but that person is expected to know media requirements and general organizational things. And then you need an expert spokesperson and an expert spokesperson who can speak to ordinary human beings and not lose them in a world of jargon.

But the other thing a reporter is looking for, the first thing a reporter is looking for when they first call is is this a story? Is this worth spending my time on instead of going home? Then come the hell questions, the hell questions are are you concerned and is this serious? The person responding is immediately hooked. If you say I'm not concerned

about this: "Governor indifferent"; and if you say I'm terribly worried about it: "Governor in a panic".

(Laughter)

MR. HAMILTON: And it requires a certain amount of art to try and figure this out and in these early stages that we are describing where one reporter has gotten a tip from an emergency room physician, it's not clear just exactly how this is all going to work out.

You need a drill and government's best friend in this case is a good phone book because you don't know if the call is infectious disease, or if it's this or if it's that. I mean this is where the press secretary starts playing a role is who should be talking and not necessarily the press secretary. You need to talk too.

MS. SWIFT: I think with the the time of the scenario, one thing is if you had hindsight, I think most elected officials would respond brilliantly. The problem is that when all the experts are saying we don't know if it's flue or if it's some infectious disease, the problem for the elected official who, I think you made a good point, is going to be measured on different levels. Whoever your doctor expert is, if they are wrong, nobody cares. They go back, and they

are still a doctor, and sometimes doctors are right and sometimes doctors are wrong.

The reality is that the press will take clues from whether or not the governor speaks, how many people they send out into the field and that will, in the reporter's mind, whatever you say will send out to them a message of how serious you think it is. And you have to make that determination when you really don't know and that's where I think we could do everything the press needed, and then there are five false alarms and all of a sudden, you're never going to believe that governor and you're going to write a lot of stories about what a moron they are, they are panicking about everything.

MR. HARTMANN: Remember two things, one is we are trying to think ahead. We are trying to think ahead about how to prepare for this. The other context I think is it won't happen perfectly but can it happen better than it happens now sort of when it's all just a crisis response? We will not do this perfectly, there is not enough time, literally, to do it perfectly but can it be better than it would be if we were totally unprepared for it?

Mike Moran?

MR. MORAN: Some of this will be obvious

to people who managed people like me but outlet triage I guess would be the best way to put this. Think about what time of day this happens. I guess I was dozing and didn't notice, is this a morning scenario?

MR. HOWITT: Didn't specify.

MR. MORAN: Didn't specify, if it's a morning scenario, then you've got particular issues. If it's an afternoon scenario, you've got other outlets that become more important. The prime time for big websites, for instance, is in the middle of the day. People are at work, that's their news source. Television is a no-brainer. But the way you manage your outreach to these outlets should be according to the media's kind of internal rhythms. The other thing that came to mind was anticipate what I'm going to do as a reporter. I am not a medical reporter but it's quite possible that on a Saturday or something I'd be thrown into a story like this.

One of the first things I'm going to do if I don't know anything about the flu is I'm going to go to one of the big medical sites on the internet and look up what this could be. Then I'm going to call somebody at Rutgers or NYU Medical Center or whatever and I'm going to get what is probably irrelevant but interesting information on how bad this could be. And

from there, this is where government can either mitigate the disaster or create a bigger problem by leaving me with that one source on what the flu could potentially mean.

Make sure you are throwing information.

I'm not sure who said push information, I think it was Maryn, that's really important. If you are not filling that vacuum, we are going to find someone else to fill it. It's not malice, it is an honest effort, under unreasonable deadlines, to meet the need of the public to know and if we are made aware that we are being inflammatory, we will pull back. We don't want to be but if there is a vacuum, that's almost inevitable.

MR. HARTMANN: Ed?

MR. PLAUGHER: We actually experienced this in the Washington, D.C. region several years ago with the low water alert and the issue about the public health concerns over some real bad stuff that was in the public water system in the Washington, D.C. region. And it turned out to just be a horrible situation because the experts couldn't agree. One community was saying boil the water for five minutes, another community was saying ten minutes and then another community had topped that and said 15 minutes.

And then of course they decided that maybe

the best thing to do was to have the mayor of
Washington, D.C. become the sovereign of course, that
was Marion Barry who had no-(Laughter)

MR. PLAUGHER: --than anybody in the Washington region. So, again, how do you sort through this? How do you sort through this. As public officials, we were deeply concerned that we were going to have a public health alert because if those people with problem immune systems were effected by this water, it would overwhelm our already overwhelmed system. So we were legitimately concerned that we had a brewing health alert, health system that could cripple us from our ability to perform day to day missions.

So we've got to simply sort through this. We then also went, later on, several years later, to the West Nile situation. Again, an opportunity for a public health crisis, and we had good knowledge, we had good decisions and what happened between that time was vastly important because in fact they had done a diagnostic on the problems with the water and how to then come up --. And so the public health officials conferred, came up with a common message and then it started being delivered by the federal government as a

consistent source, websites, all over those types of things, vastly, vastly different.

One of the things that they decided to do was totally stay away from the politicians because, again, we have no--

MR. HARTMANN: You mean as spokespersons?

MR. PLAUGHER: As anything to do with

this.

(Laughter)

MR. PLAUGHER: In other words, because we had been burned so bad before because we don't control the credibility of that local politician within their community. In other words, it's not something we can influence the outcome of. And so the decision was made let's stay away from that arena and I know that--

MS. FETTERMAN: Who can make that decision, the decision that was made to stay away from politicians? Who makes that decision and how can that be regulated?

MR. PLAUGHER: The flow of information is determined by the chief administrative officers of the local government and they actually influenced the local politicians in the role of how you perform. And I don't know of any politician that's going to trample all over their emergency managers or the people that

they are paying to advise them. So we have some mechanisms to steer the direction the way we want to steer.

MR. SEAMANS: I've got to argue with you on that point. I think politicians step all over their emergency managers every day.

MR. PLAUGHER: Well, yeah. Again, at their own risk. I think that there is--

MR. SEAMANS: There is not much risk at all, they just fire them.

MR. PLAUGHER: Again, we are in a different environment, so it's environment-specific. And I'll shut up.

MR. HARTMANN: Bill?

MR. ADAIR: I think you guys were wise to put the experts out there. And I go back to something Kitt said last night that in the whole anthrax chaos, it was the elected officials who gave us confusing and un-formed responses, and it was the people from the CDC and the Department of Health and Human Services who gave us much more intelligent responses. And I hope that elected officials can put their egos aside at these times and say I don't need to be the next Rudy Guiliani, I need to inform the public. It's sort of troubling to hear what are the political

reporters going to think? Who cares.

MS. SWIFT: That is so unfair because those reporters will write that.

MR. ADAIR: Right, but who cares? So they write it, so what? The most important thing now is we've got a crisis, we've got people coming into emergency rooms with flu that could be something they picked up at this basketball game. We need to get the information out and I think it's incumbent on the elected officials. And I see this first hand covering plane crashes. In plane crashers, there are two spokesmen, there is the NTSB board member who is a political and there is the investigator.

And who really knows what's going on? The investigator. Who do they put at the microphone? The political. And so what do we do when we cover plane crashes? We go in the hallway to the investigator and say okay, what's really going on? And I just think elected officials have to put up who really knows what's happening.

MR. ODERMATT: Let me just say this, first of all, a few calls into a reporter does not make a crisis. This, as the scenario is presented to us, is still under investigation and I believe the media has a dual responsibility. And what do you want from

government? You want information fast. Jeanne and I had a conversation last night when there were three males on the Brooklyn Bridge the other day, if everybody remembers, and CNN called them. And I said this is the information as it's coming in. You take the information and you have a responsibility to report it as is.

And the information that came in was that it was three male Arabs, that came in. And it was interesting that we spoke about it because eventually it turned out to be three drunk people, I'm sorry to say, from Boston.

(Laughter)

MR. ODERMATT: I didn't say Harvard though.

(Laughter)

MR. ODERMATT: As it turns out, the scenario evolved over an hour or an hour and a half later and I had information, because I monitor the radios and the police systems, and the information evolved into something else. But this is a scenario that the end effect, and I don't hear anybody talking about that, the result of the information is that the end effect is that there was an arrest made. There was no danger to public health or safety—

MR. HARTMANN: Let me interrupt you because it feels like what the conversation is about literally right now is whether or not the persons beseige Mayor Bloomberg or you because we are trying to figure out who the spokesperson is. It so happened you were called, but does Bloomberg get involved?

MR. ODERMATT: The mayor would not have gotten involved in this because it was purely an incident that was being investigated, and absent any knowledge, there are media sources through NYPD through my office to get the information from. But if you want information right away, you have to take responsibility for it and understand that the end result of that information has no effect, at this point, on public safety.

My point here is that the other information and the responsibility that the media has in this case is that in this scenario in which we practice in Operation Red X in New York City in May before, and Mayor Guiliani was involved, was that if you put out information about this scenario where there is no epidemiological investigation, where there is no true diagnosis about what happens, you also endanger the hospital system of becoming overwhelmed. So you have a responsibility and what we want from you is to

tell people not only the basic information, we want you to tell them what not to do, what we are asking you to tell them.

And then, finally, we expect that if you get --. Who was talking about the retired generals go to CNN or something like that? That's a problem for us because once you start getting experts in with hypotheticals and you develop this scenario where we may have a chance of containing it, either doing a ring method or whatever the case is, that might be further exploited by these hypothetical scenarios about what could happen.

MR. HARTMANN: I heard you say several times we and it wasn't clear to me who we was because that what everybody is pressing for; who is the we?

MR. ODERMATT: Well health officials and first responders.

MR. HARTMANN: You've got competitive journalists, you've got different hours of the day and so forth, and every one of them is pressing for information. And so, in some ways, Tony said look, what I'm going to do is try as quickly as possible to have experts and so forth, and the question was you are not going to do it immediately. But I think--

MR. MASIELLO: But you organize the

process and you tell the public --

MR. HARTMANN: Do you mean you or the mayor or the governor?

MR. MASIELLO: In some situations. In our situation, I probably would not do that. In our situation in Buffalo, it's more of a county issue, the health department and whatnot would organize that. But in a crisis, I would set the tone of how we are going to handle this thing. And I am a politician, I am the government leader, people are going to expect me to do those kinds of things but they are also going to expect me to put people out front who are going to explain to them the facts of what really is occurring.

Sometimes I can't speak with authenticity about a certain subject but you have somebody do that. But you can't get away from not doing it. I mean I don't know what you situation is and maybe I do in Washington--

MR. HARTMANN: Yes, we cannot get away with that because what we are trying to do is anticipate and prepare how you think ahead on this issue.

Ike?

MR. SEAMANS: There is one thing that I think is really a challenge to government officials, in

particular PIOs and others, that this is developing into a real crisis. Unless the response, not of the newspapers, and it's the local television response today. Local television, of which I am a part, these days, shoots first and asks questions later by going live immediately on anything that they perceive is a crisis. And to compound that problem, if it really starts developing, then Mike Moran at MSNBC will pick it up, and it will be broadcast all over the country and CNN will pick up their local affiliate.

And suddenly, something that might not be a big crisis seems to be because television is a hot medium and the reporter is standing there saying things that perhaps he or she doesn't really know much about. And people when they hear about this are not going to go to the websites, they are just not, they are going to turn on the TV and local television knows this. To me, I think that is the challenge for people like the mayor and Chuck Lanza and all because television is going to go on the air right now. We can go on in 10 minutes, we're there.

We want answers and if you don't have them, the crisis tends to compound, and then an hour later it's no crisis and you think it goes away but it really doesn't. So that is a real challenge for you

government people today.

MR. HARTMANN: Darrel?

MR. STEPHENS: I think we've focused a lot on who talks and not a lot about what they say. And in this scenario, as Arn has presented it, we do have some information, that most of the people who have these flu-like symptoms came from a basketball game. You can tell people in the community that, that this high fever, your medical experts, what does that say? What could that possibly be other than flu? I think there is a lot of opportunity with that basic scenario to get somebody out front that would start telling people what you actually know about what's taking place.

You can say we don't have a diagnosis yet, we know that it's flu-like symptoms with high fever. If you have those symptoms, here is some places you can go that's not already overwhelmed if you want to seek medical treatment. The public health folks have gotten better since 9/11 but my recollection of anthrax and the situations we dealt with in Charlotte-Mecklenburg, they weren't very reliable. They were unable to make a decision, they were unable to say anything to the community other than things that might scare the hell out of them, which we did. I mean we don't know.

And a lot of the CDC information about

anthrax, initially, turned out wrong. And so they have gotten better. I think they can get better thinking on their feet and respond but sometimes it's the mayor, it's the fire chief or the police chief that has to speak because they give a sense of an ability to be able to tell people what they have and to calm the waters. A lot of the times, our medical people haven't developed the capacity to do that.

MR. HARTMANN: Jeanne?

MS. MESERVE: I had a situation a couple of months which is not dissimilar to this scenario. I had a source call me and tell me there had been five unexplained children's deaths in the State of Virginia and it had risen at least to the level where people in emergency management were aware of it. And I immediately put in calls to HHS, CDC. In fact, in some cases, I had trouble reaching anybody after hours. I called the State of Virginia and I think they did a very good job at their health department.

First of all, they waited to respond to me. I was pushing, pushing, pushing because of that 24 hour deadline. They took more than an hour to call me back, they had a prepared statement that the press person gave to me and then she made the state health commissioner available to me so I could ask him

questions. Now I don't know what chain of command he would go through, if he talked to the governor or other people within the administration, but he was made available to me and he could tell me we've tested for the major biological agents, we've crossed off A, B, C and D. We are fairly confident that this is not a biological attack, we are tracking it, there is flu in the state.

He gave me a lot of very pertinent information and I was able, in very short order I think, to not only report the five children's deaths but to put them in what I think was a non-alarmist context. I thought they did an extraordinary job but one of the things that did strike me was, one, afterwards, there were a lot of recriminations, apparently, a lot of finger pointing. How did she find out? Who leaked this?

And I found this on several stories relating to emergency preparedness, that there is a real finger pointing that goes on about talking to the press, which leads me to the question when were you going to tell us? At what point do you decide you have something that, even if a source doesn't call us, that you ought to inform the community about what the heck is going on? I mean in this scenario we are talking

about today, should that information have come from an emergency room source to a reporter or should the health department have been more proactive about putting out information about what they are dealing with?

MR. HARTMANN: Kathleen?

MS. TOOMEY: I want to throw two things out on the table, in fact often it's reporters that make us aware of things, to be honest with you. But, to me, the best case scenario in the situation is not who is the spokesperson, is it the governor or is it me, sure we have dueling press conferences, but to me the absolute best thing is for me to be standing side by side with my governor presenting because that sends a strong message. I'm giving the technical information, he or she is showing, by his presence, that he supports the work we are doing and has confidence in us. But when that breaks apart, and it did in many states during the anthrax situation, it's just very alarming. It's evident to people watching, it's clearly evident to reporters.

And I just wanted to correct a misperception, for physicians in the community, they are afraid to talk and make a mistake. For someone like myself, who is a government physician, not an

elected official, it's perilous to make a big public error; our life expectancy in state government is less than two years and there is a reason for that.

MR. HARTMANN: Jim?

MR. WALSH: Just a quick point following up on something Ike said about television and its particular role. And I'll say this and I know everyone will agree but no one will do anything about it, the provision of information, it's not just pursing information to reporters, the print reporters. The thing that's missing in this is visuals and visual information. When the Pentagon runs stories and has press conferences, it's no coincidence that they run video that day of the bombs that they dropped. And then what ends up on the lead? It's their video.

When I walk into a TV station, I say I'd like to talk about this, and I am told directly by the news people we don't have any pictures for that, you can't talk about that. So information provision is not only a matter of what the print journalists can use, it is the visuals. And some visuals can be provocative and cause panic and others can be reassuring. So I think you really need to think about, in a visual society, the image content you provide to the press, not just the written briefings.

MR. HARTMANN: Maryn?

MS. MCKENNA: Something that no one else has mentioned yet, just jumping off that, is I think you need to be aware that one of the places that the live trucks are going to be in this scenario is at the airport. This wasn't just a basketball game, in the hypothetical, it's a major tourist event which means that you instantly have to consider --. One of the questions I'm going to ask, as a public health reporter, after we get through the symptoms and what's going on at the hospital, is are they starting to track the trains of transmission? How many people from that tourist event came from out of town? Do you have any idea where they went?

And that means, in addition, this is irretrievably a political story because it goes across jurisdictions. Not only does it go across jurisdictions within your own city because you've got EMS, and public health and whatever the jurisdiction is at the airport, probably there is local and there is also federal, but then it's gone into other political jurisdictions as well. So you may be having to talk to other state health directors, and to other governors and you'll have infectious disease people in other cities standing up to talk about this as well. It's a

very good hypothetical, it's very complicated.

MR. HARTMANN: Terrence?

MR. SAMUEL: I'm the political reporter who got the phone call and, at this point, I'm reveling in my ignorance because I'm going to call everybody I know. And the reason I'm doing that is because, at some point, I want to be able to ask the intelligent question in about 10 minutes. So the third person, I'm going to be a slightly less ignorant political reporter asking this question. But I think, and Bob mentioned this before, what we are trying to do here in this early stage, I mean people will have an idea of what they are going to think about this.

Forget whether the public official has got the answer, people are going to extrapolate from their own experience what this is and my role, and if you are interested, as the governor, as the public health official, is to be able to either correct that misimpression if it's false or tell people that this is what you know, that this is why this is different, and answer the question and it's not that complicated if you get ahead of this story and answer questions. If you want to make friends with a reporter, tell him you'll call him back in 10 minutes, tell him you'll call him back in 20 minutes. Say Jeanne, I'll have

something for you in an hour. It will drive her nuts but there you have it.

MR. HARTMANN: Kit?

MS. SEELYE: Along those lines, and I think a model of how this might be done, and Nancy can speak better to this, was the sniper situation. There were some bumps along the road but you all had regular briefings, fairly often, regular briefings, an array of people there. And once in a while, a pol would barge in--

MS. DEMME: Or several.

MS. SEELYE: Or several. But particularly when you came on, and I didn't really cover this but I was a concerned citizen anxious for information, I felt that you were being straight and telling us what we knew at the time.

And I think to take in Jane's point about of course political reporters are going to make judgements about how well the mayor or the governor handled this, and we are going to also look for signals. Has the governor mobilized people? But I think if you do it and sort of use the sniper set up as a model, and then take your idea of have the governor there but not have the governor answer technical questions, have a person with credibility.

(Laughter)

MS. SEELYE: That's actually not quite as unintended as it sounded because, to be fair also, I mean Rudy Guliani has credibility, Marion Barry does not, and it's up to you, the politician, I mean you've got to take some responsibility for how much credibility you have.

MR. HARTMANN: Tony?

MR. MASIELLO: I think Kathleen and Kit made some very good comments here but inaction was worse for me, doing nothing was worse for me.

MS. SEELYE: I'm not saying do nothing. Why not go out there with your technical people?

MR. MASIELLO: I'm getting to that. The point is, in a few crisis that we've had in Buffalo, I've done just that, I've set the tone, I brought the people in who can answer questions. I lay out what we are going to do and then for specifics, you have people who have that kind of knowledge respond to those kinds of things. I think that's the smart thing to do, at least for me anyway, in getting the message out because if there is a void, somebody else is going to fill it, but you are going to answer for it anyway.

So the best thing that you can do is to make sure that you set the table and have the proper

people responding to the proper questions because if you do nothing, you get creamed. If you give out the wrong information or try to answer questions you are not prepared or have the expertise or knowledge, you are doing the wrong thing. For me, the worse that would happen would be we didn't notify the public as to what the process was going to be, what the program, what the strategy, and then you fill it in as time goes by in that particular crisis.

MR. HARTMANN: Nancy, you were referenced by Kit, do you want to say anything here?

MS. DEMME: Thank you. I do agree with the show of unity or the collaborative effort because in the FBI, ATF and the local police, there was an effort and it sometimes involved politicians in contentious elections to pull that apart. And the demonstration of all of them going out together, one spokesperson but, as you saw, they would often defer to each other when it came to ballistics expertise. Nobody was going to speak about that except for Bouchard.

But I did want to tell real quick on something that Bill and Ike said was that you go searching for how bad could this be, and you go live with whatever you perceive is the crisis, I do think

that somewhere in this that the media has a responsibility not to escalate the panic by going live during the crisis and saying really how bad it could be. Well government does have a responsibility also to say let me get all my ducks in a row, let me find out what I know from the experts because maybe it is a subject matter that we are not the expert on, and can you wait and to get back to you. I think there is a mutual responsibility here not to escalate panic.

MR. HARTMANN: So let me just take a phrase that Nancy just used and a couple of other people have used, the media has a responsibility.

That's a very generic, Ten Commandments kind of phrase.

How would that actually play out?

MR. SEAMANS: Well in terms of live television, it doesn't play out and with local television it doesn't play out very well because you can call me and I would agree but I would promise you one of the other five stations in town, somebody is not going to agree and then we all run like lemmings and do the same thing. It's a responsibility but the competition factor in the television live shot these days is just relentless and there is no backing down.

MR. HARTMANN: On this issue about responsibility?

MR. ADAIR: But I think it can be done responsibly, and not to continue beating up on Jeanne, but I remember on CNN about two or three months ago there was an incident in Utah involving a chemical weapons plant or a chemical plant. And for several hours, you all were live saying terrorism alert has sounded at this plant and you kept using the word terrorism. Ultimately, it ended up not being anything. I think it was very valuable for you to let the public know about that but, in terms of being responsible, I think was it a terrorism alert or was it just a fence warning or something that went on?

And I think how we present it, especially the electronic media, can be much more responsible. Hey, wanted to let you know there is an alarm off at this plant in Utah, don't know if it's a coyote or a terrorist, but we'll keep you posted.

MR. HARTMANN: Jeanne?

MS. MESERVE: Can I just respond that there was a very active internal discussion at CNN exactly about these kinds of issues. That I feel, as a reporter on homeland security, that we have overblown some instances. For instance, what we thought was a theft of those vials in Texas a few months and it's something worth thrashing out. It's new to us, just

like it's new to all of you, and we are trying hard to find the right tone and the right way to present it so we don't cause unnecessary alarm for the public.

MR. HARTMANN: Don?

MR. HAMILTON: I want to go back to what Ike has come to twice, local TV. This is a pretty elite group. We dealing with the approach from Dover here. I mean we've got Ike Seamans, we've got Jeanne Meserve, we've got the New York Times. We've got serious, big city, national level reporters. I'm from Oklahoma City. The Daily Oklahoman has the distinction of having Columbia Journalism Review identify it as the worst metropolitan newspaper in the United States.

MR. HAMILTON: The local TV news all evening long in prime time had is a deadly virus threatening your children? Tune in at 10:00.

I mean the local TV news directors in Oklahoma City, the news directors as opposed to the talent, make about \$50,000 a year, for the news director. Most of the non-anchor correspondents make far less than that. We are talking about most people in most cities in America getting their news from people who are not likely to be invited to a forum at Harvard and the level of expertise, responsibility and knowledge is generally pretty bad. And that's what

makes the pushing of information out there so important because--

MR. HARTMANN: I have to speak a little bit unknowledgably here, but I imagine those reporters are watching CNN, so that CNN is immensely important, even to locals because that's where they are getting a lot of their information.

MR. HAMILTON: But the first thing that happens--

UNIDENTIFIED: I think they are watching Fox now.

(Laughter)

MR. HAMILTON: They're two-timers.

Yeah but Fox has the Simpsons.

MR. HARTMANN: Jane?

MS. SWIFT: Can I make another reality point? As fashionable as it is to believe that politicians are just media hams, and looking to take credit and talk about things that they have no knowledge of, the reality I believe in a governors office or in a mayor's office is far different. And we try very often to hire people into our administrations who have a lot of expertise, although that's not always easy in the public sector today.

We do rely on their knowledge but I will

tell you there is no doubt in my mind that Mayor
Bloomberg did know there were potentially three Arabs
on top of the bridge because when difficult decisions
where there is not a lot of certainty have to be made
that have particularly large ramifications, like
shutting down a bridge in rush hour, the chain of
command goes up. And because the health commissioner
doesn't want to lose their job if they make what is a
close call, in many of these situations and often
triggered --.

I thought it was a good point, it may be when the press starts to call that the mid-level bureaucrat or the health commissioner realizes they had best let the governor's office or the mayor's office know there are real policy decisions that elected officials need to make, and particularly at the state and local level, we do operate in the context, as elected officials every day, knowing that, and I think appropriately, the important decisions that we make when there is a close call as to what do you do is the action, is the governing, will have analysis and political and judgmental implications associated.

And all I think that the media should be aware of is we don't call the media back and say I don't give a shit if you are going to lose your job

because I can't give you information today. If there is going to be a respect, us understanding your imperatives to keep your job, to provide information because that's what your editors or your boss expects, there should at least be some reciprocal understanding that folks are making very important decisions knowing that you, the media, are in many ways going to be arbiter of how well I handled that, which will have significant implications for my professional future.

MR. HARTMANN: Gerry?

MR. LEONE: If I could, I'll just inject a little different perspective here. In Massachusetts, effects like these would trigger a process. I want to explain that to you because I would like to know your feedback, the media's feedback on how you would tie into this process. I can tell you this, I didn't make the same assumptions on this fact pattern that I think most people did. I thought terrorism, I thought worst case scenario right away. This is intentional, it's not accidental, it's not a medical issue.

I can tell you what would happen here, these facts would dictate a process. We have a communicator mechanism. Three are 12 to 15 people in state that get communicated directly by the activation by that communicator. It's across discipline, a multi-

agency communications system where the absolute heads over every one of those agencies, from the governor on down, the mechanism calls them. It chases you, cell phone, pager, every type of communication mechanism you have until you get back into the system. That system would then put all of those people together on a conference call, initially, and then a meeting.

And we have a discussion about what these facts mean. Is this terrorism? If it's not terrorism, that's great, let's exclude that possibility. Is this a medical issue? If it is, then let's turn to the commissioner of DPH and the health and human services and let's make that the issue. That's a process that exists here in the state. I can tell you, on two occasions within the last six months, it's been triggered, one was the threat elevation from yellow to orange, the other was when we had an anthrax scare on the northern part of our state where we had 10 to 15 letters.

It turned out to be a hoax, but 10 to 15 letters sent to 10 to 15 different communities within the north shore area of Massachusetts. Within a matter of minutes to hours, the communication mechanism was put in place, all of the heads of these agencies were put into communication by telephone and then we met at

the governor's office. I can tell you that when the threat elevation level went up this last time, we had all of those leaders, from the governor to the attorney general, actually the governor was out of state so we had the lieutenant governor, the attorney general, the heads of health and human service, emergency management, law enforcement and public safety, all in the same room.

And we made a decision about who was going to talk, what was going to be said before, collectively, we went to the press. I can tell you, as the former coordinator of a terrorism task force here in Massachusetts and now from where I sit, one of the things I hope to get out of today's discussion is how I tie the media into that process so we can better communicate, given that's our process, to the public.

MR. HARTMANN: Arn?

MR. HOWITT: I think that this is a good segue. I will leave it with Gerry said and actually throw it back to the press people. How would you want to be communicated with when something like this is being triggered?

MR. SEAMANS: Well obviously informed and informed quickly. I'm sorry, are you state or federal?

MR. LEONE: I'm now federal, previously

state. I'm with the US Attorneys Office, I was previously in the State's Office.

MR. SEAMANS: Well let me tell you that the worst communicators, or at least down on my level in Miami, and that's the feds.

MR. LEONE: I can tell you I would like to think, in the last 18 months, we've made great strides state/federal in communicating-(Laughter)

MR. SEAMANS: No, you haven't because-- (Laughter)

MR. SEAMANS: Because apparently for example, the FBI has taken over a great portion of this information flow which doesn't come out and the US Attorney is involved with that. And I know the US Attorney people, I've got contacts in there. Under penalty of death, it's hard to get information from these folks. You don't do a real good job in getting the message out. The state and local people, the local people do the best job, they understand that these live cameras are going to show up, and they've got to get ready and they've got to talk now.

The mayor knows this. He was telling me anything that happens in city, the live cameras are outside of his office in 10 minutes, and the same with

Chuck Lanza, and Miami emergency management. You just don't do a good job getting the word out. It's got to be legalized, it's got to be legal by the lawyers, you are the lawyers. It's got to be exactly right, exactly fitting in with I guess the administration's policies. The information flow out of the US Attorney, in my experience, is just not very good and I don't depend on it very much. It's just a statement and it's never the lead statement and you guys are supposed to be leading this effort these days. I think this may be the mentality at the federal level but the information flow is really poor.

MS. SEELYE: It's overly cautious--

MR. SEAMANS: Overly cautious, okay, I

see.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ MASIELLO: I've got a specific on that, an anecdote on that.

MR. HARTMANN: On the feds?

MR. MASIELLO: Yes.

MR. HARTMANN: We don't have any feds present, do we, that's too bad?

MR. MASIELLO: Let me just quickly expand on that, Lackawanna Six, everybody is familiar with that, the six terrorist in a terrorist cell in Lackawanna, just south of Buffalo. It's right on our

border, just south, a small little steel city. I found out about by watching --. Actually I wasn't watching TV, my wife was and she came upstairs Friday evening to tell me it was on TV. Well I started making phone calls, nobody told any of us that this was coming down.

But who was calling me all night long?

All the TV stations and newspaper reporters. The radio stations were calling me all night long, even though it's not in the City of Buffalo, what's going on here?

I didn't have anything to tell them and that, to me, is embarrassing and it makes me look bad. And even when I call the local FBI director, who we have a terrific relationship with and our police department works very closely with, he couldn't tell me anything, only that he couldn't tell me anything. But they weren't telling anybody anything.

MR. HARTMANN: On the feds?

MS. SWIFT: Yeah, on the feds and on the states.

MR. MASIELLO: And that was leaked out of Washington, by the way, it wasn't leaked out of local--

MS. SWIFT: I think maybe one of the good lessons--

MR. HARTMANN: I want to be careful not to beat up people who aren't here.

MS. SWIFT: I'm going to be defensive of them actually--

MR. HARTMANN: Okay, great.

MS. SWIFT: Because I think that one of the good lessons is I think the reason that things, and maybe they work better in Massachusetts which, considering the history between state law enforcement and the FBI, was not easy to achieve, although there was a lot of change of personnel. But I think there is, and has been for at least a year, incredible coordination of sharing information, speaking together as one voice between state, local and federal. But I will tell you I think it came from, and maybe this is the lesson, necessity because I hope many people have forgotten, because that was one of our goals.

But the two planes that flew into the World Trade Center came out of Boston. And the FBI and the state police were the people who were investigating from day one, and the political pressure was very much focused at the state and the federal law enforcement and political entities here. And I think that everybody, at every level of government, bought into the process and the fact that it was real, the antiterrorism task force. And that took buy-in from each level, and it took setting aside a history of bad

feelings that is necessary, and maybe we don't have enough elected officials and law enforcement here but, from the press' perspective, driving that process, there actually was a good impact because of the pressure from the press to get to the bottom of the story that resulted in I think a system that now works in Massachusetts of coordinating information and the federal government, unbelievably, to our state police and our state elected officials has been sharing information. So it can happen but it's not easy.

MR. LEONE: It's different with what Ike and Tony said, there are problems, there are historical problems. What I tried to do, when I read the papers in preparation for today, was say this is what we have in Massachusetts, let's get something constructive out of this. How do I now work with you to tie you into what exists in Massachusetts so that things can be better? We have a disconnect with what goes on in the main justices in Washington. What we try to do is localize the best we can and give whatever information we can that's available to us because we hear it on CNN as well.

MR. HARTMANN: Neal?

MR. PEIRCE: The model you raised, and Jane just commented on it, is I think a really

instructive one. And it's interesting to me that one other area that's done that really well now and has everybody waiting to be called, conferencing, getting a common voice, is the Washington region, which was the other hit on 9/11 and I don't know how widespread this is around the country and I think that's a really important issue. Where you haven't had the impetus of an attack, like 9/11, direct involvement, one way or the other, how many communities have done this? And then I think it's the press' responsibility to turn around to the elected officials and say why aren't you organizing and getting this set up in your region if it's not there?

MR. HARTMANN: I want to take a break shortly but, before I do, I want to hear a couple of voices we haven't heard. I'm going to hear from Chuck, and I want to hear from to hear from Lindsey because you are both being thoughtful and listening and you both have the responsibility, if you will, of sort of information. And I would like to hear a reaction from Amy to what they say. Let's start with you, Chuck.

MR. LANZA: I want to go back just a moment for it, to the original scenario and talk about that. Everything I've heard today talks about the politics of it and whether it's media driven or not.

But Ike mentioned last night about the public's need to know and I think we are still losing focus on whether we should be talking to you and how we should be talking to you. What we need to look at is the final message and how that's crafted for the public. I think we've lost sight of that.

I think the most important thing for us is that, at least in government, we need to make sure that we have some canned messages but so canned that they come out canned. But at least have those people we know that are experts ahead of time, not fly by the seat of our pants and try to pull somebody in because then we are just as bad as the media that we criticize for getting somebody off of the internet to come and talk about anthrax when they just once knew somebody who did a study about anthrax 10 years ago.

We need to have good, credible people and I think that's the only way we are going to survive this, both on the political side and on the civil service government side, as well as the media, is to have a good coordination. And I know it sounds very vague but I think the message needs to be crafted for the public and not so much we need to get through this, the political portion of it and the media driven portion of it and get to what the public needs to know

and that's a lot different than what I'm hearing sometimes.

MR. HARTMANN: That's a good basic premise to come back to because terrorism, the object of terrorism, is terror, so to disrupt people's daily lives. And if we think back from that, that we are really trying to minimize terror and disruption in the lives of the majority of the public so there is not generalized panic, we are trying to think back and say that's bad. We are really trying to think about our joint responsibility to minimize that.

Lindsey?

MS. WOLF: In San Jose, we have worked very hard over the last 10 or 15 years to develop a joint information process. So if we hear a first alert from our own people, the police, fire or whatever, we are instantly starting to call all of the PIOs together from various city organizations that might know about that particular thing and work different angles of that that we figure the reporters will want to know about. We also have very good relationships with the other governmental organizations in our area, particularly the county and the federal folks that are based in San Francisco.

If the information comes in from a

reporter, it works the same way, we have three or four key PIOs, the mayor's office, my office, the city manager's office, that can get together very quickly by phone to figure out who is going to know the information for that. The other thing that happens is we get calls from reporters saying I'm trying to find out about this, I can't get anybody to return my phone call, do you know anything about it? And the answer on that often is no, I don't know anything about it but have you called so and so? And they yeah and we can't get through.

And my response is I'll call them for you because they are not going to stiff me, if you will, they will answer my call. They will, I know that, I have that kind of reputation. And I can tell them what that reporter wants to know and sometimes, like Wednesday, I can answer that call for that person. The reporters was trying to get a hold of CalPin, the governor had put out a news release saying that the new power station in San Jose had gone on line and was operating. The reporter couldn't get through to CalPin to figure out if this was true or not, so he called me and said do you know anything about this? I said no but I can find out for you.

So I called one of our staff and said look

out the window, is the power plant operating? Can you see heat rising? What do you see? Yeah, he says, the heats rising. I'll call our recycled water guy, are they buying recycled water from us? I called the recycle guy, yeah, they bought 411,000 gallons yesterday, they are working. I'll call the tech guy and find out how many watts they are putting on the grid. Of course the tech guy answered his call, they are putting 180 megawatts on the grid. I called the reporter back. The good news was he got his question answered, the bad news was he no longer had a story.

So he didn't waste any more time chasing a false story.

MR. HARTMANN: Amy?

MS. DRISCOLL: Well, Lindsey, you must be beloved by reporters.

MS. WOLF: I am.

(Laughter)

MS. WOLF: I get thank yous all the time.

MS. DRISCOLL: Actually, I kind of respond to one way toward building relationships with reporters, which a lot of times you can circumvent a lot of these problems if you take the time to get the know the people. And you can't trust all reporters, I would never say that you could, but I think that having a personal relationship, especially in a time of

crisis, is an enormous help. Chuck and I last night were talking about the fact that in Florida we now address these kinds of crises, terrorism, through regions, there are seven regions in the state, which is interesting because every other crisis that we have is addressed county by county.

And yet suddenly, when a terrorist attack occurs, we are supposed to jump into this new mode, which I will tell you I think probably will have big problems when that happens. A coordinated approach is a wonderful idea, there is always going to be turf battles though between the feds and the locals. During anthrax, the FBI would not tell the health department what was going on, there were wild rumors that Mohammed Atta's former car had had anthrax powder in it and we could not find the answer to that. The FBI probably knew, they wouldn't tell us, they wouldn't tell the health department.

What were we supposed to put in the paper? Err on the side of caution and say, people, there may be some more anthrax floating out there, keep the information to ourselves, that's the dilemma that reporters face on that kind of thing. But again, I keep coming back to the same thing which is more information is better, let people make the decision

themselves. I know we can't let the hospitals be overwhelmed by panic but we are in an open society here, supposedly, and we really should trust people more with the information rather than keeping it to ourselves until we can coordinate our effort and make sure we have a statement to prepare and put out.

And if you are preparing your statement for all of us, I can tell you that in the three hours that you are preparing your statement, we are calling everybody else anyway. We are getting other information and it may not be as good, so it might not help you so much to have your carefully lined up statement of what you are going to say. Maybe if you call us and say we are trying to get X, Y and Z for you, we'll have it at 3:00 p.m., we are much more likely to feel a sense of okay, we are going to be taken care of, we're going to have the information we need and you can pull back the reins a little bit on that.

And our frenzy, which sometimes it is, is driven a lot by local TV, and CNN also, but even more so local because that's most of our markets these days are local. If I see Channel 7's chopper up there and they are broadcasting it live, you can't say to your editor let's wait a few hours, see what happens. They

are going to want you to go on it immediately and then with websites we post it too.

MR. HARTMANN: Let's take a break, I think it's time. Let's take just 15 minutes and get back to work pretty quickly please.

(Whereupon, at 10:05 a.m., there was a brief recess.)

(10:27 a.m.)

MR. HARTMANN: Start us off.

MR. HOWITT: Thanks, Frank. A very interesting conversation. I would like to pick up on the point that Gerry Leone made about the process of the government level springing into action. And let me just add a few things to the scenario that we've already talked about. As a result of the suspicions of the law enforcement people that there is at least the possibility of terrorism here, a search was launched of the colosseum where the basketball game had occurred and it was discovered that in the ceilings of a number of rest room there were devices that looked like crude aerosol dispersive devices.

Secondly, as the day has gone on, a number of additional cases of this flu-like symptom have started showing up in area hospitals and the first death has occurred. Now let me then ask questions of

both the press and government side here, one is what should government be doing in this instance in dealing with the press and obviously dealing with the public through the press? How proactive should government be in getting out the story? And what exactly is the story at this stage? Should government be getting out ahead of the curve?

The second question is for the press, obviously as some of the details spread out, more press institutions are going to spring into action, the pace is going to be tougher, the competition is going to get tougher, what should the press be doing to communicate and what will it be doing to communicate? So not only what should it be doing but what is it going to be doing?

And it seems to me that there are at least three kinds of tensions that are effecting both sides here, one if them is speed versus accuracy. How fast do you get the information out and what is the possibility that you will be giving misinformation?

Second, how much of this should be reassurance to the public so that there is not panic in a situation, versus the risk to credibility that reassurance will in fact be misplaced and that there is something serious going on that the public ought to be

worried about?

And third, I'm not quite sure how to frame this tension, the idea of simply getting the story out so that the public is not held in the dart versus the responsibilities, especially on the government side, of protecting the public and enforcing the law, which might require not getting at least some of the details of the story out or might be perceived in that way.

MR. HARTMANN: So ask your two questions again.

MR. HOWITT: So my two questions then are what should the government be doing in dealing with this situation vis-à-vis the press and ultimately in dealing with the public? And should it be getting proactive or should it be reacting at this stage in that regard? And secondly, what should the press be doing and are there things that the press will be doing that perhaps it shouldn't be doing in a situation like this?

MS. TOOMEY: There is no question then why you need to be proactive and I think that the public health piece at least is going to be the same whether it's this or an ecoli outbreak in a water park, it's the same message. Are my kids at risk? Is my family at risk? What do I need to do to protect myself? And

if you don't take control of that, you're going to be covered up anyway and get misinformation out. Not only proactive with as much as you know at the time but opportunities for regular updates with the press so that you can be sure that there is an expectation of regular information out as you are unfolding with new information. If not, you'll get covered up and again the bad information will get out.

MR. HARTMANN: Let me press you back to be more specific in Arn's scenario. So in Arn's scenario, who is speaking, when? Now you've got some evidence of terrorism, you have rough, crude aerosol devices. So what's--

MS. TOOMEY: We are working hard to determine what the agent is, we don't know at this time. The most important thing we are trying to determine is what it is and how we can respond to protect everyone who may have been exposed, as well as others in the community who may have come in contact with people who were there. We should have this information very quickly because our laboratory is working right now on identifying the agent. We will let you know as soon as we know, and very quickly, we'll put that response in place.

And I think at this time we would at least

know that it was bacteria or a virus, it was something and we would share that information--

MR. HARTMANN: Well I'm going to favor several government people to fill in, to add to what Kathleen started. We are saying what should government do in Arn's specific?

Chuck?

MR. LANZA: Tapping into what Kathleen said, we have ID'd the initial contacts as well as secondary contacts, the people that were there. That's number one priority for us. We also have to have people quickly on the agent trying to determine what it is. Unlike ecoli, which would pretty much be a dead end thing, the transmission of it again is reduced, if this is a droplet type of thing, we are talking about it getting out into the general public pretty quickly. We need to get that message out but we also, in government, have to identify what the treatments are going to be.

First of all, the diagnosis and the treatments and to coordinate that because the hospital overloading would become a critical factor by those sick and those that think they are sick. The psychological overlay would increase tremendously. I think the factors that most are using now are 10 to 1,

they found that in Tokyo, after the sarin, so we would want to reduce that as much as possible, but you know that it's going to happen anyway once the media gets a hold of it. But we are going to be using them at the time to look for--

MR. HARTMANN: Let me press you back a second before we turn to Jane and John. Give me a sense of time. In other words, the media is pressing you hard, how long is this going to take you to get organized and to sort of give information out? Is it an hour, is it 24 hours or—

MR. LANZA: Well the model is already created. I think SARS, we just demonstrated that these type of things are being done already, we need to replicate that. The question is do we have local officials that are versed or well versed in that yet? I'm not so certain of that but I would suggest that you have a plan in place about how to activate this and have our people out there on the streets quickly. And we did that with anthrax also but that was a slow start up. This I think would have to be a quick one based on the fact that we've done it in the past.

MR. HARTMANN: Jane?

MS. SWIFT: Let me say what I think would happen in Massachusetts, it builds off what Gerry said,

and then just throw out one of the potential problems because I think it's very clear at this point that getting good information out, even if it's limited, in the most credible way is what will allow you to prevent, hopefully, panic, maintain order and also reassurance and credibility don't always have to be intentional where there are tensions in how you answer those questions.

So I think the best case scenario, from the press' perspective, government's perspective and probably the media is to quickly pull all of the levels of government and the folks who are responsible for making some legitimate decision to one place, as Gerry described, we have done at times successfully in Massachusetts, and to have them stand and speak together. I think the advantage that we forget, it's often a disadvantage in other scenarios, that you have in Massachusetts that you don't have in other states is our state capital is in the center of our commercial and media district.

And so all of those people, on most given days, or somebody they would directly delegate to are within 20 minutes or a half an hour, depending on traffic. And I think we have to think about when the governor is in Albany, and the mayor is in New York and

the press is dispersed, I'm not sure if it's as easy to get a perfect scenario and I'm not sure how you address that.

The second thing I would say, and actually it builds off what Chuck said and we dealt with this, the press would love to talk to the people who have the most specific knowledge of what is actually happening. One of the problems is that public responsibility demands that they actually be working and not talking I know you would love to talk to the scientist who is testing the agent but my responsibility is probably to not pull that guy out of the lab but to find somebody else who can speak credibly. And I think there needs to be a different discussion about that as well, that governors, mayors or arbiters, do I make Chuck come into the mayors office or into the governors office to do a press briefing? Or is it more important that he be at a place where he is directing very important work because we probably now do have an emergency?

MR. HARTMANN: John?

MR. ODERMATT: I couldn't agree more with the governor and with Chuck, but it's a problem because in a lot of states it's geographically based, you can't get all those people together to give one unified

both questions very succinctly is that it's so important to be able to create that system where everybody who is involved is put together immediately. And you can't do that at 2:00 in the morning, you can't do that at 3:00 in the morning but the reality of it is that you have to because now that we've gotten this new information about the aerosolized cans being in the HVAC system, and we'll make an assumption that it is, it's important to get those people together. And that has happened because I've been at Gracie Mansion at 1:00 or 2:00 in the morning doing just that.

But once that happens, now our responsibility to the media is that we create this one source of information and that really use it as an opportunity to get out the information that we want the public to know about it. And the information is simple, it's not that hey, we found aerosolized cans, it's that we have investigated it and this is where we are in the investigation, and use it as an opportunity to tell the public if you were at that basketball game, you need to go to X location or Y location, not to tell people about the investigation or what we found, it's that we are at that point in the investigation. That's the first part of it.

And then in terms of utilizing the media to its effectiveness is realizing -- I don't know who said it before -- is that we'll get the maximum bang out of the media release at 9:00 in the morning or at 7:00 in the morning when people are waking up. So perhaps to work up to that point, if it's at that time at night, because we know at 3:00 in the morning it's not really going to reach anybody. But we have to be ready for the media at 7:00 in the morning to get that information out to its maximum effectiveness.

MR. HARTMANN: Don?

MR. HAMILTON: The key here is the

aerosolized cans because that's
the litmus test. That makes it
not Legionnaire's 7, this is
what makes it terrorism, and the
dynamic of this is going to be
the people who should be
thinking about media strategies
may be kept out of it. This is
criminal evidence in an ongoing
criminal investigation. Two
things are going to happen, to a
certain degree, it depends on
whether an incident command

system has been set up, but the feds are going to be involved, they are going to run it up the food chain.

And at the same time the locals folks are there, the mayor is going to know, the governors going to know, and classically, in these circumstances, someone at the political level in Washington or someone at the political level locally, leaks it. The law enforcement tendency is going to be let's sit on this until we are sure what we have and let's protect the information as tightly as we can to protect our prosecution, but it's going to get out, it's going to happen.

And at that point, you have a whole new level of frenzy. You have strong suspicion that it is not a naturally occurring event and maybe these all turn out, after six hours of thrashing around and trying to figure it out, maybe it all turns out these were aerosol deodorant cans. But the potential for a real frenzy here is very high and you've got some conflicting interests that are going to thrash themselves out very hard within the bureaucracy.

MR. ODERMATT: But that's exactly right and that's just the point of not saying that you have

aerosolized cans.

MR. HAMILTON: My point is that it's too important --. The sensible thing to do is to keep your mouth shut about it and--

MS. SWIFT: But it will get out.

MR. HAMILTON: Somebody will miss the importance of it.

MS. SWIFT: Let me just state a point about a situation that I've been. If you are the political official who doesn't talk and you've answered a question in a misleading way, you are screwed.

MR. HAMILTON: Absolutely.

MS. SWIFT: Because you know the three levels of government are going to know about it, and it gets out and you have said to whomever--

MR. HAMILTON: You throw sand in their eyes and some jerk in Washington, the assistant deputy secretary of something, calls the plan.

MS. SWIFT: I think the media has to understand that dynamic.

MR. HARTMANN: Darrel? I want to hear from the government people first and then the media press back.

MR. STEPHENS: One complicating factor is, back to the airport, that tournament, most people that

had tickets aren't from the town that it's in and so that has to be that all the things that people said are right. You've got to pick up, how do we connect with where these folks are going back to through that airport, because I think, as Don said, with aerosol cans combined with everybody that's been sick that's local seems to come from the basketball game. So we've got a real big issue on our hands and the more we can get out, the quicker we can get it out I think the better we are to try to isolate those people.

MR. HARTMANN: Eric?

MR. FUREY: From an operator's point of view, I think that we jumped ahead a little bit in the scenario because between the time the people are getting sick and they're saying that it's the basketball game, until the time that, whether it be a HAZMAT team, Boston HAZMAT or the first CST working together with them, it's going to be a long time trying to sweep the Fleet Center, bathroom and nook and cranny trying to find these cans. It could be a long time getting samples and then verifying the samples with the Department of Public Health. It probably will not be 24 hours.

MR. ODERMATT: I think you've kind of taken for granted that we found the cans but to culture

it I think is what you are saying and to really find out whether it's an actual, I mean it's pretty reasonable that we would know what it is at that point.

MS. SWIFT: And I will say there is a system where there are homeland security designees in every single state who have an emergency number to call and homeland security at the federal level and because of the nature of the event and that apropos the other states, but also just the potential that it would get out. I think that system would have been activated early on which makes it even more likely that somebody is going to say something because when governors in all 50 states know, you sort of work with the least common denominator.

MR. HARTMANN: Kathleen?

MS. TOOMEY: What PCR, we would be able to identify it in a matter of hours, not days. But I think the complicating factor which makes this different than your ecoli outbreak is the fact that, because it's terrorism, the FBI are in charge and so I'm not free to go and just make a statement, all that has to be vetted in partnership with law enforcement. And I think that's where we get hung up as well as the media get seemed as though we were tripping over each other and that's what happened with anthrax.

MR. HARTMANN: Let's step back and remember our objective again. I think the objective is not to panic people, that's very important that people not panic. And that the people who need to be seen, in terms of treatment or evaluation, actually know who they are and what they should do. So it seems to me that's success, we want to operate back from that.

MS. SWIFT: I'm not sure if there isn't, in our democratic society, also a belief among the public that they have a right to know what's going on. So I agree with you that in terms of what needs to happen to affect activities, the right people getting the right tests, is a responsibility. I do think that the general public expects that if there is serious information like that, that it is the obligation of elected officials to share it.

And how you do that without inciting panic is with a better relationship with the press, I hope, and the establishment. I don't think you can assume that the only responsibility to the public is to utilize media to reach the people that you need to get tested, be safe, go somewhere. I think there is a responsibility to the public to know.

MR. HARTMANN: So it's this balance though between accuracy and speed.

Bill, let's get the press entering at this stage.

MR. ADAIR: A confession, I want you to leak everything to me and not to my competitor and I want to win a Pulitzer Prize.

(Laughter)

(Laughter)

MR. ADAIR: And this is my opportunity to do this. So if you would just help me win this Pulitzer, that would be great.

MS. FETTERMAN: My confession is when we found the aerosol devices, I thought okay, now we've got a real story. So that's really how our little brains are working.

MR. HARTMANN: Nancy? Okay, Michael?

MR. MORAN: Isn't there a further implication here of, for instance, let's say this was Metropolis. I have tickets to go to Madison Square Garden to see the Rangers tonight. If you are withholding the information that this happened and those people go to Madison Square Garden and it happens again, then you are culpable for that, regardless of the criminal investigation and the implications of that. The press is going to make that argument and that actually I think is the right argument.

MS. SWIFT: Can I hang on the hat that elected officials who make such decisions whether or not to shut down the game, whether or not to call the Knicks, but they have that potential for making life--

MR. MORAN: But I guess what I'm saying is there is a balance somewhere between panic and absolute knowledge. And one of the great haunting feelings I had all through the 9/11 experience was where the hell is the government? I mean how could a plane hit the Pentagon a half hour after the second one hit the World Trade Center? Who is telling me what's going on? There was nobody. I mean News Radio 88, I was like crazy on my radio, nobody could tell us anything, and it was completely understandable. Nobody knew really anything but I do think the reflex the government has not to panic people sometimes gets in the way of the fact that you should be scared.

(Laughter)

MR. MORAN: You should be scared and it makes it worse.

MR. HARTMANN: We're trying to find the balance, find some reasonable balance here.

Nancy?

MS. DEMME: John said that that the main message, and I agree, the main message is to the public

what to do, where to go and we start there. And then I do think there was a caveat during the sniper thing that we have six hours max before whatever we found and are dealing with becomes media knowledge, max.

MS. FETTERMAN: You had six hours.

MS. DEMME: And we knew that the letter would be out, we knew that all these things would be out but we had to work as quickly as we can. And then the feedback from the public generally has been that they don't want the case tried, I mean they don't want all the evidence put forth in the media. And unfortunately, some of the media I think wants to do the investigation on the airways as well and the public doesn't necessarily want that. They do need to know, as he said, that there are aerosol cans in the sports arena because they need to make an informed decision whether they go to the next arena event because we don't know for sure and we can't tell them that they are not there.

So there are things we have a responsibility to get out there, even if it is part of the investigation, as long as, in some way, it doesn't compromise the investigation. But I do think that there is that extra level that sometimes media goes to to begin to do the investigation themselves through the

media, whether it's following investigators around, or bringing in talking heads or one level farther that hopes to instill some of the panic.

MR. HARTMANN: Tony?

MR. MASIELLO: At least for me, I would rather err on the side of giving a little bit more accurate information that not giving enough accurate information. I think that's important because I think if you are hiding things, you're not telling things that are really accurate. I mean timing that is important, it's bad. I would rather give people more information, I mean accurate information, not bad information.

MR. HARTMANN: Put yourself in this situation though, what are you going to tell them?

MR. MASIELLO: What I'm I going to tell

them?

MR. HARTMANN: Or with your experts, but what's the message?

MR. MASIELLO: I'm going to tell them that what we know right now --. Oftentimes, public elected officials or government officials or whatever have a tendency to say too much, they look too good, the know it all. And I think it's more important to tell them what you do know but also, again, here are the facts as

we know it right now, this is what we are going to report in the next update and these are the people who are part of the information process because I think the mayor or the governor sets the tone and the balance, but you can't scare everybody.

But here, again, it gets back to the Fleet and the next event because I've had to do this in snow crises with major league hockey and major concerts. I have to make the call to close that building and I have the information, now is the media going to allow me to close that building without telling them why, for the next event? It will never happen.

MR. HARTMANN: Tony, let me press back.

Are you going to describe the symptoms of this

particular malaise?

MR. MASIELLO: I probably would not.

MR. HARTMANN: Or your spokesperson?

MR. MASIELLO: I probably would not because I'm not good at that. I know what I can do and I can't do and I know what I know and what I don't

know.

MR. HARTMANN: This is the government in general because Chuck is worried about overloading the hospitals, so are you going to describe the symptoms?

MR. MASIELLO: What I would probably say

is listen, if you were at the game, these are the symptoms that you have to be concerned about and we would advise you, based on the information I would get from the people advising me, that you call your doctor for--

MR. STEPHENS: I would have a number set up for them to call and then you connect them with the medical people.

MR. ODERMATT: But that's where the opportunity is. Now the opportunity is to get across the information that is available. The information is that, number one, you were at the game, number two, these are the symptoms and hopefully emergency managers have a system in place to mass treat people so the hospital system is not overwhelmed. You set up a point of dispensing for mass prophylaxis and that's the way you do it. All the information in this scenario is there to do that. If it wasn't, then you would have to worry about the information going out too soon not to overwhelm the system.

MR. HARTMANN: Jim?

MR. WOLF: Just a couple of quick points, it seems to me that, on the government side, what you want to be able to do is set up a robust system of communication that's fault tolerant because you are

going to make mistakes. It is inevitable. Eric said we may not know for a while what it is, and other people said oh, we'll know within an hour or 24 hours, that's not the way it worked with anthrax, anthrax was characterized differently over time and there were multiple tests that had to be taken over time and people made mistakes.

So you've got to know in advance that you have a communications program that's going to be responsive and robust but it will make mistakes. So how do I present information in a way that, when I make a mistake, thy system doesn't fall apart quickly?

Just on a couple of other things, if I was a government person, I would want to know what are the stories I want to put out? I want to tell people what they can do, I want to tell particular constituencies what they should do, that is private physicians.

People are going to want to know causes, they are going to want to know what the future is like but all of this is empirically knowable. You go back and you look at the last way the big story was covered and you say well there is a human interest story here, and there is a story on this, and a story on that and a story on that. And you prepare material to give to the press on the stories they are likely going to write based on press

history. This is knowable and it is preparable, and so you are not caught trying to respond as if it's happened for the first time.

And then the final thing I would say is I know folks are worried about the hospitals but in Oklahoma City and in the sarin gas attack, it's private physicians where people showed up and people really need to think about the communications system that you raised, Kathleen, with private physicians because these folks are often unplugged and don't know what's going on. And a lot of the danger here and the effects will be not the number of people who die but the psychological trauma, the terror that will result in increased hospital admissions, children being scared, mothers with children being scared.

The particular populations that are vulnerable to the psychological consequences of those things but the mental health aspect is almost never discussed. It's always what about the dead bodies? But this response mechanism really needs to focus on the mental health/social worker/private physicians side that's out in the population. That's where people will go to and if they have a bad experience, that's what will traumatize them.

MR. HARTMANN: Ike, are you going to

respond to Jim's proposal that you have a robust communications system that knows how to fix mistakes?

MR. SEAMANS: Well it sort of spins off of that.

MR. HARTMANN: Is anybody else responding directly to that? His proposal? Yeah, Bob?

MR. BLENDON: I just want to go along with Jim, we asked people, and that's why New York would be very different, if they were under biological attack, where would they got first. It's 75 percent that would go to their private physician, call and what makes it worse is the unbelievable belief that when they get there, Moses is there saving them. So you really have to have a connection here very quickly. New York is the place they would go to the hospitals but that's not true for most of America. In most of America, they will try this crowd first, their family doctor, and then they'll drift over towards the ERS.

MR. MASIELLO: A point of clarification,
Bob. In New York, the first response would be for
people to go to their hospitals or go to their doctor.

MR. BLENDON: Well New York City is more likely to use ER, outpatient departments because it's where they get a lot of their care, much more so than the rest of the US. Most other people always identify

call local doctor. New York surveys--

MS. MESERVE: Even if they don't have insurance?

MR. BLENDON: --issue but we are talking about 15 percent don't have insurance. So the 85 that do, New York is a big, and I'm talking about the city, a big outpatient ER place. They are much more likely to use those physicians than the rest of America that relies very heavily on individual doctors. They will call, go, try to get an appointment and then they'll spill over, unless you tell them that you want them to go somewhere else.

MR. HARTMANN: I want to stay with Jim's thought that we need a robust communications system that knows how to fix mistakes. So are you on that?

MR. WALSH: You can suffer mistakes and--

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$ HARTMANN: --and then also know how to sort of--

MR. HOWITT: I'm not sure I know what that means, actually.

(Laughter)

MR. WALSH: For some reason, we see some organizations that are able to do this very well. If you asked what's the government organization that does the best in terms of public communications, and I

hadn't given this a lot of thought, it's the Department of Defense. They have the best website, everyone uses that website. They feed those reporters, they know how to run --. They know what their stories are.

(Laughter)

MR. WALSH: I mean I'm not in favor of it but I needed to be descriptive. Nobody does a better job than they do in terms of being able to achieve what government's want to achieve in the press like this.

MR. HARTMANN: Don?

MR. HAMILTON: The robust part--

 $$\operatorname{MS.}$ LEANING: The NTSB is a point of the call, it's--

MR. HARTMANN: They deal with different kinds of issues.

MR. HAMILTON: The robust part happens internally. One of the things that's going to have to happen is that the political figures and the PIOs are going to have to go to war with the men in black, the investigators, the intelligence people, all of that. Because the instinct of the law enforcement and intelligence crowd is to say let's wrap this up and keep it quiet, it will help the investigation. So there's going to have to be an internal war there and the PIOs and the politicals are going to have to say

what's the worst thing that would happen if this became public? What is the worst?

And what's the worst way for it to become public? The worst way for it to become public is in filtration out through ambulance drivers and partially informed people, so you've got to get out there. The mayor is right when he says I want to tell them what we know. You've got to draw at least the most obvious conclusions for them. We have received information that there are these aerosol devices there. This forces us to consider, at this moment, that this was likely a terrorist event.

What does this mean for you? If you weren't at the game and if you haven't been in intimate contact with someone at the game, it just means that you probably shouldn't go to the next game. Those of you who were their and their immediate family members should look for these symptoms and should consult your physician. But the people inside the system have to force an orderly release of the information and draw the obvious conclusions for the public because I remember where we started with the two or three percent, and what people understand, and I'm not going to light matches around sarin gas. You've got to give some simple, basic instructions and push the

information out, what does it mean for you?

MR. ODERMATT: But why would you have to tell people about the aerosol devices?

MR. HAMILTON: Because they are going to find out anyway and they are going to find it out in a fragmented fashion.

MS. SEELYE: Why would you not tell them?

MR. ODERMATT: Because it may hamper the

investigation.

MS. SEELYE: That's why we have reporters all over surrounding you and your very perfectly orchestrated press conference. We've got reporters with all the sources all around asking questions and a couple go into the press conference because of why should we tell them?

MS. DEMME: And it's coming out anyway, and it is coming out, so it's better if it comes from us in context, it gives us much more credibility.

That's why we always play with the six hours because it was coming anyway, use it, analyze it, do what we can as quickly as we can with it and then we be the source of it.

MR. STEPHENS: Six hours is a long time actually.

MR. HARTMANN: Maryn?

MS. MCKENNA: I want to respond to the point about structuring a communications strategy, but just to address what Nancy just said, in my newsroom, in my city, and I'm sure in any other city where this happened, as Mindy says, this just became a full court So we are not only talking to the official sources, we know by now in which ERs these people are being treated, and there is reporters, and there is live trucks outside the ERs that are clamoring for --. The hospitals, if they are smart, have activated their emergency plans and they've sent out a spokesperson but the TV people are probably, forgive me, shoving mics in the faces of the nurses who are coming off shift and saying do you know you are treating bioterror patients? Are you going to go home to your kids? (Laughter)

MS. MCKENNA: But in terms of the communications strategy, I think an important point to keep in mind is that, particularly with regard to infectious diseases, the public is always going to assume the worst. And what that means is that you are telling that this is something that apparently was transmitted in an airborne manner. They are going to assume that there is direct person-to-person transmission, that they can give it to somebody else.

They are going to assume, unless you can specifically tell them otherwise, that this death, which might be somebody, as in the case of the smallpox vaccinations who had a family and personal history of heart disease, and went out and played tennis and dropped dead, but it didn't really have anything to do with their smallpox vaccination. It might not have anything to do with the fact that they went to this basketball game but you better know that, otherwise the public will assume that this is something that kills people.

And the third thing is that even when you tell people that there is a very specific case definition, that you are only at risk if you fit these three or four categories, the fever, you've got respiratory symptoms, and you went to this basketball game last night. People get so nervous about scary, unknown infectious agents that they are likely to think my neighbor six houses down went to that game last night and I wonder how far this spreads, so I'm going to go to my doctor anyway. So the communications strategy has to keep in mind not just what you know and don't know but the worst that people are going to imagine.

MR. LEONE: We're now hitting upon, and Peter captured this in his paper, but we are now

hitting upon one of the greatest tensions between the media and government as it relates to criminal law enforcement, in that the media wants to run with an investigation, they want to find out all the information and they want to report the information. Even if it's because of what Bill said or what Nancy said earlier, either you are keeping up with the Jones and trying to beat the next media outlet or it's just that entertainment portion of what media has become post O.J.

But in any event, on the criminal side, you're trying to maintain the integrity of an investigation. We are trying to get to all of those individuals who may be witnesses in the criminal investigation, we're trying to get to all the evidence. There is that big band of yellow tape around the Garden, or the Fleet Center or wherever this has occurred.

And I think it would be very helpful to talk this through on how we get to the base of this tension. I think the base of this tension is really trust between the media and criminal law enforcement types, and the media knowing that they'll get as much information as they can without us compromising what we are trying to do on our end. But to me it's a

competing tension which always exists when you have a crime scene and a criminal investigation.

MR. SEAMANS: The tension only is --. And I didn't mean to criticize you unfairly when I was talking about feds not being responsive. I've suddenly realized, listening to other people, that really what I was trying to say is it's the legal process that you're concerned with, and therefore, you are the slowest to provide information, which is what reporters have a problem with. And I don't know how you, as a US attorney or the FBI which is legal, I don't know how you overcome that and that's why there is the tension there because you want to maintain or the chief wants to maintain the integrity of the investigation, but we interpret it as you are just too cautious and you don't want to provide the information. And that is a problem that's going to be difficult to overcome.

MR. LEONE: And you're absolutely right but I think in a situation like this, and this is not unique, there really has to be a dual track approach. There is the criminal law enforcement investigative piece but there is also this very important public information piece which we need to get out as quick as possible. And it's a balance but I think it's only a balance that you can engage in and win when you bring

the right parties to the table and we talked about how you are going to do it.

MR. HARTMANN: Ed?

MR. PLAUGHER: I think that is absolutely correct and this is a super fundamental question about where we are as a nation. Homeland security has absolutely nothing to do with homeland security because we are not going to lock down our nation, we are not going to become ultra secured. The real question is how are you secure in an open society? And we have to remember we are creating a model that we've never had before which is this threat, whether internal or external, that is changing the way we live or we are resisting the change in the way we live.

Again, I'm part of a senior advisory committee that is advising the president's homeland security advisory council and this is a key issue that we are currently working on at the various levels within this homeland security council. And we just published this template, the Statewide Template

Initiative, a publication for all 50 governors on what are we telling the governors to do in this regard.

Because it is a fundamental basic question about who we are, how we governance ourselves and how we are going to governance ourselves in the future.

First off, a statement was made earlier about the FBI is in charge and the FBI is not in charge, the FBI is in charge of the criminal prosecution of the terrorists but they are not in charge of the incident. The governors of the 50 states are in charge. We are a nation of states that the governors are the ultimate authority. The statement was made last night that the president issue a policy about quarantine. The president has no quarantine capability, only the public health officials in the 50 states have quarantining authority. The president might think he has quarantining authority and he probably will act like he does but that's a whole different issue.

(Laughter)

MR. PLAUGHER: What is being advised?
What is being done at this level? Because the
governors have a full plate, I mean their plate is
enormous in this regard because they do have to have to
conduct the investigations, they do have to protect the
public. And so what do we tell them? We are telling
them that you better do it now, you better work out
your systems now. And one of the things that we are
telling them is information sharing and technology.

One of the key questions that a state has

to answer now, and I'm not quite sure who you are going to report this back to but we're telling them they have to answer this question, maybe just for themselves, do local and state plans provide for outreach to the media during and after terrorist incidents, natural disasters, and all different types of hazards that go on in their community? We need to work this out, this is very, very fundamental. We should not be debating who gets what information at what time, that was yesteryear, today, we've got to sort through this.

MR. HARTMANN: So the issue right now is whether the media has further information about the aerosol cans and at some point, John and Gerry are saying hold on, you guys are trying to be the investigators here and we need to hold some of this stuff confidential.

MR. PLAUGHER: The game plan and how do you protect yourself in an open society has to take that into consideration. That's all I'm saying is let's make sure we develop our game plan, let's make sure that we have a clear cut understanding, that we've had an incident, there is information that would be helpful for the investigation. The investigative authorities are in charge of that particular piece of this unified command, they make that decision about

whether or not the aerosol can information is released.

The public health officials have another slice of the unified command, they have to make a decision about the information that gets released about how we are going to manage the public health threat. The decision now whether or not to run the basketball games, obviously a political decision, has to be communicated within I think between governors, between other governors about other events in our nation because people do travel. How do we put that in context? So it's all about making sure that we have a unified command and part of the unified command, from my perspective, needs to include a media representative.

MR. HARTMANN: Juliette?

MS. KAYYEM: I'm picking up on both things of what Ed and Gerry said. Coming from a history at main DOJ, I'm operating from the assumption that the leak actually came from the FBI.

MS. KAYYEM: It's true. So the idea that we have to keep it quiet is I think somewhat fanciful.

(Laughter)

Let me give an incentive for why the government should come out soon and fast with a lot of facts and that is because not just CNN but now NECN,

with the local 24 hour stations, they are filling time because they are calling Jim, Arn and I. And let me tell you what I do when I get that phone call, I never check a government website. I mean it's just like forget, they are too slow, they are too --. I'm checking CNN.com and MSNBC, I don't have cable in my office. If I get a chance, I'm going to watch cable.

If I don't see a government person, if I'm going to be on --. The question they are going to ask me, a correspondent or someone will ask me, is will you go to the game in New York? Would you go to the game in New York? I have no context for that unless I've heard from a government official, unless I have some context for the story.

So in terms of filling all the time, the government spokespeople are only going to be on for two minutes, the correspondent is only going to on for a little bit, and then they are going to fill five or six minutes with some panel of people who need to be at least as well informed and they are not going to get informed from some government website that's going to help them. I'm going to have 20 minutes to look at a couple of websites and most of them are going to be media ones, so I'm feeding off of all of you.

MR. HARTMANN: Jim, back on that?

MR. WALSH: That's certainly my experience and I would agree with that.

On the issue of the aerosol cans, you don't want to put yourself, we said it before, I think it's just an untenable position to hold back because they are going to find out, then you will have lost all your credibility. You can't make judgements in advance about whether this piece of information is important or not important, just to disagree with you a little bit, Nancy, because you are judging in the present. It may turn out that that piece of information you think is not important enough for the public to know turns out to be crucial later on and you can't judge that at the time.

So the bias has to be to release it rather than hold it, realizing that there is no free lunch here. There are going to be errors on both sides but the costs of holding it and getting burned are worse than the costs of releasing it. And there was one other thing I was going to say but I'll just pass. Certainly, what Juliette describes is certainly what I have gone through, that describes my experience to a tee and my colleagues who are a similar position.

MR. HARTMANN: Jennifer?

MS. LEANING: There are a couple of

dimensions that I think we should be paying attention to here, one is the flow of time and this links to how I would position press and government as an observer in this. Certainly, a fundamental issue is trust but I don't think we should look for trust. There is an appropriate conflict of interest between the press and the government and although the media representative might be in the unified command, that media representative is not speaking for the press. The press is not in the unified command, the press in this country is outside. And I think the government has to realize that, that the tension is always going to be there.

What I've observed is, over time, as these things start to unfold, if it becomes really serious, then you begin to see the press becoming much more pliable and much more willing to work with the government, if in fact the government has been straightforward, honest and respectful. Then you begin to get that alliance in the sort of mid to later phases of a disaster and a terrorist incident which you really must have, which we saw with the World Trade Center and the mayor, which actually developed with the sniper in the Washington area. Initially, it was very raggedy and then people started following their set point and

it began to work very, very well.

So what I would be suggesting here is that, at the early phases, which is what your scenario right now is, Arn, is that it's going to be messy and there is going to be quite difficult cross threads going on that everybody has to be aware of. But people should be aiming for that place the next day or the day after in this unfolding incident where you want to be in a place of pretty good trust. And that has some implications for how you, as a government official, have to behave now.

MR. HARTMANN: Jane?

MS. SMITH: I think you can make it not be messy much more quickly if, after an original incident or just because elected officials decide to do it, you bring everybody together on the government side and the highest ranking person already have a comfort level of how they are going to deal with these issues. And I would also say, no matter who speaks on camera, there is that tension between the press and the investigative authorities, emergency management authorities, and an elected official.

In many states, it will be the governor but, in places like New York, if it happens in New York City, if it's a big city, then it would probably be the

mayor, particularly if the governor is not in close proximity. It will be the elected official who will be the arbiter and make the call about what is appropriate to release and those decisions I think are much better for the public and much better for the investigation if you can have that open conversation before you go out and talk to the press.

MR. HARTMANN: Mike?

MR. MORAN: A quick just fact that the aerosol cans are out, public knowledge, no doubt. I mean I've seen it happen. If it doesn't come from justice, it will come from the CIA, it will come from someone whose vested interest is this is going to get worse if we don't tell or I'm going to curry favor with a source or whatever it is. It's going to happen. It probably goes from Washington, in my experience. And more importantly, to defend John's point on the investigation, taking kind of a contrary view in the media, I've been involved in a situation, with regard to al-Qaeda, where I regret something that was reported.

A colleague and myself both got information that, in 1998, when most people didn't know what al-Qaeda was, that bin Laden's cell phone was being picked up and eavesdropped on by NSA. And we

didn't think twice about reporting it because no one paid attention to the stories anyway. We couldn't get al-Qaeda on nightly news. There was a joke going around that if bin Laden had trained killer sharks, perhaps--

(Laughter)

MR. MORAN: --we might have been able to get the story on it. But we did get this bit and this was the value and, in this case, the backlash of having a website is that network news, when things that don't make the bar for network news, often show up on MSNBC.com. They are very good stories. This one was a very true and good story but it caused bin Laden to stop talking on his cell phone, or his satellite phone, excuse me, and that was a disaster.

MR. JONES: May I ask if anyone asked you not to report that story?

MR. MORAN: No one. And we were criticized later and the issue is don't criticize me, find the guy in the CIA who made this judgement. If they tell the press, the press is not in the job of withholding information that it has. We will do that

when it's clear and obvious but it was not clear and obvious, in this particular story, that this was a national security issue that should not have been told to us probably.

MR. HARTMANN: Ike or do you want to-MR. JONES: No, no.

MR. SEAMANS: Jennifer was right on point about getting the press involved. The media, I can't speak for the Oklahoma City and so forth, but the media, national media, bigger city media, we're not just looking to make you look bad. And in situations like this--

MS. MCKENNA: But if we do, that's gravy. (Laughter)

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$ SEAMANS: May I say it's also inevitable.

(Laughter)

point, you can get the press to work with you. Again, this beast of local live television which is the bane of everybody, including a lot of us who are in the business. You can get us to work with you. During the anthrax thing in Florida, Chuck Lanza came around and

talked to all the televisions stations' news directors

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MR. SEAMANS: Seriously. Here is a key

about calming it down. During the hurricane season,

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for example, the hurricane people talk to the weathermen about don't dramatize, don't say it's right here when it's 1,000 miles away because, with their graphics, it could appear that it's in your backyard.

You can get us on your side, particularly that beast of local live TV which is the first point of contact that people are going to have with your story, and you can get the newspapers to work with you, not forever but you can for a while, to calm it down but you've got to work with the press, and that's the whole thing. I've seen many examples, even the most ludicrous local television stations that will go on live with anything, if you tell them you can't do this, they will respond. And so don't hold us back, work with us and make it a symbiotic thing.

MS. DEMME: Can I respond to that? I kind of want to clarify that even though I said that there were times, and I talked to Jeanne about this yesterday, that the media did take on that sort of responsibility, and come forth with issues they were about to put out and say would this compromise or cause the person to shoot? And there was a point, and some of you may remembers, that very early on, the first two days, an individual's face was on the cover of a North Carolina newspaper as the person wanted for the

shootings. And that came out about that they listened to the scanners, and they put that up, and it was misrepresented down the line, down the East Coast.

But they quizzed us, quizzed us, quizzed us and they wouldn't back off of it. And finally, I said to the chief, I'm going out there. And it wasn't that big then, it was like the third day so it wasn't what you saw in the end. Well when I went out, I asked them to put down the pens, put down the paper, put down the camera and I'm going to talk to you off the record, which I know there is no off the record. I mean I do understand that but it was like we had to say why we can't talk about it.

And they were really good once we said it's going to be a Richard Jewell situation, he's missing at the right time, he's got that kind of gun, he's got that kind of car, he's got military training, but nothing puts him in the area so please back off of him. And then they did but it does take the extra--

MS. LEANING: Plus teh fact that we all had to pay Richard Jewell money too.

(Laughter)

MR. SEAMANS: In this book that they gave us last night, I was reading it, and there's a chapter in here by a man named Nachman Shai, who I know, who is

a former spokesman for the Israeli Embassy in Washington and then later in Israel. And he goes through a lot of scenarios that I happened to be involved with in various wars and terrorism things. And he talks about --. It's very interesting if you people are trying to learn how a media person at that level sees us and he sets up a situation, there was a terrorist incident, and we did this and we did that, and he goes this is what I did to calm it down and this is what the government did. And he goes through it one, two, three, four.

And I used to see this in Israel, the
Israeli press is incredibly aggressive, more aggressive
than the United States press. They really knocked the
hell out of the government and the army before and
after the event. During it, as he points out, they
really worked together for the common good. It's not
like here where the World Trade Center goes down, and
I'm in Miami, and it's big but it doesn't effect me.
It didn't effect me. It effects me if they come into
my shopping center. It's a nice little scenario of
what you need to know about how to get us on your side
at the critical moments. Later, sure, we'll come after
you and that's understood, but it's a great little
primer on how you should get us on board and how you

can do it.

MR. HARTMANN: Mindy?

MS. FETTERMAN: I was just going to make a point, talking with Nancy last night, that we haven't really discussed somewhat which is can terrorism and what is going to happen in the future, if it all is as bad as we think or fear it might be. We are a part of the story too in that, like Kit said, we want to know what's going on because we are afraid, just like citizens of America are afraid. And I think that that was one of the things that the sniper really brought home to us. I mean we were all sitting there going where can we get our gas? Should we go get our kids?Reporters are people too and I think one of the—
(Laughter)

MR. HAMILTON: She asserted.

(Laughter)

MS. FETTERMAN: But when you are walking your dog and you've got your ID in your pocket because you might get shot down on the street, and you just moved there and you don't really know a lot of people, that really changes your mentality when you are covering a story. And I think that, in the past, the media could take a little bit of a hands distance to stories, sort of like a what have you done, and what

have you screwed up and what is going on kind of thing, but when a town is going to be under attack in a major big way, well we live there too. So what should we do? Where should we go get our kids? So I just think that's a dynamic that is different today than five years ago or 25 years ago.

MR. HARTMANN: Jane?

MS. SWIFT: I think actually we are getting to what the last question was for this panel and that is what's the difference between a long duration event and an acute event. And I think we found the aerosol cans, who talks, how do you talk, is a little different than you are obviously going to be in a long term investigation with a longer term threat, anthrax and the sniper, that was unfolding over days and I think that the relationship and the opportunity to utilize the press actually is very different and that many ways, and this is just my perception, long duration events are easier because everybody accepts that there is not going to be one Pulitzer, or at least they get over that they weren't the person who broke it, so they are not in the running for the Pulitzer and you have much more of an ability to manage a relationship for everybody's imperatives.

But in the acute event which, from my

perspective, is one of the most important things to try to establish better understanding and relationships between government and media because elected officials are people too and are making really important decisions in a media context that have enormous implications.

MR. HARTMANN: Jeanne?

MS. MESERVE: A couple points, one, at this phase in this scenario, there would be another story developing which would start the second guessing of the politicians which is we will know about the aerosol cans and it will come from federal law enforcement. And we will be asking how did they get there? Where was the security? Why weren't people searched when they came in the door? What about those sniffing dogs? Why didn't they pick something up? You are already going to be getting that kind of--

MS. FETTERMAN: So you want to do a grand take on how they work?

MS. MESERVE: Right, so you are already going to be getting publicity that's going to question-

MS. FETTERMAN: How they could--

MS. MESERVE: How this could have

happened.

A second point, and I'm sure all of you in the emergency management field know more about this than I do, several people have mentioned public panic. It's my understanding, from talking to people who have done a lot of research on that, that it's really overestimated. People at Johns Hopkins have spent a lot of time, and the public actually responds pretty darn well, especially if you give them concrete information about what they are coping with and what they can do to cope with it.

MR. HARTMANN: Gerry?

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ LEONE: I will not assert that prosecutors are people.

(Laughter)

MS. FETTERMAN: Finally, some truth. (Laughter)

MR. LEONE: So this to sort of piggyback on something Jennifer said earlier and then something that Ike said. I've had the opportunity, the fortunate opportunity, to handle some high profile criminal cases and I will say this, one of the things that we need to get over when we are talking about trying to get the yes between us and get over this trust issue is the fact of the matter is the press is not as altruistic as we would like to think at the end of the day. I mean

this is about ratings, it's about entertainment. The criminal justice system has become entertainment and it's a source of entertainment for ratings and for media outlets keeping up with the Jones.

And we, on the criminal justice side, know So, to the extent that information is out there that. and media outlets are trying to compete with each other, something Bill said earlier, we know that and we are sensitive to what is out there and what your reasons are for wanting it. I think I'm a lot better, in my field, about being sensitive to what the media needs and using the media to inform the public but I can just tell you when we are trying to get to a level of trust between the two groups, it's a complicating factor in the United States which may not exist in Israel because of just the societal issues that we face, our television, our whole entertainment world. But it's something I've run up against in handling some of the cases I've handled.

MR. HARTMANN: Tony?

MR. MASIELLO: Excuse me for a second. I hate to go back to last night's anecdote but here, again, think about it for a second, 5,000, 6,000 children stuck on busses in the neighborhoods, parents not knowing where they are, wives stuck on bridges in

cars freezing and what not --

MR. HARTMANN: Just for the people who weren't there last night, Tony talked about a scenario, a couple of people weren't there, a scenario about a major snow storm happening quickly and releasing the--

MR. MASIELLO: 3:00 in the afternoon--

 $\label{eq:mr.hartmann: --employees simultaneously} \mbox{ and it was a jam.}$

MR. MASIELLO: Not one child was abducted, not one child was missing. Every child was accounted for and the next day every child got home. Now why did that happen? It was relationships between the media and government. We all needed each other, we all worked together to get that information out. We had to, we had no choice. It wasn't a typical daily us versus them kind of media-government kind of thing, it was we needed each other to have a positive outcome.

Now saying that, what happens after everything went well, so to speak? Then the mayor gets criticized because he let everybody out at the same time. Then the mayor gets criticized or the board did because they didn't have back up communication. I mean all those things are going to happen, there is going to be an after story, or two or three. But when you are in a crisis, and I think that's what we are talking

about right now, this is a new paradigm since 9/11, a lot of old hang ups, and hard feelings and other stuff goes out the window. We really need each other and we need to use each other. I don't mean that in a negative sense but we use each other to accomplish the end game and that's to protect the public.

MR. HARTMANN: Maryn?

MS. MCKENNA: I wanted to go back to this idea of short versus long duration events and offer an example that I saw work surprisingly well last summer. If you cast your minds back, before SARS and before the war, one of last summer's big stories was the unfolding West Nile epidemic. It was a not very well understood agent, it was a national story and, if you'll remember, first the West Nile cases started moving across the country, then it was discovered that West Nile could be transmitted by organ transplant, then it was discovered that West Nile could be transfusion.

And this went on for about at least two months I think, it was the acute phase of the story, and the CDC, sensibly, in sharp contrast to what they did during the anthrax attacks, kept saying, in their briefings, this is what we know right now, and it may change tomorrow and if it does we'll tell you that

tomorrow. And after some initial resistance, it was kind of surprising how well we in the media behaved around that. I mean every day we reported what the news of the day was and sort of what we thought the news of tomorrow was going to be, and sometimes we were right and sometimes we were wrong.

But they sort of gained power by giving up power. They let us know that there were things that they did not know and that they weren't going to be able to answer all our questions today. And it managed to contain irresponsible speculation I guess fairly well.

MR. SEAMANS: Also, admit mistakes. Admit a mistake, if you made a mistake, just admit it and let's go on.

MR. HARTMANN: How do you do that and maintain credibility?

MR. SEAMANS: Yes.

MR. HARTMANN: How do you do that? (Multiple people speaking)

MR. SEAMANS: If you just admit it. And other than that, she or he hasn't got credibility.

MR. WALSH: And the one thing you want to advance, this is this fault tolerant thing, you want it advanced, you say this is the first time we are dealing

with this or there are going to be mistakes we make in the future. We are going to work very hard, we're not going to get everything right, but we think we have it well in hand. But you warn people in advance that it's messy or ragged, just like we've all said around the table here, and then when the mistake happens, you can admit it and say look, I told you we're not going to get everything right. We're going to get most things right and, at the end of the day, we're going to be okay. And so you set it up in advance.

MR. HARTMANN: Jane?

MS. SWIFT: I think the difference between West Nile and the anthrax, from my perspective, folks in public health departments and in government had been anticipating West Nile for years and had known it was coming, had been tracking mosquitos, had been thinking about how they would respond. And I think that what the press needs to understand is that it's a lot easier for government to respond and give you good information right away when you know something than it is, even, it's easier to say you don't know something when there is something you do know because then you can have credibility and some ability to give information. Whereas anthrax, the problem was, and maybe this is part of what we need to do in government better, we

just need to be prepared to deal with a lot more things that we just don't know.

MR. HARTMANN: Chuck?

MR. LANZA: Traditionally, government doesn't do well out of the box the first time. better every time we do things and that's usually done by after action reports and we sit down, and we lay it all out on the table and because we do that every time, I think the media understands that this is a cleansing method that we go through so they don't beat us up with it, they take it for what it's worth. Unfortunately, two categories that are usually mentioned, in addition to communication which is always a problem in any activation, is some of the media events and some of the political events, but those people do not usually stick around after for the after action report. They just want to report on it and sometimes they'll sanitize that portion that either mentions themselves or the other side.

MR. HARTMANN: Jim?

MR. WALSH: Just a real quick point, and I'm sorry to have spoken twice in three units here, but I just wanted to pick up on what Jane said and disagree a little bit. We are very much focused on a BW incident right here and I would say, in some ways, the

wonderful thing about anthrax is no one knew anything about it from the government's side. And a reporter couldn't go out and collect a sample, couldn't go out and conduct independent information, so it made it an event of a certain kind.

A radiation, a dirty bomb with radio active material, everyone has an opinion about radiation, anyone can buy a Geiger counter, and go stick it and get a reading on it. They may not know what that means but anyone can do it. And so I think it's good to talk about this particular scenario but we should prepare ourselves for the fact that there are going to be other scenarios where the challenges will be much different, where the problem will be everyone will have an opinion and there will be no lack of interested parties who want to push a certain line about whether radiation is harmful or not.

And the people coming to the table, you think people have issues about infectious disease that they are bringing to the table, we have 50 years of radiation emotions tied up with a bomb and 50 years of scandals, government scandals, involving radiation. So that's going to be a much more challenging mediagovernment environment. I would just footnote that and think about the ways in which that is different than

infectious disease.

MR. HARTMANN: Ike?

MR. SEAMANS: I just want to give you an example of how not to do it, a few months ago in Miami there was an incident at the Miami Airport. They thought they found what could have been anthrax on one of the concourses and it was a major, major crisis. The fire rescue units rushed in from all over the county, the airport was shut down, they pulled people off airplanes, pulled them out of the terminal, and there were no answers. I don't go out and do these anymore, I sit in the studio and pontificate about all this, but I do have the contacts at TSA and we haven't talked about TSA, which has got a major responsibility here and, in a lot of ways, they are not fulfilling it very well right now.

Anyway, I called TSA in Washington and asked where is the information? What's going on? Why isn't your local guy doing anything? And as the governor said, he was working. Okay, I understand that. Where is the designated spokesperson? Well we don't know where she is. And they put out a press release that was wrong, they had the wrong time, they had the wrong, everything was wrong and it was outrageous. Helicopters in the air, live trucks,

thousands, ten thousand people on the street that couldn't get planes, a major panic, no answers from any government official.

Finally, the airport, PIOs, which were no longer in charge of information at the airport on things like this, the PIO called a news conference and brought her security director up to say something because people wanted answers. It was absolutely outrageous. And then when the I called TSA and I said let me tell you what happening now, because you guys won't say anything, the airport is talking, and that set the TSA off. How dare they preempt our authority? I said do you guys get it? I said there are 10,000 people on the street, every airplane has been emptied, and you are controlling the flow of information from Washington, and the mayor came out and everybody went nuts. That's the way you don't do it.

By the way, just as a footnote, this is going to be a continuing problem with the TSA. A friend of mine is very significantly involved with the information and one roadblock after the other is being put up whenever the media wants to know anything. And this is going to be continuing as situations happen around the country and we saw it in Miami, it was absolutely outrageous. You talk about irresponsible

reporters, there was one reporter going live, he was 500 yards from the thing inside, he was 200 yards from the door and the incident was another 100 yards in there, and he is saying that's right, Bob, I think I feel something in my throat.

(Laughter)

MR. SEAMANS: It's really something. And one of our cameramen out there on the scene told me he turned to him and read him the riot act. But that's what happens. A 23 year old reporter, that's right, Bob, I think it's here.

(Laughter)

MR. SEAMANS: And why? Because it took two hours or longer for any comment to be made. And it was because of an aggressive airport PIO who stood her security director up and made him say something. It wasn't much. That's outrageous. That's what you really want to avoid.

MR. HARTMANN: Kit?

MS. SEELYE: I just wanted to bring together two threads that I'm afraid have gotten a little bit lost, one is that you started with the premise that the goal was to prevent panic. And I think there has been a little bit of discussion here that the idea of panic is overrated and I really think

that's true. When you start from that premise, that means you are going to start withholding information.

MR. HARTMANN: I don't think necessarily so, I think it could be exactly the opposite.

MS. SEELYE: Well it sort of led to the suggestion of why--

MR. HARTMANN: The implication, that's right.

MS. SEELYE: And why did we tell them there are sprinklers. But if you want to have credibility, I think you have to think the way a regular person would and I'm just thinking of thing everybody is familiar with in an airplane. You're sitting on an airplane when the steward or whoever says if we run into trouble, your oxygen mask will drop. Don't put it on your child first, put it on yourself first. I mean do you know a mother who would put it on herself first before putting it on her child?

I mean there are just sort of certain common sense things that lead to having credibility and if, as the mayor said, would you let us shut down the arena without telling you why? No. I mean there are just certain common sense things and I think in the attempt to not spread panic, it can lead to this withholding of information that in fact gives you

credibility. And I just wanted to sort of weave those two stray threads together.

MR. HARTMANN: I think that's really true but I would stand that on its head. That if we want credibility, which leads to non-panic, then you have to seem to be and actually be as forthcoming as you can be at that moment. So that when you fix the mistake, which you are invariably going to make, for lack of information, people say well he or she were telling me as much as they knew at that particular time. So I wouldn't assume that panic is sort of prevented by lack of information, it just seems to me it's exactly the opposite, which is why you guys are so important.

MR. HAMILTON: That's the fact but the reality is when somebody inside government says we don't want to panic people, they are using it as an excuse to shut up.

MR. WALSH: Let me jump in. I was just thinking of Vienna, and every official, the secretary of energy, the head of IAEA, all of them talked about panic. So at the highest levels of government and I think, Jeanne, you're absolutely right about that, the studies don't show it, but that is in the minds of the upper most officials.

MS. MESERVE: Although some of the people

who have done the studies, and I asked them specifically about radiation and whether there isn't a completely different emotional overlay because we have lived with this terror and crouching like turtles under our desks, and they said that isn't fully researched. They don't know in fact how will we--

MS. SEELYE: And you think about real panic, think about these nightclubs with the fires and people stampeding out and killing each other in a stampede.

MR. HARTMANN: My definition of panic would be overloading the hospitals. So, for example, why I pressed back Tony why he would reveal symptoms, if you remember Arn's scenario happened three days before, so it's three days later and the people, the 25,000 people or so, 10,000 of whom are local, most are from out of town, this thing iha just had three days to incubate. And so if it's really, so you are telling symptoms because what happens is that people, one you tell the symptom, is I coughed last night, I better show up at the hospital. And suddenly you've got 10,000 people at every hospital and you've got a problem.

MS. SEELYE: And you have a governor thinking, do I need to quarantine this city?

MR. HARTMANN: Right. Big, big issue. Kathleen?

MS. TOOMEY: I think we need to draw the distinction between panic and the ability of the public to ascertain their own personal risk. And I think although the panic may less than we think, I think the ability for the general public to really make an accurate perception of what their risk and their family's risk is is relatively low. We see this all the time and certainly Bob Blendon knows more about that than I do. And so part of my job, in this situation, would be to try to give a message to the general public about what their actual risk would be to prevent just what you were saying.

And that wouldn't necessarily be a panic reaction but in Georgia, where we had no credible anthrax threats, in the first two weeks of October, we utilized more Cipro through our state funded insurance plan than they had used in the prior three months. And so people were going and demanding antibiotics and so we hadn't done a good job in communicating actual risk.

MR. HARTMANN: We have Michael, then

Jennifer and then I'm going to turn to Arn. And Arn,

basically saying here is what seemed to rise to the

surface in the conversation. And then if somebody says

I also heard this, that's fair to add also. Mike then Jennifer.

MR. MORAN: Just a note on panic. I mean I totally agree that it's in the vacuum, in the absence of piecing of information, that panic takes hold. And I think also just the case studies of the situations we had in the last few years, you don't see panic. It was notable in its absence on September 11th, there was not panic, there was shock, and numb and a complete disbelief in some ways but it was not panic. And I saw people coming off of ferries covered in what was the remains of the buildings and they were not panicked, they were trying to do what they could to get out.

But I also wanted to comment on there is a political overlay to all of this which is it might be a noble thing to hope to avoid panic, particularly in a rad bomb, something like that. It's possible that people would head for the highways, clog them and it would make things worse. On the other hand, there is this longer term event with regard to panic, that is is our society changing? Are we panicking ourselves into changing the nature of American democracy and the way our government interacts with its citizens and the authority it has to interfere in our lives? And that I think is another aspect of panic that I find

interesting that is kind of not getting commented on here but it does run through everything we say.

MR. HARTMANN: Jennifer, please?

MS. LEANING: Well I was just going to suggest that we narrow the definition of panic, and I'm in complete agreement with what people are saying here is that panic in the sort of decision making under stress literature is a very specific symptom that happens when an individual or a group have a very high sense of threat, no information about the options they can take to help themselves, the sense of having very little time in which to make their decision. And then to add to that the sense of being physically trapped, it's there.

Those four conditions are rarely met in the sort of situations we are talking about but there is a lot of opportunity for both government and press to deal with those four factors, to keep and tamp down the potential for panic. What a number of you were talking about was fear and anxiety in this population, America, which I do think is something that needs to be managed, and that's a much more complex process. But panic is really a fairly rare thing.

MR. HARTMANN: Say the four again just so we hear them as if you were managing them. Say the

four again, the criteria, please.

MS. LEANING: One is a high sense of threat, the other is very little information about what your options are to help yourself. People want to help themselves, if they don't have any information about it, then it happens. The third is the sense, it could be a very grounded sense, that there is no time in which to sort this out before that threat is imposed on you. And then the fourth is if you are physically trapped or if you have the perception of being physically trapped.

MR. HARTMANN: Thank you.

MR. ADAIR: We can correct one of those so easily which is the low information. That by giving the information, the problem with so many of the bioterrorism threats is that you give information and you say if you have flu-like symptoms, or it seems like there are only about four ways that any biochemical agent can show itself, either something on you skin, you get sick to you stomach, you get upper respiratory things or you have a headache. Well that's the symptoms for everything.

(Laughter)

MR. ADAIR: But if you can address that low information thing, you can and we can stop the

panic.

MR. HARTMANN: That's very helpful to have that four part.

Arn?

MR. HOWITT: It's quite a challenge to try to summarize and pull this together and I feel somewhat awed by it, but let me do it by cutting it in a very different way than we've talked about it so far. It seems to me there are three questions that have been structuring a lot of the comments that we've talked about and each of these questions applies, on the one side, to government officials and, on the other side, to the press.

The first one is what does my position require? We've heard a lot of comments about this in terms of what the professional responsibilities are, either in building authority or supporting specific government functions, decision making under stress, et cetera and on the press side, in terms of reporting the news.

The second element of this, of what does my position require, is not quite as lofty, it's what does this situation mean to my career? And there are also parallels on each side in terms of how people are going to judge my performance. Am I going to keep my

job after this is all over? Am I going to win the Pulitzer Prize? Do I sell a lot of newspapers or get a lot of people to listen to my radio or TV station? So the first one is what does my position require?

The second is how do my actions in this situation fit into the system that I'm part of, much of which I don't control myself? I have to interact with other people in my own government situation. I may be a law enforcement person, as Darrel said, or a public health person, as Kathleen said. I have to worry about how those other people are going to react in this situation. The press is enmeshed in a competitive situation. Actually, even before that, they are involved in their own organizations and they have a role to play in their own media organization, and then they are competing with other ones. So those actions fit together into a system and a lot of what people do are conditioned by the roles that they are playing there or the ways that they seem fighting through that.

And then, finally, the question that we've been quite interested in is how does what we are doing, both personally and through the system, affect the public in terms of the information that's in their hands, which they are entitled to as citizens, irrespective of --. And I think both sides have a

feeling that that information is due to them, even if it has no immediate implications for them personally. But information does have implications for some people, personally, in terms of either their confidence or their fear, so there is that connection.

And then finally, there are implications for what actions people are going to take as a consequence of getting that information and we have concerns about whether we either are going to lead them to take the correct actions, from their point of view, or to do things that might be incorrect. And even one step further than that, even if they are taking actions that are correct for them personally, is the resulting effect on society going to be appropriate or dangerous for other people? And I think that, from that set of issues that we've been talking about, I think there are a couple of things that came out of this.

One is that there are some lessons that have been learned in the recent past that seem to be reflecting in the way each side represented here are behaving. First of all, there is a great deal of effort I think in many jurisdictions, on the government side, to getting the act together, and I think we've heard some very positive things about how government is thinking about interacting, different parts of

government, both elected leadership and professional leadership, and different types of professional leadership are interacting with each other, trying to train each other to behave in certain ways.

Some of that has been ongoing for a long time, as Lindsey mentioned, some of it is much more recent in its vintage. Unfortunately, it hasn't spread as far as it probably ought to but at least in major jurisdictions there is a lot of effort that's being put into that. On the press side, there obviously is also a lot of effort to get better informed about some of the issues that might be coming up and be prepared, and we'll talk a lot more about that this afternoon I hope.

Another element that we talked about is that there are, especially if we are talking about a crisis that is ongoing in some fashion, and someone mentioned how the National Transportation Safety Board is one of the best at doing this stuff, but we didn't note the fact that once they get into the act, the whole situation is over. The plane has crashed—
(Laughter)

MR. HOWITT: The train has run off the tracks, people are injured. The ongoing part of the story is did government handle it right in the first place or did the company handle it right? And what

ought we to do in the future to prevent these things from happening again? But it's not a dynamic story and I think much tougher is how you behave in a situation that's fraught with danger and huge amounts of uncertainty, and nobody knows what the right thing to do is. In those situations, politics are inevitable.

And although we did talk about the fact how people come together, to some extent, especially in the crisis, and may be on the same page, I'm struck by someone who came to one of our executive sessions a few years ago who said gee, we would at least be trying to serve the public for the first day—

(Laughter)

MR. HOWITT: --and cooperate. And I think that the issue is what kind of dynamics are there that are occurring over the course of this crisis and how do actions interact. Some of that, in these kinds of incidents, and is it going to escalate and have a negative effect on the public or not? I think all of us tended to agree that there was likely to be some breakdown as a crisis extended. The cooperation was going to diminish, that there was going to be more sniping, not in the sense that Nancy dealt with it but in terms of internal politics.

And the tension I think is going to be

there, as several people noted, and I think the challenge that we have is to think of ways in which, recognizing that tension, each side can work, think about how they will not exacerbate the tension and work negatively from the public side, but recognize the fact that, even with that tension, there is an interdependence that's critical.

And finally, one other note to touch, which I hope we'll come back to, is the point that Bob raised early on and a couple of people have picked up on, is we have been talking about information in a sense as we intend it to have this effect. Government intends it to have that effect, the press intends or perhaps wants it out there for the purposes of informing the public. And yet, as Bob suggested, we have to be sensitive to the issue of how people hear it and what they understand from the information that goes out, irrespective of what our intent is in providing it. And I think that the discussion of panic in a way suggests that we don't know enough about those things yet, perhaps in the negative direction, also in the positive direction, to be able to draw those conclusions.

MR. HARTMANN: Does anyone want to add to Arn's remarks?

Alex, please?

MR. JONES: I think Arn has done an excellent job. I would boil it down. I think he has given a very detailed version of what we said this morning. My version of what we heard this morning starts with the idea that we are a self-selected group of people who probably tend to think more alike and do these things with a kind of prescriptive positive thinking than is perhaps realistic. I think that what Don said about Oklahoma City is something that ought to be taken to heart.

I was the editor of a newspaper in a small town in Tennessee and I have seen panic. I helped create panic in fact and I did it inadvertently but I did it by keeping some information that was confidential, as far as I was concerned. In this case, a grand jury, information about a guy who was a law enforcement officer, a senior one, who was being investigated. I had a rival news organization in another town that decided that they were going to break the confidentiality and reported it. As a matter of principle, I decided that we would not.

What that did to my town was unbelievable to me, in retrospect, it made it go crazy and it made it go crazy fast. And what it taught me was that even

with good intentions, withholding information can be a very, very dangerous thing to do, more dangerous, in my opinion anyway, than releasing it. I think probably around this table, what I've been hearing, that would be the general view. But what I have heard in this conversation is from the public officials, government side, the people who have the authority and responsibility for dealing with the crisis on that side is we want you journalists to use information responsibly. And from the journalists side, I hear we want you to give us information, a lot of it, as much as you possibly can, as quickly as you can.

And I think that we should not think that that is a simple equation and a simple summary of the way most people think about things. One of the purposes of this thing we are going through today is to try to influence both public officials and media to act responsibly in these situations, and I believe that what I heard is something that then leads us logically into the prescriptive side of this, which is something that we will be getting into in the afternoon. But if that is not your sense of what is being said in broad strokes, I would be eager also, with Frank, to hear it.

MR. HAMILTON: Two things bubbled up for me that were important and a bit it's sliced in a

different way, one is we need to expand the definition of responders, at least during the school day, to include the school system. People worry about their kids, they want to go get them, do they need to do this. You've got to rope the superintendent of schools into your decision making if it's during the school day. And is there going to be a high school basketball game tonight, dah, dah, dah, dah, dah.

The other thing comes from Juliette's observation, government needs to start feeding its web pages in real time, not updating it when somebody has a few minutes. The web is there, particularly important in a catastrophic situation where people, in their thirst for information, crash the cell phone system. The internet is more robust than the phone system so you've got to recognize this as a wonderful opportunity not just to reach a broad public but to get the chattering classes, get information to them. Feed your web service in real time.

MR. HARTMANN: Anything else that anybody wants to bubble up? We'll continue the conversation.

Ed?

MR. PLAUGHER: Well the National Academy of Sciences has done some phenomenal research on who does the American public believe during the time of a

crisis and I think it would be a great reference for this group to go to because it is well researched and it's current. I mean it's just been produced.

One of the things that bubbled up from that is that it is actually a very moving scale and that the believability of information is dependent on the situation. It is purely situational, it depends upon what's going on in your area at your time and it is also based upon, in certain environments, the trust factor as perceived prior to the incident, not during the incident.

And so I just invite this group. It's extraordinary work that's been well done as the National Academy of Sciences try to move on this whole thing because there is a group of us that are pushing them to help us with decision making dynamics. And decision making dynamics are really starting to bear down on local first respond community members as we try to figure out what our role is in this new world that we are trying to live in. In other words, do we step up and take that role to provide information or do we use other sources and other information because we are trying to be effective?

We don't want panic but we do want certain things to occur, we do want things to happen, and so we

are looking to the scientists, the social scientists, to help us guide through this and then we will plug that into our information dynamics, into our flow charting as we map out biological, radiological, chemical, even down to some very simple basics, back to the boil water alert, and some of the other infrastructure issues and those types of things. So, again, I invite this group to look at that research and it will help you immensely as you try to hone in on this issue.

MR. HARTMANN: Lunch is in the room down that way on your right and we'll continue our conversation in about 45 minutes.

(Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., there was a lunch recess.)

<u>A F T E R N O O N S E S S I O N</u>

(12:57 p.m.)

If you look at our agenda, MR. HARTMANN: what we want to talk about for this section is preattack reporting on preparedness and terrorism. are trying to think in advance not only of this morning, we were literally in the crisis, and Jane made the nice distinction which Jennifer picked up on and so forth, and it's immediate versus sort of duration. right now we are saying before the event, not just relationships, but also comparing in terms of how does the press understand and report the level of danger. And we are not necessarily dealing with the government's sort of color coded system but literally how do you make a judgement about that? And then, secondly, how do you asses the state of preparedness prior to an attack?

Let me just start with the second question and Juliette, who has very fresh in her mind something that *USA Today* did a short time ago, the year report card after 9/11.

MS. KAYYEM: So I think the time period that we are talking about now is probably the less benign time period between the journalists and responders. It's sort of making homeland security

relevant in the absence of an impending terrorist attack basically. So a number of these agencies, and I asked at lunch whether they were preparing for the second year, did one year later reports, which were basically report cards of cities and jurisdictions.

USA Today did a multi-city where you have an outside expert panel that assessed everything from airports to security of water supplies, whatever.

And I know from getting calls, there is a great tendencies to give grades, and then you're like well, do I curve?

(Laughter)

MS. KAYYEM: You have no idea how to assess what the grade should be and one of the questions I, there's a few things I want to throw out here now, one is we all know, rationally, that no city is ever going to be fully prepared. We can talk about New York City forever and we know that they are not going to be fully prepared. People are talking now about the budget for homeland security and they say is \$4 billion enough? I have no idea and I study this stuff. There is no context to \$4 billion, you have no idea what it means.

And so knowing that fact, that no city is ever going to be fully prepared, are these stories

fair? Do they actually do anything? Is the American public savvy enough to know that it's sort of like a gotcha kind of story?

And then the other thing I wanted to raise for this discussion that we have been talking about is in the sort of pre-attack discussion, and where I think you guys sort of use each other now, is we have been always talking about the press ratcheting up the story. So the press is the one that always wants to assume the worst case scenario. That's actually not necessarily true right now. In other words, the government has great incentives, for a variety of reasons and I'm not just talking about the feds, to ratchet up. And how does the media give context to a pitch that they are being given by the government?

The mayor is here. Lackawana was a perfect example. Everyone knows they got arrested, it was a huge story. Those of us who have been in law enforcement on the outside were trying to give it some context and what people don't know is four of the guys have now plead to non terrorism related charges, five now have plead. I mean we don't follow that story. So those are sort of the contexts in the pre-event that I think the antagonism is sort of greater and how do you put that all in context.

MR. HARTMANN: And let me operate on the assumption that Alex voiced earlier and it is that we are not just trying to influence the people in the room, you were not invited because you are nudnicks. In other words, you were invited because you're already proficient, you've already experienced this, you are doing good things and we are trying to send a message or to do some guidelines to those who are not in the room. So in the context that Juliette gives us about understanding the level of alert and communicating it, and also about the level of preparedness, how do we want to say to other how it should be done?

MS. SWIFT: I think this is the most difficult place for elected officials who, more than the appointed or civil service officials, live in a world of transforming before the press. They accept that that's the world they live in and struggling with answering the question or making the case that you're prepared without giving a road map to those who want to know where your allegiances are. So how do you honestly and candidly acknowledge, if asked the question, or bring to the forefront for internal policy discussions, which often don't stay internal, a legitimate area of weakness without running the risk, kind of like your telephone call, without running the

risk of becoming part of the problem?

Because I'm sure --. I've never been a terrorist, I don't think I know any terrorists, but a lot of what they spend a lot of time figuring out is where our weaknesses are. And so this is I think the realm in which there is the most difficult tension for elected officials, and maybe other levels of government, in dealing with the press and what, for many governors anyway, is a new level of responsibility that they are not entirely comfortable with.

MR. HARTMANN: Are there models out there of how to do this right? How do you show sort of where in fact that we're not perfect but at the same time, without making yourself vulnerable?

MR. ADAIR: But there is a conflict that will always be there whenever you have a security system based on deterrence. Take the air marshal system, the whole air marshal thing is a tremendous shell game trying to give us the illusion that on any flight, if we charge the cockpit, that we are going to be tackled and go to jail. And yet now to appropriately give us a sense of what air marshals do, the TSA has taken many of us through the training center in Atlantic City and let us see how they train and how they are organized.

Well, as part of that, you can see up on the board the big map of the United States with all the flights that have air marshals on them at one time.

And I probably won't be revealing any secrets to say, when I saw it, there were about 60 flights that had air marshals on them. Now I was asked not to report that, so that I don't reveal how few peas there are under the shells. But yet don't I have an obligation to say to the public well don't feel very safe because there aren't many of these guys?

And so there is this inherent conflict, so much of the homeland security is based on illusion, the other one being what I just don't believe, although this is not something I've written about, the Geiger counter radioactivity sniffers at ports and wherever the border patrol people are. Well I don't believe there are enough of them. They are trying to give the illusion that there are a lot of them. Now should I report that and say to the public don't feel too safe because there really aren't that many? Or should I perpetuate the illusion to stop the bad guys? I don't know the answer.

MR. HARTMANN: Terrence?

MR. SAMUEL: I would say you might want to report that there are 60 but you don't report to the

public that you're not too safe. I think people understand this, they know that every flight, I mean people have an ability to assess their own risk and, as a result, how to navigate the system in a lot of ways. And I think what public officials sometimes don't understand, what sometimes we lose, is that, you know, give people the information and they will use it in the best way that they need to use it.

I think, in the end, if we think about that, a lot of the conflict that we feel becomes unimportant because that's not the important part of the equation. The important part of the equation is how people get the information, how they use it. And part of this new environment that we are in is that people understand that there is a different threat level and they respond accordingly. I mean part of the reason you don't see the panic that you are talking about here is because people understand.

MR. HARTMANN: Chuck?

MR. LANZA: On the pre-attack reporting, I just want to talk for a second--

MR. HARTMANN: Are you going to stay with Bill's example that Terrence picked up on?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ LANZA: I'm actually going to move away from that.

MR. HARTMANN: Let me just --. A couple of people want to stay with that.

MR. HAMILTON: There is a model out there for evaluation of weakness and that is the Army's war gaming system. The US military continuously runs equipment, personnel, maneuver exercises all the time. They can do, however --. First, people outside the military establishment largely don't care. Their other ability to do this is that if you find that there is a terrible weak spot in the way you respond to a certain kind of maneuver, you can classify it and say it's national security information. And I touched this last night, I think we are going to need to examine the ability to protect certain kinds of information which currently fall under the Freedom of Information Acts, at state and national levels.

MR. HARTMANN: Anybody want to pick up on the 60--

MR. SEAMANS: I've been up there too, I was up there in November, and I totally disagree with you, Terrence, that you should report that information. In fact, I was there with five television crews around the country, and they showed us the map around the country and as you pointed out, there was not that many. But for you to report that I think would be

totally irresponsible. They made it very clear that we are showing you this to show you what we are doing, and we're going to build a better system and all that, but to report that and to point out the weakness of that system I just think is just irresponsible reporting, when they made it very clear we are showing you this. And they may have even, in our group, may have even said national security. But it was clear to me that this was not reportable information and it was inside stuff. And I don't agree that that should be reported.

MR. HARTMANN: Jeanne?

MS. MESERVE: To me the question isn't how many air marshals are in the sky, the question is whether they do any damn good. I mean the fundamental question is how effective all these things we are talking about, vis-à-vis homeland security, actually are. And I don't think any of us know.

MR. FUREY: We probably won't know.

MS. MESERVE: Right.

MR. FUREY: Because we don't know what's happened since 9/11.

MS. MESERVE: And the second point I would make is that the government now has a way of finessing these questions which is saying--

MR. HARTMANN: Can I stop you for a second? What do you mean by that, we don't have to know what's happened since 9/11?

MR. FUREY: Because from the military perspective, people like the Reid, the sneaker bomber, and the episode that happened in the northern states coming down from Canada, these people are probing our security. And so people like Reid and the guy that was caught up at the Canadian border, in my estimation, are people that are testing our security and they are sacrificial lambs. Whether they know they are sacrificial lambs, they are not high like an Atta. They are not running a cell but they are sent here to test what we are doing right and what we are doing wrong.

Getting back to the 60, it wouldn't matter if we have five, as far as the military war games it, because the terrorists don't know where or what flights those are on. So, in effect, it is a security because you don't know. Israel doesn't have every flight covered with air marshals either but yet they have a pretty successful rate with not being hijacked.

MR. ADAIR: But doesn't the number matter in the sense that your odds of being on a flight that has one are much better, so to speak, you are much

safer the more air marshals there are. Or are you?

See and that gets to another point, should we be writing more stories questioning the effectiveness of some of these things?

MS. MESERVE: Yes, you should.

MR. ADAIR: Instead, they take us into these programs and they sort of swear us to secrecy, and that inhibits us.

MR. HARTMANN: Jeanne?

MS. MESERVE: Let me just finish the thought. The line the government is now putting out to all of us is what's really important is the security you don't see; total B.S.

(Laughter)

MS. MESERVE: They are trying to make the American public think there is more there than they see.

MR. HARTMANN: Alex?

MR. LEONE: It's B.S. but it's not total B.S.

(Laughter)

MR. JONES: I think we stubbed our toe on a very, very important question and that is should the media aggressively report on efforts to safeguard or, in the name of safeguarding, should the media not

report those things? And I think that this is not an easy question to answer but I think, for those of you who tend to be on the safeguard the information side, John is not here because he is going down to New York to layoff 10 people. One of the reasons is because people in New York are not steamed up enough about this, apparently, to provide the money.

One of the really important issues here is not divulging secrets, it's keeping pressure, sincere, serious political pressure, on the people who do control purse strings and are having to make very difficult choices right now. And to determine whether those choices are going to be made in the area of favoring these kinds of things that would safeguard us against terror or whether that is viewed as a low enough priority or low enough risk so that you don't have to --. I mean I think that at the same time, it can be compromising, it's also fair to say that it's essential to have that pressure on if there is going to be an effective way of doing this.

So when Frank asked Jane about models, I think what we really ought to be looking for are ways to balance these priorities in ways that make sense all the way around. Does anybody have one?

MS. SWIFT: It would seem to me that, from

a government perspective, it is maybe not my desire but it's very fair to have the media writing articles, based on the information that we've given them about how it operates, as to whether or not it's an effective strategy, and who thinks it is and who thinks it isn't, more than reporting the specifics of the number 60, how many percentage flights, which might have, give advantage to those who are seeking to exploit our weaknesses. And so I think it's not always easy, I'm sure, for the press to figure out where that balance is but I think if we could come to an agreement that that's where the balance should be, then we can argue when we step over it.

MR. HARTMANN: Let me just stop and say has anybody seen this done well and correctly where you say good, well done? Is that you, Jim?

MR. WALSH: That is. I mean there are people who disagree with this assessment, not in the terrorism field, but the Department of Energy, it's all been reversed now, but went through what was called an openness initiative where they tried to define should we try to classify all the information? How much do we release? And what they ended up saying was there is a very small block of information where we need to raise the fence much higher than it is but the rest of it

isn't going to substantially help anyone build a nuclear weapon or carry out some attack against the United States.

Now what's happened with 9/11, I couldn't disagree more with more with the notion that what we need is more classification and more secrecy. If you have a problem, the best way to ensure that that problem continues is to classify it and make it secret. That will guarantee that that problem is not remedied. And while a lot of this conversation about well we don't want to release anything to terrorists is based on an assumption that has no empirical basis, as far as I know, in my study of terrorism.

Our sense of what we should classify, because we fear that terrorists are going to use it, we want to look at the thousands of terrorist attacks and see how many of them were based on information that was released by a government in the public domain and had a material influence on their targeting or on their operations. The calculus of a terrorist is it's driven internally by operational constraints, it's driven by their organizational structure, it's driven by their targeting strategy. They wanted to kill a lot of people, they want some symbolism, they have a financial strategy.

The notion that we've got to make all information secret because there is some chance, theoretical chance, that a terrorist might use it against us is not empirically grounded and it's full of costs and consequences.

MR. HARTMANN: On what basis did the Department of Energy make the distinction between information which could not be released and that which could?

MR. WALSH: What they did was they got a panel of scientists together, all of them lab guys. These are guys who actually all have the high security key clearances and a lot of the were retired lab, Los Alamos, Livermore and Sandia people. And so, in some ways, it was not unanalagous to what Jen just suggested, that it's only the final technical details that end up being really important, but there is so much. That accounts for ten percent or five percent of the total.

But what we have here, there is no balance, the pendulum has swung in the opposite direction. We've moved into the 90 percent classification realm. What we are talking about is very high fences for what is actually, in terms of reaction, a very small percentage of the information.

MR. HARTMANN: But you've given us a model, it's one model--

MR. WALSH: It's now a rejected model, by the way, but it was the model ten years ago.

MR. HARTMANN: Ike?

MR. SEAMANS: The model that the government has been working on since 9/11 is that symbols are going to be attacked, the World Trade Center, the Capital, water plants and so forth, all because one terrorist, that's his MO. When, in fact, a study of terrorism will show you that most terrorist don't attack these things. In Colombia, they attack little police Kiosks in the city because it hits you in the neighborhood. Like Mindy was saying, journalists are people too. We're nervous when the snipers do it. I'm not being cynical but if the snipers had picked off congressmen, probably the reaction wouldn't have been as great as if they had picked off people in a gas station because now you are hitting me at home.

And I've written about this. I want to know why it is that government persists in protecting symbols, like the guys down in our area who surround the courthouse but nobody surrounds the shopping center that has 15,000 people in it in a given day. And when I've asked the police chief about this, he says it's a

matter of money, I don't have money to deal with that.

I've got to get out there and I've got to show that we are protecting the seaport, I've got to show that we are protecting the airport.

When does government finally understand that one terrorist goes after symbols, the rest of them do not, they go after your neighborhoods, which scares the hell out of everybody? This has been proven in Northern Ireland, Colombia, Israel and so forth. When is that model going to come up?

MR. HARTMANN: Terrence?

MR. SAMUEL: I think the reason is because we are working with a different model of terrorism. Anti-American terrorism is about symbols and it can happen. It will probably happen that people are going to start walking into shopping malls. But I don't think there is any reason not to think that the people who hit the Pentagon and the World Trade Center would also have wanted to hit the White House and the Capitol and that we had reason to respond that way.

Talking about models, I wasn't strongly suggesting that we should report the 60 because I think it doesn't matter.

But what I think we should report is what we know and legitimate questions based on what we know.

Nobody thinks that there is an air marshal on every flight and nobody thinks that that's the solution to the whole problem. I sense that people understand that and if we are getting from the government that we have air marshals and, as a result, we're okay, I think it's legitimate to raise questions about that. I mean the 60 doesn't bother anybody, I don't think--

MR. SEAMANS: It bothers them, they just don't want it known.

MR. SAMUEL: Well that's their problem.

MR. HARTMANN: Neal?

MR. PEIRCE: I don't see how you have a healthy democracy without a lot of debate about what we are doing in terrorism or not. I mean I live in Washington which is just like an armed camp these days. It's looking as we've given up to the enemy, practically, with all these barriers everywhere, as if they are going to do much good in many cases. And most government agencies, the former building chief of GSA told me a great desire is the bid to have lots of security to show you are an important target. It's part of bureaucratic positioning.

I think we need to have a lot of debate in this country, even if it might reveal something of our thinking or where we are prepared or not, because

otherwise we are going to be in almost a police state type of lockdown, can't talk about it, need to do this, need to do that, and losing all of the natural controls. And the money that goes for all of this is not being spent on other pressing needs.

MR. HARTMANN: What would you do about the 60? In other words, do you report it or not? See Terrence is going to report it, Bill chose not to.

MR. PEIRCE: Actually, I would skirt around it as a statistic but I think it should be obvious to everybody that we don't have, and I think coverage could say, I think probably you can say air marshals are only going to cover a certain fraction of flights.

MS. SWIFT: Can I say two points? One of the things is that we haven't acknowledged enough, although I think Ed started to talk about it earlier, is the people who are making a lot of important decisions about where to put the police are largely operating in a context they've never lived in before. I mean everybody is sitting around here, and Terrence has his idea, based on the information that he knows, what would be an effective strategy for deploying resources within a state. And no matter how many resources there are and how much support you build for

resources, we're always going to live in a world of limited resources where you can always do more. So you have to make choices and I don't think there is --.

The National Governors Association conference calls I was on with Tom Ridge, the single most prevalent question in a whole bunch of different touch points was please give us some context to make incredibly important decisions. There are not a lot of governors who are former CIA guys, I mean you have some US attorneys, and that's helpful. So that's something I think that really needs to be addressed.

The second piece is I would disagree, and I'll give you a specific example, that it's always ridiculous just to create show and to create a presence. Because the two planes that did so much damage came out of Logan, in the first couple of months after 9/11, the air traffic fell off everywhere in the country. It fell off much more significantly in Boston, partly because we are a Northeast sister city but also because, at least if you believe, anecdotally, what the tourism people and the business people were telling you, people were saying I'm not sure it's safe to fly into Boston. We also had a very robust public debate about whether or not we had the most politically corrupt and unsafe airport in the country with every

extremer reporting what you could expect.

And for that reason, one of the things that I told the state police colonel, who I reassigned to the airport, was I want you to be visible, I want people to be pissed that they are waiting in line, I want people to think we have more presence and more security at that airport than anywhere else in the country. And the day I read a front page paper that people are starting to be annoyed by the lines, we win because I needed to get people back on planes using our airports. And if you can create, through --.

Did we deter any terrorist attacks? I don't know, but I do know that we had to take extreme measures that weren't driven just by the security means but also by the perception amongst the public that had economic and terror effects on our economy in order to not ruin our entire tourism economy in Massachusetts.

MR. HARTMANN: Mike?

MR. MORAN: I don't know if you've all seen dangerous curves signs on the road, that's what the mall, not being guarded, is all about. Those signs pop up after somebody dies and I think what we have just done is we are sealing off the exit route after the group left by correcting our air traffic problems. They don't hit twice in the same way. A truck bomb in

Kenya, a boat full of explosives in Yemen, planes in New York and Washington. Now--

MR. SEAMANS: World Trade Center, twice.

MR. MORAN: Right, but they came back to finish the job that they started, successfully. And so what I'm saying is while we obviously need to deal with the vulnerabilities that were there, and the debate that the press can, to some extent spur, is are there other places? This is reporting that is being done but it's so enormous, the topic is so enormous, ports and water supplies and nuclear power plants, that we are not really seeing any kind of coherent --. I can't track it, I'm supposed to be tracking this kind of coverage and I can't track whether it's making any difference. It seems to be just bouncing off the bureaucracy. I'm a little frustrated by it.

MR. HARTMANN: Maryn?

MS. MCKENNA: I want to just scoop up a couple of things that people said, and what the governor said about giving us context and Neal said about having an open debate. And suggest that because, if we're not closing the barn door after the horse is gone, then we need to determine where the vulnerabilities are by war gaming them or by following out certain models. And I want to remind all of us

that whoever programs the model gets to set the debate. And my example for this is a model for the potential spread of smallpox that was war gamed sometime in the 12 months before September 11th.

It was called Dark Winter, it was led by former Senator Sam Nunn playing the role of the president and it posited a spread of smallpox, rapid enough that they shut the war game down early on the assumption that, in this war game, the entire country had just become infected with smallpox and died. This is important for two reasons, quite aside from the fact that it's gruesome. The first reason is because there are a number of reputable public health scientists who would say that the model that this was based on was false and that smallpox is nowhere near infectious as Dark Winter presumed it to be.

The second reason why it's important is that Dark Winter made an enormous impression on the White House, particularly on the vice president's office, and it is widely assumed that much of the impetus for the number of people proposed to be vaccinated against smallpox, rising as high as it did last fall from the 20,000 proposed by the CDC's advisory board to the 10 million or more eventually proposed by the White House, is largely due to the

effect of that particular model, as opposed to the more conservative models proposed by folks at the CDC and some folks here at Harvard. Dark Winter was mostly done by the Hopkins School of Public Health.

And there is a third reason why this is important because if the smallpox vaccination campaign goes as the White House initially proposed, which is a very open question both because of public reaction and because of some of the secondary medical complications that are now emerging, it is going to be so costly that most of the states, and I think Dr. Toomey will back me up on this, are now saying that if they execute this campaign, other government functions and public health will suffer.

So the question of how we war game and who gets to set the debate for the models that we are exploring to determine our vulnerabilities is I just want to say a very nuanced question that has a lot of downstream effects that we need to think about.

MR. HARTMANN: Don?

MR. HAMILTON: I don't know a perfect model but I think I could propose one that I would like, and it can be done either by the media chasing a certain kind of detail story or by a public official who steps up to the plate and puts it this way. But

somebody needs to be framing it the way I think most people at this table understand what's happening, which is governors and others are going to have to say all right, I can put this much more security out there but that means I'm going to have to cut this many tens of thousands of people off of Medicare.

But people are not positing the question that way and reporters aren't asking questions that get at that. What are the choices that have to be made?

MR. HARTMANN: Have you seen that model used?

MR. HAMILTON: I have not.

MR. HARTMANN: For anything? Nancy?

MS. DEMME: I don't anything on that.

MR. HARTMANN: Models in which we have seen it done right?

MS. TOOMEY: It's right but that's exactly the debate we are having right now about smallpox. If you move us forward, then this is what we are going to lose. We haven't been very effective in framing that debate because it's being driven external. But I think the public health community has certainly tried to use that argument. If you choose to vaccinate, this is what we are losing.

MR. HARTMANN: Jeanne?

MS. MESERVE: I just want to pull up on something the Governor said in talking about beefing up the airport security. You said I don't know if it was effective, security, but it served a political point and it served an economic point. And for those of us covering it, this is really problematic. I mean we are trying to get to the question of is it good security? And you've got a different approach to the problem and we feel often I think, I do anyway, that I'm being bamboozled and that there is often a political agenda behind the security steps that are being taken. It makes it difficult to evaluate, especially where everybody now is at the money trough.

MR. HARTMANN: Can I go back a second? You're using political as if it's a dirty word.

MS. MESERVE: Well, I'll tell you.

MR. HARTMANN: I'm serious. I mean there was an insinuation there.

MS. MESERVE: I covered politics. Kit and I have ridden on the bus together and I don't view politics that way but we are dealing with a public safety issue here. And I think to a certain degree, this is so important that it has to be judged differently than a lot of other things we deal with.

MS. SWIFT: But just, not to defend

myself, although I will, terrorism seeks to disrupt our way of life, which is the public safety issue. And certainly if I had information that I could prevent 3,000 deaths by doing one thing or I could get 20 percent more people on our airplanes by doing a different thing, it would be clear how to measure those decisions but I don't think reassuring the public and keeping our economic system running is entirely not a response to terrorism.

MR. SEAMANS: Can I rebut you on that? Let me tell you, when the National Guard was at the airports in Miami, I had the full confidence that if there were a couple of drunks having a fight, they would be there for it. But they would never spot Mohammed Atta, who dresses like us and looked like us and, by the way, they wouldn't stop him one second because terrorists are gray people. They don't run around in straggly beards and robes when want to do This is the problem I have when you stack the this. airport with state troopers and National Guard who wouldn't know a terrorist if they came up and asked them for the time of day. You need something better than that, you can stop the drunks from fighting but you can't stop the terrorists like that.

MS. SWIFT: But I'm not sure, and I would

be interested in what Bob's research showed, what the general public's perception was. Not people who were educated, not people who had thought it through, but the general --. Because you kept getting on planes, Kit kept getting on planes, people who had to for their life and could measure it, but it was the sort of traveler--

MR. SEAMANS: But the people you had there don't know anything about the--

 $\label{eq:mr.hartmann:} \mbox{ I want to get Nancy in } \\ \mbox{here.}$

MS. DEMME: I think you're right on both of those. Right, they can stop the drunks but they would not be able to necessarily pick up on the terrorists. And it's maybe not impossible but it is very, very difficult to measure the effectiveness of all of these fortifications and all of these security efforts because if it is effective, unless we find someone later on with the drawn up plan that says I didn't go here because they did this, you don't know that. And he's off laying off people who, perhaps because of some of the effectiveness we are having, once they are laid off, something might happen that would cause us to bring them back. Any type of intelligence type work that is proactive and effective

is almost immeasurable.

On another note, in reference to what you just said, is that maybe in the pre-attack stages what we need to do, and I don't exactly know how to do this and to use the media, is to educate the public, and by the public I mean like mall security. I mean people that are at a level to see what is going to happen, to really intercept. They are not going to do the mall, they are not going to do the White House and the Pentagon anymore, they are fortified.

If we unfortify them, perhaps they would, but they are going to be stoppable only in the planning stage, which means while they are doing their presurveillance, only their efforts that lead to maybe photographing six people, maybe not a big deal, that's a tourist attraction, but six people photographing and asking about security measures. And we just need to enlighten and educate the public and certain people who are in positions where they can see things happening. The only time we can stop them is in the planning stage. Once the planning stage is done, it's too late.

MR. HARTMANN: Arn?

MR. HOWITT: I wanted to focus on an issue that Rich started to talk about a little bit before and which Mike picked up on about how do we judge whether

the system is working as a whole? And I had a slightly different take than Juliette on the USA Today report that tried to evaluate city systems systematically. Although it wasn't perfect, and I'm not sure what would have been perfect, it was trying to get at an important issue, which is how do you judge whether these things are working well?

And I do know that I had the experience the week after, I forget the day that it appeared, it was a Friday, or a Thursday or something like that, early the following week I was visiting the offices of a major city, and the mayor stepped out and came up to me and a colleague and said did you see that awful USA Today report, how badly it reviewed us, et cetera, et cetera? And he was very steamed about it. And actually, it was pretty accurate about that particular city, and there were weaknesses and the mayor was in a state of denial about those things I think, for a large part.

And I think that as difficult as it is, and I don't have any better way than Michael does of getting my arms around what that system-wide evaluation ought to be, still, it's an integrated system. It should be an integrated system, the pieces of it. Public health, guarding airports, et cetera, do have

certain interrelationships and senior officials are responsible for the system as a whole. And I think we have to figure out ways of effectively thinking about how to assess them.

MS. FETTERMAN: I can't defend in any way what we did because I'm not quite familiar with what everyone is talking about. So I hope it's not *US News* and the *World Report*, you're quoting. I hope we did it right.

But when you talk about models for covering things, I think with the TSA, USA Today has been more aggressive than many in the media in covering the TSA and the result has been information, not secret like 60 people, 60 air marshals getting out. But we've chronicled a new agency trying to get their act together, and not doing it very well and not being willing to admit that they are not doing it very well and wanting to say it's national security that you are even talking about it.

So I think that's something that the media needs to keep in mind and the government officials need to keep in mind is that we are a watch dog. We have say how are these --. We are whispering to each other to the billions of dollars that are coming out. How is it being spent? What are they spending it on? How

effective is their planning? And we have to do that, that's our job. So something like the TSA, and they did, and they've been very vehemently just crying the blues about *USA Today's* coverage of the TSA, when in fact, from my perspective, it's helped the TSA do a better job of what they are supposed to be doing.

They can't just sit back and say well it's air marshals and it's secret. Well how are you training your air marshals? Oh, not as well as we used to, you used to train them like this but now you don't. But we are safer? Hmmm. So and guns and pilots, you're just going to let some guys have a bunch of guns on the planes? Hmmm. I don't know, is that a good idea? We'll have a bunch of pilots with a foot shot off. So I mean these are the kinds of questions we have to ask and we have to be ready for the response to be this is national security, we can't discuss this. Oh, really?

MR. LEONE: Can I address that?

MR. HARTMANN: Are you going to be directly responsive?

MR. LEONE: I would hope so.

(Laughter)

MR. HARTMANN: I apologize.

MR. LEONE: That's okay.

MS. FETTERMAN: Is it bullshit or totally bullshit?

(Laughter)

MR. LEONE: From my perspective, law enforcement and public safety, there is a part you see and there is a part you don't. The part you see is what we built around this Anti-terrorism Task Force in Massachusetts, it's measures the governor took that let people feel safe, to have a public confidence around what you can see. Trials, public trials. I prosecuted Reid, it was I think great public confidence in seeing that Richard Reid got prosecuted in our criminal justice system.

But then there is part you don't see and the part you don't see, and again I learned this from prosecuting Reid and other terrorism cases, is there is a whole intel world out there that needs a lot better coordination but there is a lot that we do that people don't see and frankly shouldn't see because a lot of what they don't see, if they did, would undermine public confidence in how safe they are. I mean there is a dichotomy in public safety but it's especially underscored in the terrorism world, and that is we need to take measures that make people feel that they are safe. But we need to do things that are not in the

public eye which continue to heighten our ability to keep people safe.

MR. HARTMANN: I think part of the problem is the fact that you are making the decision about what's seen and unseen, and it's in the context of having seen, over the last 40 years, the FBI make that decision and us saying hmm, I don't think they made that decision very well.

MR. LEONE: Well I don't differ with you, you should be pushing. You should be pushing for what you are not seeing, or what you are seeing, and whether we are being effective. I think that's very important dialogue but there is great benefit in law enforcement and public safety to having both ends, a public piece which ensures confidence and a non-public piece, which frankly, as I always tell people, you shouldn't have to worry about because that's our job and not yours.

MR. HARTMANN: Well I think that was being honored here. Even Bill was saying I didn't report the 60, so, in effect, that's the same principle that she was honoring.

Darrel?

MR. STEPHENS: I think in the search for a model, I think we've got to sort things out a little better than we've been able to sort them out around the

table where we go from guarding the courthouse to guarding, having sky marshals on the airplane. And there is different ways, there is different expectations, different requirements and there is different ways to determine whether or not we are prepared through TSA at the airports and on the flights that we have going on around the world versus whether or not a local government has the mechanisms in place to be able to respond to a particular problem versus what the role of the state is.

And I think there isn't one model, there has got to be several ways of looking at how government is prepared to respond to the responsibilities that they have at different levels. And until we begin to sort that out and focus on that, I don't think we are going to get at where we need to be.

MR. LANZA: I think Mindy answered the question with one of her questions on how the money is being spent when you look into that. And I believe that us, in government, have duped a lot of you in the media in thinking that the terrorism money is being spent wisely when we do this big exercise when we show you the latest equipment that we just got, but we haven't put together a coordinated response to use that equipment. I think you'll find that endemic, or

epidemic actually, throughout the country.

And originally, when the legislation was proposed in the `90s, they went by the size of the community as opposed to the threat to the community, and the money went out that way. And now, they are putting the money out based on the desire of the community as opposed to the needs of the community. And in order for us to really spend our money wisely and not have it come out of other sources that it doesn't need to, every community needs to have a plan. Not a plan on how to spend, buy stuff, but respond appropriately and safely, and that's not happening throughout this country.

It's happening in certain pockets where you have a couple of people with good plans and the rest of them are saying well we want thermal imaging cameras, so they will write a terrorism thing to get thermal imaging cameras or whatever they latest device is. So I think the media and government, and you all need to be the watchdogs on this, we need to have that money spent on planning for preparedness and response issues as opposed to buying things.

MR. HARTMANN: It seems to me these are pretty basic principles. Nobody is saying, that I heard, led by Bill, that government should tell

everything. And so you knew some things but you said I'm not going to reveal that. There seems to be agreement that media have a responsibility in our democracy to push. And so where are we stubbing our toe? How do we move forward from that?

MR. JONES: I want to say something about the airport National Guardsmen before I address that, if I may, just very briefly. I felt safer with those National Guardsmen there and I'll tell you why, because Mohammed Atta would have been stopped now by the metal detectors and presumably, by the mechanisms that have been put in place to keep them from going through with box cutters that people just sort of blew off. But keep in mind that back in the `60s and `70s, the terrorism in Europe was the Red Brigades and they often basically walked into a ticket office of an airport and opened fire and started throwing hand grenades.

MR. HARTMANN: But did it make you feel safer?

MR. JONES: Well it made me feel safer to have somebody there with a gun that was not a Red Brigade, yes.

MR. HARTMANN: Most of us are amateurs at this conversation about what's effective in terms of deterrents.

MS. SWIFT: Can I just--

MR. HARTMANN: No, wait a minute. I really want to know because the issue that we are dealing with here is the responsibility of journalism and the responsibility of government, in terms of whether our government is prepared and whether or not the media really are playing the right role in terms of pushing. And you would say we are stubbing our toe, that's the conversation we need to have. We are not experts literally at that deterrents that were symbolism.

MR. JONES: I couldn't let that pass, that's all.

MS. SWIFT: Can I just say on the stubbing our toe? We're all going to get mad that a bunch of public officials who don't know the right context are making the wrong decisions about assigning resources. I think there also has to be a recognition in any local media market or even in a statewide media market, if Michael, and maybe he is the most brilliant person on national security to ever report for his paper—
(Laughter)

MS. SWIFT: --decides that his focus is on X, and starts writing about it every single day and about those weaknesses, I think the press does need to recognize that that will drive a decision about where resources will go. And so the press also has to accept that if they choose to focus on something as a shortcoming, whether they are right or wrong, it will, to some degree, impact resource allocation.

MR. JONES: I don't disagree with that and I think in fact you're exactly right in the sense that what the media focuses on will probably have a lot to do with shaping what the priorities are, or at least have some, and I don't think that's inappropriate. The question then is what should that priority be? And I think we've heard it and I think we heard it from Chuck. The planning, it would seem to me, is where this has to start and the concept of municipalities and organizations that are going to be responsible and don't have plans, plans that include all kinds of things, both preparedness and responsiveness. I mean the avoidance is one part of it but then dealing with it when it happens is also a very big part of it.

The point is, it seems to me, that if there is a priority for journalists, and I'm talking about the message that we are going to be trying to

send, it is that journalism ought to be holding the municipalities and people in authority's feet to the fire about being prepared, about thinking about it, about creating plans, about making it absolutely clear that there is a plan out there, that there are smart people, they are devoting resources, and effort and energy to coming up with a way to coming up with a way not just to prevent it but to respond to it. But that in fact ought to be the priority.

MR. HARTMANN: Jane is biting her tongue. Come on, Jane?

MS. SWIFT: I would just love to hear from Ike, based on his earlier honesty about local news coverage, an honest assessment about how many stories are going to be written about the planning process that gets going through or if the TV cameras from his station are going to show up when you buy the new infrared equipment.

MR. SEAMANS: Oh, well we'll go crazy for that story because it's a dog and pony show and it looks wonderful.

MS. SWIFT: The infrared camera but the planning--

MR. SEAMANS: It's great stuff. Now what does it mean in the long run? That remains to be seen.

MS. SWIFT: But you didn't get my point.

MR. JONES: Well I don't. I don't think you are right and I don't think it even matters. I think you have to ask those questions and I don't think local television is the only thing that drives news.

MR. SEAMANS: No, it isn't.

MR. HARTMANN: I think it's a Jane/Alex conversation right now.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$ SEAMANS: Well she asked me a question.

MR. HARTMANN: Okay.

MR. SEAMANS: Early on, after 9/11, there were some of us who found out that while the local authorities were saying that the plans were there, they were not and we were reporting that quite consistently. And we used to come sit on his doorstep to ask him, and the mayor and other people, they were talking a good game, but it wasn't there and it's still not there.

After a recent flap in Miami involving the manager saying we have a plan and we don't, all the fire fighters suddenly started coming forward and saying hey, we are the first responders, we don't know anything, we don't have our equipment.

So there were several of us going after that from the very beginning and it was clear that

there was no plan, they were talking a great game. They formed an Office of Homeland Security at the county level, the only county in the country they say, but if you call the man, the director, a retired police major, a wonderful guy, he doesn't know. And he will tell you I have no idea, I don't know anything about this, I'm trying to figure it out. So the press, at least in our area, have been going after them but they haven't done a good job.

MR. HARTMANN: Neal?

MR. PEIRCE: Well there ought to be a national sort of standard understood or growing of what a good regional plan is. And I get very impatient with the certain city that's going to solve it or certain municipality. It has to be a regional plan and we are wasting incredible amounts of this \$4 billion if everybody buys duplicate equipment. So those are the kinds of things that the local press, maybe it's a planning story but it's a critical one, and the amount of money that gets spent or whether that plan really has legs to it. I just think that there is nothing more essential than us going after that kind of story.

MR. HARTMANN: Jennifer?

MS. LEANING: Well there are two kinds of plans. I mean they are related but they are pretty

different. One is a preventative plan and the other is a response plan. And I think the emergency medicine and the emergency management community, all of the uniform public safety people and many of them are around this room, have a moderately good sense about what a response plan is for a range of incidents that then begins to drop off, in terms of the knowledge base, for bioterrorism and an extensive radiation accident. A dirty bomb makes everybody worry because it actually could have such rapid economic effects.

that are very difficult to plan a response for but there is a lot of tribal memory and basic practical know how that's in the community. And that absolutely needs to be assessed by the press and looked at in just the ways you were talking about. That is do these guys, these firemen, these police guys, do they have the training and the back up in this community to be able to meet the plan?

And I really agree, Neal, that there needs to be a sort of general description about this plan. It's not going to tip off the terrorists, I mean they know what's going on. The plan is about expectation. People should be trained to X and what it's going to cost. That is definitely not out there in a clear

enough way and could be really explored and assessed from the press side. The preventive side I think nobody knows, even the FBI, they don't know.

And I think this is a place for really deep, investigative journalism, very smart people who spend, it has to be the richer media and the richer press but go out for a year and try to figure this out. Judith Miller kind of stuff, but even deeper than that. I mean all this stuff about human intelligence, that that's what we missed and we don't have it. I haven't seen very many good stories about this. Now maybe this is people who try to investigate this get immediately into what's considered classified but a deep assessment about what prevention for terrorism is I have not, from my perspective, seen particularly good analysis out of the press and it's not going to come out of the government.

MR. HARTMANN: Darrel?

MR. STEPHENS: I think that there has been some work done on prevention. I don't know how much the press has written about it, I haven't seen a lot actually from either a national or a local level. But a lot of the focus on prevention has been target hardening, assessment of vulnerability, establishing, which is expensive, not terribly complicated to do in a

lot of cases, but it does contribute to the prevention environment.

MS. LEANING: That's mitigating. That's assuming someone--

MR. STEPHENS: I see it very differently. I mean you can call it that but I see it as in fact aimed at prevention because there are some assessments made in where you go and how you engage in things and I think target hardening is a preventative measure. I think as well the types of investigations that are going on around this country, the types of people that are being looked at are very different today than they were prior to 9/11, and I think that also serves in a prevention role. We know about things and we are engaged in investigations today that we would have never looked at 18 months or two years ago and I think that's partly about prevention as well.

MS. LEANING: Can I just say, excuse me, but is there any evidence that that is making any difference?

MR. STEPHENS: About the same as there is with sky marshals.

MS. LEANING: Well that's my point. That needs to be evaluated.

MR. LEONE: If you report it, you've seen

it. There are several successes in the terrorism world that can not be reported and--

UNIDENTIFIED: Could you tell us more about this?

(Laughter)

MR. JONES: Why can't it be reported?

MR. LEONE: Because several of the successes are based upon the gathering, dissemination and usage of classified information. The terrorism world is a little different. That's why when I talk about the B.S. and total B.S., it's not total B.S. because there are a whole lot of things going on that the public doesn't know about that take place in the intelligence world, take place domestically and in the foreign arena that we can't make public for a number of different reasons.

Also, Jim, I differ with your characterization of terrorists not learning about what happens in the public. The African Embassy trials, I've spoken to Pat Fitzgerald who has prosecuted both of those cases and in fact we have seen numerous occasions, some based on classified information, some on public source, that terrorists learned from that very public trial and they utilized techniques and trade craft that they used by watching that trial. So

none of this is an--

MR. WALSH: I want to respond to this. I read those trial transcripts and there is a wealth --.

I mean one thing that would be great -- and I'm going to respond -- would be great for journalists to do is actually address terrorism. When people learned that there were 400 terrorist attacks during the 1990s against US assets, they were surprised. And there is a huge--

MR. LEONE: 37 percent--

MR. WALSH: Pardon me?

MR. LEONE: 37 percent of all the attacks were against, they weren't on our soil but they were against--

MR. WALSH: And most of them were against US businesses, not against US government targets. I mean there is a lot that actually if the public knew more about the broader context in which terrorism operates, it would actually help deal with some of this. But in the context in which there were, in a decade, 5,000 terrorist attacks, how many of them do you think were based on a state document that was released about how to improve security at X? Of course they are going to read the trial transcripts. I said that, as with the case of the Department of Energy,

there is going to be some information.

What happens is you classify everything and that actually retards the system because people don't get the information they need to make their improvements because everyone is locked out. What you need is to identify the most important information and you put high fences around that 10 percent and the rest you let go. People want to shut down archives and not allow people to go into archives. I have spent too many days in archives, that's why I am as pale as I am.

I can tell you that there are no terrorists, there are no guys in robes going through, like a phone book, box after box, page after page of material. That's not a source for terrorist activity but people would start classifying and pulling stuff out of archives for that reason. We have to be empirical and scientific in our assessment of what sources terrorists use, that's all I'm saying.

MR. HARTMANN: Don?

MR. HAMILTON: I have been seduced again today, as I have many times before, from something I ought to know better about and it's the difference between a threat and a vulnerability. And if you are trying to protect yourself against terrorism by logging the vulnerabilities and protecting the vulnerabilities,

you are going to go crazy. You get at risk by trying to get at intentions. You probably don't have a large enough database and what we are really talking about here is how can you arrive at a reasoned model of risk assessment, and you see almost no reporting on that.

You start getting at risk and then you can start saying we've got a reasonable, specific and credible gets at this but nobody is really digging behind what does specific and credible mean? I don't see it explored. What is the risk of terrorism? And the reason you end up with federal terrorism insurance is there is not an actuary in the world who will touch it because you don't have a large enough base and you don't have a means of judging intentions.

MR. HARTMANN: Reiterate the distinction you are making between vulnerability and threat and why you think it's so important.

MR. HAMILTON: A vulnerability is, in essence, everything that could happen and a risk is everything that could happen versus the probability that this will happen. And that's why discussions about whether the courthouse is at greater risk than the shopping center, which are always fun to talk about, don't help us protect ourselves or prevent terrorism. If you are going to get at risk, you are

going to get to get at intentions and then you are talking about something that we've had a fragmented discussion on, which is domestic intelligence.

MR. HARTMANN: Mike?

MR. MORAN: A way to end that, my point was that, since 9/11, one of the glaring deficiencies clearly was the ability of various agencies that have responsibility for these things to share information, to know what the other agencies knew and to feel empowered to share that with other agencies.

Everything I see in my fairly consistent view of what's been going on since, and perhaps there is things going on that I don't see, I admit that, is that this retarded system is merely retarded in a different way now.

(Laughter)

MR. MORAN: The Pentagon has suddenly developed its own CIA capability which it's not going to share with the CIA because they are working across purposes in various parts of the world. The "clearinghouse" that was created under Ridge is a shell. There is nothing there, they have no capability. If you ask them off the record, which I respect, I do not quote people off the record, they will tell you well I got a report from CIA today, I got

a report from NSA, and I'll read them both. But they don't have their own capability to --. They assess it, to some extent, but only in the most --.

I mean that, to me, gets at what Jennifer is talking about, that's the story. And let me tell you the journalism dilemma here, I've pitched that series, reforming intelligence, three times to my bosses and they don't want to do it. They are just not interested, it's boring to them, and it drives me out of my mind.

MR. SEAMANS: That's the problem when the governor turns to me or Alex talks to me about television doing stories. Television is not the medium for this because we call it no picture, there is no picture. Or Jim referred earlier he had a story with the local station that says well, we can't do that because we don't have any visuals. And it's a terrible thing but that's the way it is in our business.

MR. MORAN: But the internet is a great medium for this, and we do independent stuff and we could easily do this.

MR. SEAMANS: Occasionally a television network, local almost never, occasionally networks rise above it. So this is something so important, we've got to tell it to you whether we've got a picture or not,

but it's not very often I don't think. Maybe Jeanne has better information.

MR. HARTMANN: Before you begin, Juliette, if there is any time you want to --. You've been listening carefully so any time you want to get into this conversation, either in observing or reflecting back, you're privileged, you can just say I want to be in here now.

MS. CHANDLER: I'm still sort of stuck on looking for the model thing and I like the points that Jen --. I mean I'm in investigative journalism and it does sound to me like this is a great place for us to dig in. I think that the real difficulty is nobody seems to be able to tell us how to really assess whether a plan will work or if it's credible. So I mean I can just see jumping in in Charlotte and digging around what are we going to do with the nuclear plants, or this or that, but finding out whether that is enough seems to be what we are all struggling to figure out.

MR. HARTMANN: Are you directly responding?

MR. ADAIR: Yes. Here is one way to question maybe not effectiveness but priorities and this gets to what Alex was saying, we have focused in the media so much on individual things, the air

marshals, what are they doing to protect nuclear plants, and we haven't focused much on the much broader forest issue which is the administration would like to give a \$724 billion tax break over the next 10 years. And we haven't said well what does that equate in terms of security or other things? And maybe we need to look more at that, not as sexy, no pictures and not as, one of the things that sells homeland security stories is that threat that something could happen. Well this one isn't that sexy but it's something we need to look at as priorities.

MR. HARTMANN: Lindsey?

MS. WOLF: I wanted to get back to several points about the planning. I can't speak to what is or isn't effective, I don't have that kind of expertise, but in terms of media covering planning, what we've done in San Jose, and we have the same kinds of target hardening kinds of planning efforts that everybody has. Whether they are effective, I don't know, but the process of bringing reporters in, we've invited reporters in to our EOC to look at our plans, not to get them to write a story about our plans but so that we get that conversation going. And they understand, in advance, if something happened, whatever it is we are planning for, that's not ever what happens of

course.

We plan for all kinds of vulnerabilities and we have come to the point where we have driven ourselves crazy, but it's to bring reporters in, to see the plans and to talk with us, and to see what questions they would ask us that we could then work out in the next iteration of those plans. They have been very willing to come in, not with the expectation of doing a story, with the expectation of doing it on background so that they then are better prepared and they know where to go, they know where to call and then know what our EOC looks like.

We have a policy like most other jurisdictions, you don't come inside the EOC when we are in a crisis situation. They never otherwise get a chance to see that EOC. So that's what has worked best for us, it's not looking at it in terms of will we get a story out of it. We get stories out of the drills, that's visual, but the planning process, coming in while we are planning, is for the media's information which may or may not, they may not feel necessary to pass on to the public.

MR. HARTMANN: Juliette?

MS. KAYYEM: Lindsey's point and then
Don's too. I'm taking this from something some of u

who were at a previous executive session meeting learned was one of the problems with the effectiveness argument of the overall strategy argument is, after September 11th, is your line, 3,000 people died today or only 3,000 people died today. We have no way of talking about civilian casualties or permissible losses. The government has no good way of talking about it and the media I think has no good way of talking about it.

So when you tell me there is a smallpox plan and you say under this plan, under our modeling of it, 20,000 people will die, but if before the plan, 400,000 people would have died, it's a good plan. But we have no way in this country I think, either government or the media, to talk about that stuff which is the stuff that we are talking about. I mean death, life and death and that 5,000 people dead is a lot unless you compare it to 400,000.

MR. HARTMANN: Neal and then I'm going to ask Alex --. Oh, Peter?

MR. EMERSON: I want to pick up on what Juliette said and then also Jane, and Ike and many others. And that is that I think Neal started it off with this is a democracy so it's based on information. So the public has to make informed choices, they can't

make it without information. But as Bob Blendon pointed out, they don't have enough information and sometimes when they get the information, it still doesn't translate into them actually knowing or having the knowledge.

Ed mentioned that homeland security is really not homeland security because you can't lock down this country. And what sells homeland defense, to me, is the belief that somehow this country is made safer by everything that this government is doing. what concerns me, and I think Juliette hit it right on the head, is that the federal government has framed the question and the debate in such a way as to suggest that if we do all of these things, we will be safer. And I think the reality is that it's a false premise, you can't lock the country down and that at the end of the day, the judgement, which is the question that's on the table here, should be based on what are the priorities, that almost, in some ways, have to be made on a regional level and, in some cases, on a city by city level.

One could say a priority would be our air system because that has severe economic consequences if we don't protect it. But as Jim pointed out, most businesses, chemical plants, et cetera, industrial

plants, are completely vulnerable today. I mean we haven't, as a society or even as a city, made the decision should we take a little money from the courthouse, that you pointed out, in guarding the court house, and maybe we ought to assist business in helping to protect that big chemical plant that anybody could walk into any time?

So I get worried that the debate that the federal government has posited is really a false one and that the press could be enormously helpful in saying wait a minute, first of all, we can't protect America fully, there are going to be losses and what, as a democracy, are we prepared to pay, in terms of loss of life, based on priorities? But we don't have the information to make those decisions yet.

MR. HARTMANN: We're going to get Neal and--

MS. MESERVE: As quickly as possible, you said it makes a difference if the press pays attention to an issue, that will prompt government action.

Chemical plant security has gotten a lot of publicity, a lot, and nothing has been done. So don't think that we are always a catalyst for change, we aren't.

MR. HARTMANN: Neal, please?

MR. PEIRCE: I like the point about you

can't lock the whole country down because that raises the whole question, and also Bill got on this question, with the budget. And we have these \$724 billion of tax reductions, we also have a massive increase in the Pentagon budget this year. Who is to say that that massive increase of firepower, practically \$1 billion on some days for arms dropped on Iraq, is a better expenditure than home defense?

And that really raises questions in my mind about our whole set of priorities and I think that's what we, in the press, need to be raising constantly, is what are our national priorities and what's most important to us? That plus what's effective and what makes sense of the many choices that we have to make on homeland security?

MR. HARTMANN: Alex, please? If you could summarize this in about three words. (Laughter)

MR. JONES: Proper planning. I think that what's been demonstrated by just this hour of conversation is that there are a couple of things, one, clearly there are real secrets and real secrets should not be divulged. But clearly, too, there is an enormous stake and an enormous number of unanswered questions and questions that still need to be argued

out.

The way that Jennifer framed it I think is completely right. There is the issue of a plan for preventing and there needs to be then the plan for dealing with the emergency. And it seems to me that all of these things that were raised, the things that were raised by Peter and other people, like Neal and so forth, are implied in the questions that would be part of pursuing the question of planning because the planning is going to be premised, it would seem to me, on priorities, on choices, on decisions that are made either in response to perceived public priorities, or individual priorities or the priorities that come down from the federal government. I don't know. They have to be explained though if journalists are looking for answer.

And I think that, for the purposes of this gathering here, the thing from this section that I think is valuable especially is the idea that the coverage of the planning process itself has been neglected and it is a very legitimate and open area that is absolutely fair game for coverage of an aggressive sort, that does not tell secrets that shouldn't be told. But that does, at the same time, force the people who are in authority to explain their

thinking and explain why they are making they choices they've got, and to unearth the kinds of things that Ike was talking about, about the firemen who say wait a minute, they might to be telling you this but they don't have a plan.

I think there is also something to be said for the fact that we should not kid ourselves about local television and the willingness and the ability of local television to deal with this. Local newspapers are going to be much more likely, like in San Jose, much more likely to treat this seriously. This doesn't apply to every television station but I think it applies to most. But if the local newspaper starts to cover it, the local television is much more likely to pick up a piece of it.

and I think that the idea of investigative reporting for the USA Todays and the creations of criteria for making judgements, those are things for USA Today or the New York Times and the major majors with the people who can really be specialized and who can get the attention. And I think that's also something that would theoretically lend itself to the kinds of local inquiries that say here's the criteria that these people have come up with, where do you fit? I think that if we could --.

One of the things that I found really interesting is right at the beginning of this hour when I said what are the models? That we were all kind of like we ain't got none. And I feel like that's something that maybe we ought to try to think through a little more carefully. But that's the message that I got from this hour.

MR. HARTMANN: Thanks. Let's take a ten minute break and come back and work toward the end. Thank you, Alex.

(Whereupon, at 2:10 p.m., there was a brief recess.)

(2:25 p.m.)

MR. HARTMANN: We'll begin with two things before I set the stage, one is Arn is going to test the validity of a hypothesis that was sort of postulated earlier in the day.

Arn?

MR. HOWITT: I would like to test the validity of the proposition that one's professional stature grows if one fixes a mistake. Juliette and I would like to candidly admit that we misattributed the overview to USA Today, that it was actually CNN.com that produced that. And I'll still say that I liked it better than I disliked it.

(Laughter)

MR. HARTMANN: We want a show of hands as to whether Arn is more credible than he was this morning.

(Laughter)

MR. SAMUEL: How could you possibly make that kind of mistake?

(Laughter)

MR. HARTMANN: Secondly, Kathleen wants appropriately just to give all of us a frame of reference about bioterrorism and the fact is, underlying a lot of what we've done so far, is the background of law enforcement when in fact it's public health that's going to take an immense responsibility for it. So, Kathleen, educate us a little bit so that we are on the same wave length.

MS. TOOMEY: Well just throwing this out to think about as you are reporting on this. What I was struggling with is a lot of what we are talking about for bioterrorism prevention in fact isn't prevention at all, it's actually having a surveillance system in place, being able to respond after an attack occurs. And so, in reality, it's not prevention, it's response. And they have taken this law enforcement, that's an uneasy connection because public health is

very different than law enforcement. We are trying to bring this public health activity into our law enforcement world and not always with good results.

And so you end up making an assessment of a response for smallpox using the same metrics of how many guards you have outside equals how many people are vaccinated, as that's your adequacy of a response when that is not the adequacy of our smallpox planning.

But I've also heard federal marshals say we can't prevent bioterrorism, we can't do that. When in fact I think in the terms of actually primary prevention, you could. They told us that in Atlanta at one of our meetings and thinking about where these biologicals are manufactured, or how are they dispersed or even knowing if there is transport of biologic agents.

I just think that we have to think about how we are framing bioterrorism because it is different than a lot of the other terrorist activities we are talking about, in part because of that public health role in this that public health has never worked before as part of law enforcement in this way.

MR. HARTMANN: Do you want to add anything, Jennifer?

MS. LEANING: I completely agree and I

enforcement and public health is that law enforcement, with the rest of emergency management, has an incident command system that is very hierarchical, and takes orders and moves. And public health tends to be much more discursive, and science-based, and investigative and slow. And at that level, collegial, it's obviously fairly competitive but you have groups of people debating. And that doesn't jive well in an emergency when you need a public health answer and you need a law enforcement or an emergency management response. And that's what some of the issues are that I know Kathleen is dealing with, and I and others are as well.

MR. HARTMANN: Chuck?

MR. LANZA: Traditionally, law enforcement doesn't work well with a lot of other agencies, and I apologize for saying that. But, in terms of public health, they are probably the weakest in terms of staff and any agency. I know at least at the county level, throughout the State of Florida, to expect them to do anything in terms of a large scale surveillance or any other part of the response would be almost non-existent. So emergency management is involved in fire/EMS, for the most part. Law enforcement really would be doing the investigative portion of it and

would not be involved at all.

In fact, there would be a great deal of cooperation on their part to get involved because they are more into arresting people and they don't want to be anywhere near anything that's going to contaminate them or cause them illness. And we found that during anthrax, even on the evidentiary gatherings portion of it, they really wanted nothing to do with that at all. They wanted to get the fire guys to put it in a bag and take it to the health department to get it checked out. They wanted nothing to do with it.

MR. HARTMANN: Can I operate on the assumption that I have you fully until 4:00 or maximum 4:00? Is that okay? Good because, Nancy, before I turn to you, what I would like to do in this last session is to be sure that absolutely everybody at the table is heard. I want to be sure that everybody is in this conversation and that at some stage in the conversation, what you are telling us is what, based on your experience, what you bring to the table already, plus the things that you heard in the conversation today, what you would say to colleagues in terms of the question what should press and government do in advance? And what you think the other side should do.

So we'll hear from government, what do you

think you should do? What would you tell your colleagues what you think the press should do? And vice versa for the press. So, at some stage in this next roughly an hour and a quarter because I'm going to ask Darrel and Neal to summarize it. Not summarize, again, it's what rises to the top for them. But I want to be sure that each of you gets in here and tries to be as concrete as possible in terms of what you would say to people who aren't at the meeting because, in some ways, you are all meant to be surrogates for people who aren't at the meeting.

And the Shorenstein Center and ESPD will figure out how to sort of do a group message, if you will, of what would you say to colleagues. So let's think about your opportunity in the next hour and a quarter or so to get that particular message in. So I want each of you to grab that opportunity and just let me know that you want to do it, and don't everybody try to do it at ten of four, please.

Nancy?

MS. DEMME: I'll just real quick response to what Chuck said that law enforcement doesn't want to when it comes to disease, smallpox, and of these anthrax, any of these other things have anything to do with it. But there is a component that --. I work

with public health very closely and actually those relationships started before the bioterrorism issue because of some other problems that we had in the county. But we have to work hand and hand with you and sometimes public health makes assumptions regarding what law enforcement --.

We'll they'll just do a quarantine. Well, no we won't. No, we won't quarantine anybody, we'll have nothing to do with that, plus there is legal ramifications as to our amount of use of force. But we have to be brought in early to start to deal with those things. And then when I'm wearing my media hat at these same meetings, I'm thinking okay, we cannot just start to quarantine people when you say to do so, once we get a buy in from the department that they'll do such a thing, without having explained to the public what it means, how it works and the limitations and the parameters, and bring media on board as well. There is, again, an educational component that we should probably do a front end attack on before we ever come to that and all.

MR. HARTMANN: Good, thanks.

MR. LEONE: Chuck is absolutely right.

Criminal law enforcement is a very parochial animal,
and Arn knows this and Juliette knows this. We spent

the better part of the first eight months after 9/11 doing a lot of different things but prioritizing building partnerships between public safety law enforcement and emergency management and health and human services. I think it stood us well in the state that people from other jurisdictions, I would just focus on that as a priority, if nothing else, in this new dawn of terror.

MR. HARTMANN: Building those partnerships?

MR. LEONE: Absolutely.

MR. HARTMANN: So is that you saying your take away, what you would say to colleagues?

MR. LEONE: I think it's the one area where if we could say here, in the district, what we've done as well as anybody nationally, I think it was see beyond law enforcement and public safety and see this as a multi-agency, cross-discipline problem, and build the partnerships. To be frank, coming out of this, one of the subgroups of our ATTF is going to include the press and the media after this, and that's one thing I'm going to try and form here in the state.

MR. HARTMANN: Tony?

MR. MASIELLO: Relationship building I think now is more important than ever before.

Relationship building amongst local government, whether you are county, city or whatever the case may be. I know we are doing this in Buffalo now, in Western New York, in the Niagara Frontier and Southern Ontario because we are on the border. All of us now are at least collectively talking, planning and thinking together because we realize if something happens, we are going to have to be the first responders, especially the city because they have the most professional expertise in police and fire emergency services.

So what's happening now is that kind of relationship building between ourselves at the local level, governmentally, because we need each other and we have to because we are all going to respond to something that hopefully we won't have to together. But also relationship building goes to media also. I think in the past, and Lindsey brought this up, in the past, if I had a press conference on planning, you announce the plan. Well that isn't good enough. I think what we have to do is meet with the editors, you have to meet with the station managers, the anchors.

I think everybody has to fully understand what this plan is so that if something happens, it's

not a knee jerk reaction, it's everybody has at least thought about it, they understand it. I know stuff happens that may not go according to plan but at least people would have more in depth understanding of what's going on so that there is a sharing of information but also dealing with it responsibly.

MR. HARTMANN: Anyone want to press back, clarify? Mindy, that was your hand, wasn't it? No, it wasn't? It was Bill, sorry.

MR. ADAIR: To start off, I would just want to encourage anybody here who is not a journalist to leak to me, and to leak often and really help me win that Pulitzer.

(Laughter)

MR. ADAIR: What was I think the most painful thing said all day was something that Arnold said about how we wonder how dealing with this is going to help our careers, help or hurt our careers, sort of our standing in all this. And I had made the sarcastic remark about winning the Pulitzer but I think a lot of us think that way and it drives us in good ways to do good things, that we want to be good at what we do. But I think we need to be driven maybe more by what does the public need to know and what can we do to help them know what it is more than maybe we have been.

And that means sort of putting our egos aside and focusing more on here are the things you need to do to be safe and less on this will really make me look good in the boss' eyes.

The other issue that Alex talked about, and this is something I really intend to do, is to really question the forest here and the big picture about whether, I cover Congress, so much of the debate in Congress is about these giant spending issues and I think we focus on the politics of that but not enough on the priorities. They are talking about spending \$724 billion on a tax cut and I just wonder what that would get you in terms of homeland security. And I intend to ask more questions about that and I think other journalists should too, both at the national level and the local level.

MR. HARTMANN: So how would you ever get that out? So, for example, if you wanted other colleagues to think the same way, how would you try to influence them?

MR. ADAIR: It's like we're all members of a cult here and we are trying to get others to join us. (Laughter)

MR. ADAIR: I guess, informally, I, covering aviation safety and security a lot, in talking

to them, will talk to my friends and colleagues about it. I don't really have any formal channels for delivering a message like that and I'm sort of on the fringe of the homeland security reporters, but there is also a growing group of reporters who just cover homeland security. And I think we all need to talk about that and say geez, we get so focused on the little political battles in Congress, and oh look, the administration is pulling back, they are not going to ask for the full \$724 million, or they want a billion, they want to postpone it, whatever.

I think we all need to do that, so I think that can be done informally. I don't know sort of formal channels, and as a reporter, I'm always suspicious of formal channels anyway. If somebody e-mailed me and said write a story about this, I would be suspicious, but if a friend said hey, I went to this thing at Harvard and it was pretty good, and one of the main points was this, I would take it seriously.

MR. HARTMANN: Neal?

MR. PEIRCE: Well the press is a little bit like a swarm of bees, there is no leader but they tend to go from place to place with some sense and we don't know how it happens. It's some chemistry inside this great swarm that makes it move in one direction or

the other. The question really is how do we get the swarm to think hey, the large priority issues ought to be discussed here and not just the details? And I don't really know how that can happen except more reporters trying it and if a few of us pull off in that direction, and more do, thousands more than are in this room, well then you can influence the direction of the swarm.

MR. HARTMANN: The same issue?

MR. SEAMANS: Yes. It's difficult because of the priorities of whatever your medium is. Very few reporters have the luxury, and I think you mentioned Judith Miller, very few reporters have that kind of luxury to do what she does and to be free to do that because the editor wants something, and she wants it now and she wants it a certain way. Very few of us have the luxury to go after these stories that we think are important and that's a real problem. I mean if you are talking about, in the newspaper, a few. If you are talking about a television station, maybe one. At a network, maybe one or two.

So it's just so hard, because of the press of the news and, unless you can convince the editors and the managers that this is really big stuff, and I need two weeks to pursue it, very few editors and

certainly nobody in television is going to buy the idea that, listen, Dade County is not doing a really good job in planning. I'm going to show you exactly why and it's going to take me three weeks to ferret it out. They are going to say, hey, we give you all the freedom you want but not that long for that. That's just what's going to happen because we are going after the story of the moment.

And just as a footnote, as long as we are into our--

MR. HARTMANN: No, I want you to keep pressing forward what you would do. In other words, what it is you would tell colleagues, based on your --. Well the question we said is what should government and press do in advance? What would you say to your colleagues, based on your experience, and to the other side? To Chuck and to the mayor, if you could get the mayor's attention.

MR. SEAMANS: Well I'm sort of fortunate,
I do have the luxury of doing what I want to do. If
you see me do a story, that's what I chose to do that
day and I spend a lot of time on the story because I
think it's so important. And I tell colleagues all the
time, colleagues at my television station come to me
and ask for information and ask for advice, how to

approach the story on anthrax, is it safe for me? And I do get to the mayor, and I do pursue these and we do run them.

But it is difficult to get into these almost intellectual exercises of planning that just don't translate really well into television journalism, and sometimes not print journalism. Really, print is probably the only people that could do it really well.

MR. HARTMANN: Jim?

MR. WALSH: I think that we can admit that it's a for-profit competitive business and that people have personal ambitions. And then we should ask ourselves how do we use those motivations to get the good outcomes that we want? And it seems that one of the things that people should be thinking about in advance is, and this sounds self-interested by the way, is that the media, even local television stations, can make partnerships, informal or formal partnerships, with the local university that has some expertise in the area.

And you can't wait until the moment that the event happens to begin educating the media on this because they will be too busy doing their stories.

What they can do though is say you don't have to come to our place, we will send someone over to your guys

once a month. There is always, I know from local television, there is always a slot where things are down, it's after the 12:00 newscast and before the 4:00, or whatever your own local thing is.

And once a month we'll send someone over, and we'll take an editor and a reporter, and we'll do a 30 minutes briefing on this thing. We'll do one on anthrax, one on botulism, one on radiological weapons and we'll do it once a month for 12 months. And what is the advantage for you? The advantage for you is that when this happens, you are going to be able to do not only the best reporting, you are going to be able to claim the university's name, you'll be able to say that we have this preparation and the university and my competitor's don't. And my chances of winning an Emmy or Pulitzer increase because of the quality of the job that I'm doing and it costs them nothing.

But it's something that has to be sustained. I've heard a lot of government people talk about, and I heard this at IAEA in Vienna, well we've got to educate the media. And what they mean is having once dinner at the National Press Club. Everyone who works in local television knows that those faces change every four, six, eight months and there is another set of reporters who come in and the others have moved on

to another city. It has to be sustained and it has to be institutionally based but it has to be easy for the media and it has to meet their needs. They have to get something out of it.

MR. HARTMANN: Maryn?

MS. MCKENNA: I wanted to go back to what Ike, Bill and Neal said. This is not my take-home message, I will try to come up with something a little more positively spun for my final comment. But I have to say I'm at a point of discouragement because I can't think of a phrase more calculated to strike into the heart of an editor than cover planning. (Laughter)

MS. MCKENNA: I mean the entire drift of not just television, certainly which is picture focused, but of newspapers outside the two or three nationals has been away from process stories for the past 10 to 15 years. After 9/11, a few people anyway realized that this homeland security apparatus is rising around us. That is beginning to change but with the speed of turning an ocean liner and I'm really troubled at the ought of --. Like Ike in his newsroom, I have a kind of privileged position in mine but to say to my national editor, even a follow the money pitch, that there is all this money coming down from the feds

and there's all this stuff that's involving local law enforcement and public health, and it involves a lot of meeting and a couple of miles high of paper. And it's just going to guarantee that they are going to go to sleep on me.

MR. HARTMANN: Arn?

MR. HOWITT: I want to respond a slightly different way that Maryn because I think that we've allowed this statement about covering planning to be shorthand for something that's a great deal more complex and, in some respects, much more important. I definitely agree that we ought to be looking at the forest but it seems to me that an enormous amount of this depends not just on writing good plans, because nobody may ever read them or take any action based on them, but really there is a critical link between thinking through what you need to do, what are the contingencies for which you need to be ready? What kind of relationships have to be in place? What sorts of capabilities have to be there? That's the planning part of it.

But then there is a critical part of whether the agencies involved can execute what they are being asked to do, and not just execute it at the elite level where the people are actually writing the plans,

but at the line level, on both the prevention side and the response side, in Jennifer's terminology. Homeland security depends critically on line workers in the organization, the average officer out in the field, the EMT, an epidemiologist who is out doing an investigation, you name it, it's got to be some of those line workers.

And if we don't check to see that they've exercised, that they have relationships with other people, that they know how to do it, that the plans are not just specific but also robust in the sense that they can be adapted to something that's different from what we expected, and whether the training is in place to allow people to do these things well, we haven't looked at the right stuff. So I think that's all part of the forest and we want to be careful not to limit it just to the actual writing of plans. I'm not sure that deals with Maryn's problem about process stuff because it still is a lot process oriented.

MR. SEAMANS: Well what you point is is the end product for many people, and your general readers in the popular press would consider this pretty dull stuff and an editor knows this. And even though the reporter is really enthusiastic, the editor also has to judge hey, we aren't the popular press here, we

all aren't the New York Times.

MR. JONES: I was given three words and I used two to say cover planning.

(Laughter)

MR. JONES: And I think that when we say cover planning, we think city planning and whatever. But I think that, very much on the line of what Arn says, I think if it was framed as cover coping with a terror incident locally.

Let me put it this way, David Brooks was here last week. David Brooks said, and I think he is right, that since 9/11, the only thing that matters, as far as electing a president of the United States, is security, is whether people feel safe or whether they don't. Now that's not the only thing they are concerned about but until the democratic party persuades people that they are the party of safety, be positive that there will not be a democratic president.

My point is that this is an issue that is very important to people, obviously it needs to be framed in a way that would make it interesting, but I think that their safety and the confidence they have, or frankly the lack of it that they have, is very important. And I think the very process of questioning it will not only bring up the issue of how the media

itself is preparing for it but how this is going to be addressed. So I think it's an end in and of itself.

It's also I think, journalistically, a good story, framed right.

MR. HARTMANN: By the way, one of the ways that frame it may be from an outside point of view. Planning sounds dull, threat assessment, which is the term that Don used, doesn't sound dull at all. I mean suddenly if you say I'm doing threat assessment for Charlotte, or Atlanta or Miami, you say woah, that's interesting, I might be interested in that.

MR. HAMILTON: There is a great story in how are terrorism threat and analysts trained. You don't have to get into the information that they use but what is the discipline like? How do they analyze it?

MR. HARTMANN: Mike?

MR. MORAN: Just quick, to pick up on threat assessment, we've got a guy who is crazy about covering threat assessment, a guy named Brock Meeks, who is in Washington for us. He has only recently been given the homeland security beat and has done a few pieces, and it's an unbelievable oyster. I mean we are prying it open very slowly but everybody talks about their plan and they can't point to it, is our

experience. You cannot find them and if you can't find them, you can't find an educated group of people within the same municipality who actually could tell you what's in it, so it's actually a pretty interesting story.

But what I was going to say, and this may or may not be my final word, it's up to you, from the political end and public service and civil service side, my advice would be to find, the news organizations in your town and make a call. Find out who it is that is supposed to be watching this story, who, because I bet you most of them don't have somebody. Most news organization in the modern world in the United States have become gigantic blobs of generics. They cover reactively, the don't have specializations. If they develop a beat, it's either to shut them up because they are just always crying about having a beat, or it's somebody who is really special, and has developed some kind of specialism and it would be stupid not to take advantage of it.

But often you'll find that very large local news organizations might not have a homeland security or even a public safety type reporter. They just have cop reporters and that's not the same thing. You need somebody who you can reach out to in that

critical moment and say you know, I know that guy,
Moran, he's a pain in the ass but I have his home
phone, I have his cell phone. This is something that
we need to talk to the media about in a way that goes
beyond source. So that would be the advice for that
side.

On the other side, I've had the experience of having to try to plan for the 9/11 event in the future in my organization and a couple of things have come to pass, we've had this enormous and difficult discussion over the acquisition of chem-bio suits and eventually the network threw its arms up and said we're not going to do it because we cannot decide who gets them, where you draw the line, how many we need, what bureaus do get them, what bureaus don't, what circumstances you would absolutely not be allowed to leave the office without them. It became an impediment to covering the story.

And that leads to the second dilemma which is another one news organizations should think through, I was a war correspondent and when 9/11 happened, I reacted like one and started telling people to go to the scene, as if all of them had signed up to be war correspondents. And you find out very quickly when things like this happen that not everybody bought the

idea that we came up with the first day that we are all war correspondents. It may be true and they may find out by accident but I made a decision, at some point in my career, that I was going to go to Bosnia and cover combat. That was pretty good preparation for this atmosphere.

environmental issues or state politics may not have crossed that line. They have families and they think of these things in different dynamics. They are not willing to do that and, within the news organization, that was a really good conversation to have because it was kind of like one of those war movies where you say we're not going to think badly of you, you can stand up and leave the room right now. And some people literally said I'm not interested in being on the go team to go to these events, I would prefer to be home. And that was a useful conversation to have because it's going to be hell to have the day it happens.

MR. JONES: Jeanne, I jumped over you earlier, do you want to be in it now?

MS. MESERVE: Well there was a discussion about how do we get more people to do the story. There is one simple way, have Neal and Kit put it on the front page of their papers. They still very much set

the news agenda for everyone else, USA Today also, excuse me. It's still, at least in the broadcast world, very much a follow the leader kind of story. I agree with you that there are always creative ways to tell a story, you always can find a visual way to tell a story, we just have to work harder to do that.

And so to what we might do in terms of preparing, I think your idea is a great one but I can't think of a reporter who has that kind of time to invest. There is always breaking news, you always get diverted, you're not going to be able to do any sort of regularly scheduled briefing. I think what's really important for us all to develop great rolodexes with 24 hour a day phone numbers. And for those of you on the other side, please give us 24 hour a day phone numbers. I don't think most of us will abuse this but we've got to get information from you quickly.

And we have to be able to sort out who are the truly knowledgeable people and who are the charlatans. It's been my experience there are a lot of people out there presenting themselves as experts, in one area or another of homeland security, who really don't know what they are talking about.

MR. HOWITT: --asked whether I know anything about the subject I am being asked to comment

on and, because I have a moderately reputable employer, it is assumed that I know something about many issues about which I am totally ignorant. And while none of my colleagues would ever think of commenting on topics about which they don't have expertise, you should still beware of people who are less scrupulous than all of us are.

(Laughter)

MR. WALSH: Can I follow up on Jeanne's comment just quickly? And by the way, that's happened to me, I'm asked about mayonnaise, floor polish, terrorism.

(Laughter)

MR. WALSH: I agree with you that there are a lot of folks, editors, and of course a briefing may not be the thing that works in your schedule. But I think there are a variety of partnerships you can make at that university. Maybe it's an arrangement in advance that they provide you content of a certain kind, or that they provide you a network of people with those names and phone numbers or they send you an e-mail, newsletter or something.

I mean there are any number of things that one could make use of, even if it's an event preparation plan. This thing happens, your university

people that you have on that who are specialists on that topic do steps one, two and three on that day to get in touch with you to provide you with content or whatever. But I'm saying that those people are there and you don't want to wait until the day, you want to do something in advance to set up the structure so that you can maximize your chance to be able to use it.

MR. HARTMANN: Mindy?

(Laughter)

MS. FETTERMAN: Well we've been very specific in having a go team. We asked for volunteers, our theory is we sort of call it the go-ish team.

We'll go but not really.

MS. FETTERMAN: So you volunteer but you can drop out at any time. So our goal is the personal safety of our employees, period. So we are trying to figure out how to cover an event in that parameter, how to cover an event and live to tell the tale. So we are going through the whole debate of bio-chem suits, which we did for war correspondents because you're there, and the alarm goes off, and soldiers are putting their suits on and you put your suit on too. The problem in America is who is going to tell you that it's dangerous? Who is going to tell that something has happened? And are you necessarily going to be there or

not? So we're still debating all that but probably will not go that route.

chem suits? And I said yeah, right after 9/11 we got some. And the other day I did a little survey of our bureaus, did you get your suit? What have you got in it? Well some have a half mask, some have no boot. It's like the Katzenjammer kids with the bio-chem suits, so you just can't do it that way. So what we are trying to do is pick a group of reporters who will study up and get smart so that we have some people who are smart already. So when it happens, it's not like oh my God, remember that guy? He knows something about it. And remember that woman? She covers that. Like you normally do, like a real user in crisis which is you stand up and look around and go hey, who is here?

So we are trying to be more organized in that way and so the go team though has reporters of all ilks. I mean we have sports reporters, life reporters, money section reporters, news reporters who cover the FBI, and so it's a very eclectic group. But we did a formal week of "training" with experts from around the country as well as the British Royal Marines who come in, and I know some of us have a lot of experience with them, but they are coming in and when he lops his

bloody off, take the bloody arm, and put it in your pocket and take it home.

(Laughter)

MS. FETTERMAN: And we're going, okay. I can see my little editors up there going ah? But it's good to hear it, it's good to hear it. So we are trying to be prepared as much as news people can be prepare. But I think on the government's end, what you can do for us is to help us prepare. I mean even just hearing Northern Virginia has a plan to tell journalists what to do and where to go, and I said well hasn't anybody called USA Today? Well you're not in Arlington County any more.

(Laughter)

MS. FETTERMAN: Well okay, but we are down wind from Arlington County.

(Laughter)

MS. FETTERMAN: So I think we need to really think about what we are going to do with our newspaper people because they are going to call you, and they are going to show up and the idea is have you done the most you can do to educate your newspaper people and media people that you are going to be dealing with. And as media people and executives, have we done the most we can to educate our people? One of

the things we learned in our go team training was each expert is more afraid of the other expert's danger.

So the dirty bomb guy says you know dirty bombs are really not that bad, but boy that smallpox. And the smallpox guy says that smallpox is never going to happen, but boy that dirty bomb. So it was comforting in a way, we all walked out of there going hey, it's not going to be that bad. And the ignorance factor of the American public is going to be what we have to do, have to help disperse.

But the other thing is not just get ready with training but get some material ready that could go in the paper, tada, tomorrow. Get your what to do in case of an attack package all done with its graphics, with its pictures and it just goes in the paper because you don't want to be writing it on deadline, you don't want to be producing it at quarter to 11 for the 11:00 TV show. Get some stuff in the can that's right, that's correct.

MS. MESERVE: Except that the advice varies from incident to incident and so it's hard to prepackage because you don't know if you are going to be dealing with DDX or you're going to be dealing with something else.

MR. SEAMANS: Like when you do graphics

explaining what anthrax looks like, you can do that. Like she says, you can--

MS. FETTERMAN: And that's the other thing we learned as a part of the experts as looking to you all is that people didn't really say things incorrect about anthrax because they were trying to lie to you, they didn't really know. And anthrax turned out to be different than what we all thought it was because we were based on slaughter houses in the 1800s with anthrax, not something that someone put in an envelope.

So no one is going to know what's going on so all you can do is try to raise the level of awareness of your reporters and, again, me joking, and it's no joke, but what's an English literature major doing worrying about this? That's what our world has come to so I think we all have to really treat it as a homework assignment in a way. Get smart, get your stuff ready, get your cheat sheets all aligned, get your experts in a row, make your contact with the universities and the jump into it like we do with a big fire.

MR. HARTMANN: Amy, are you building directly on that?

MS. DRISCOLL: Sort of.

MR. HARTMANN: Ed, are you directly on it?

MR. PLAUGHER: Again, sort of.

(Laughter)

MR. HARTMANN: Maryn, are you directly on it?

MS. MCKENNA: I wanted to address the issue of training.

MR. HARTMANN: Okay.

MS. MCKENNA: I second almost everything that Mindy said except that I wanted to raise a caveat just on the journalism side about this issue of training. I am acquainted with folks who have done the sort of training that you do immediately before you go to a war zone, that Centurion and other folks run, and I have met people who believe that their lives have been saved by this, and I think that training is marvelous. It's also very expensive. But I think there is a difference when it comes to training for, as a journalist, covering a potential NBC event that the industry has to think about.

And I speak both as somebody who has been through NBC training with the CDC staff and also as somebody who has a pilot's license and therefore, in my training, I had to train a lot for emergencies. And the difference between going to war, for instance, and training for an NBC event is that you do the Centurion

training and off you go to the war zone. You can train for an NBC event and then have the bio event happen six months, 12 months, two years, five years down the road and you are no way going to be --. I did my training with the CDC a year ago and I know I am not as sharp as I was two days afterward.

I guess what I'm saying is that that kind of training cannot be a one time thing. We were talking about this last night, Peter raised the analogy of CPR training where you have to take the refresher. I really worry about journalism organizations thinking that their people are more safe than they actually are because they have not kept them sufficiently sharp. That's my point.

MR. HARTMANN: Are you on training, Don?

MR. HAMILTON: Training and homework, yes.

The homework comment that Mindy made really came to something that I wanted to say. Understanding the nature of terrorism, several people here have said that terrorists seek to disrupt our way of life. I think that's a very arguable assertion. In fact, if you look at terrorists and what they say, and you look at the history of terrorism and what terrorists have done, disrupting the American way of life is not really there. Usually it's try and force policy change of

some kind, sometimes a very narrow thing, release a prisoner or something.

In fact, terrorists don't do that very much. I think there are a surprising number of people who have not done the basic scholarly work on understanding what terrorism is, how it's different from other kinds of violence and why terrorists do it. And that leads you into that whole world that I talked about with threat assessment. I think that there is a fundamental level of knowledge that is not there and it doesn't necessarily require formal training but it requires a dedication to read the books and study the literature. It's there, it happens.

MR. HARTMANN: You might, by the way, give us some references. Everybody, we want both final remarks but also, let's assume that we can continue the conversation, even if it's a hard copy, or an e-mail or whatever it is. So as you leave, and think over the next couple of days of the next steps, why don't you get it back and share with us. We are encouraging you to write, we are encouraging you to continue to think. So let's not think of the whole processes ending at 4:00 this afternoon. So, for example, gee, if you really want the knowledge, you should read these books. Why don't you tell us what the three books are, not

right now.

MR. HAMILTON: To facilitate that, is it possible to share the contact information? At least on an opt-out basis so that we know how to stay in touch with each other after the fact.

MR. JONES: Yes.

MR. MORAN: Business cards get a little overwhelming.

MR. HARTMANN: So we can arrange that.

MR. JONES: We'll take care of that.

MR. HARTMANN: Okay. Terence?

MR. SAMUEL: Mindy was talking about training reporters and I won't take credit for this. Lindsey says you know as soon as that happens, he is going to be on vacation. But I guess I'm thinking about Mike talking about preparing for an attack and his newsroom trying to think about that, and that's happening in a lot of newsrooms around the country. I think we ought to give the public a way to think about this as well, and one piece of wisdom I heard here and one set of stories I think we ought to pursue is this whole business of trying to explain to people the difference between the threat and the vulnerability.

Don, that piece of nuance struck me as a real way to frame stories and establish a set of

priorities that naturally give us a way to talk across this gulf that we've been talking about here in I think an interesting way.

MR. HARTMANN: Amy?

MS. DRISCOLL: Actually, I was still admiring USA Today's commitment to training its employees because in the Knight-Ridder bureau in Washington, where I was a couple of weeks ago, the reporters have all been a hermetically sealed pack, which is about the size of a piece of paper, and apparently inside of it is a hood which they supposedly are going to be able to use to get out of the building. But they are not allowed to practice with it because it's hermetically sealed, so they obviously all agree that they probably not going to get out if there is an attack and that's I think kind of the mentality among a lot of reporters.

But like Maryn said before, I was actually feeling kind of discouraged during the break too because I felt as though the conversation had gotten kind of esoteric and journalism is inherently very practical. And I was trying to picture how I could pitch this kind of story and how I could get this kind of emphasis of my paper. But then I had the opportunity to talk to Jim, just for a couple of

minutes, and he said well this is a good kind of time to brainstorm with people who aren't journalists, and that's when I started thinking about the partnership idea and I would actually like the *Miami Herald* to partner with Jim Walsh.

(Laughter)

MS. DRISCOLL: Because you came up with a couple of great ideas, very quickly, and it made me realize that that kind of investment of time is something we should be looking at these days. Which is kind of along the lines of partnering with the university maybe near you and getting some perspective that you don't have already, and using that as a tool then to write these stories. And it doesn't have to be process, it can be threat assessment and most reporters already have the sort of basic skills to ask the questions but we don't know the right questions to ask now because terrorism is a very large topic.

And there are so many entities involved with it that it can tend to be overwhelming but I think starting with the plan for your area, or your region or your state is a good idea, and then probably a lot of things will spring from that.

MR. SEAMANS: I think this is a great idea but you will find, when you come back to Miami, and try

not going to find very many people at the five or six universities who know very much about this. There are professors who suddenly last semester created a terrorism course but, humbly, I know more than they do. And that's basically what we have in Miami. Perhaps Jim here in the auspices of Harvard is one thing, but down in South Florida with the University of Miami, and Barry and all these schools, there are no really real good terrorist experts.

MS. DRISCOLL: Well then maybe it doesn't have to be local then.

MR. SEAMANS: That's a different problem. You can pick up the phone and write your story by talking to the guy, and when I write columns for your paper, I do too. I call all these experts all over the country but for television, I've got to get them in front of a camera or it doesn't work.

MS. MESERVE: Why don't we just think universities though. I mean here's a great resource. People in the emergency management field who have studied this stuff and know this stuff--

MR. SEAMANS: And in our area, that's just what it's--

MS. DRISCOLL: But those people are also

often hampered by budgetary and political restrictions and I was looking for somebody who would be outside of that.

MR. SEAMANS: Exactly, because there is going to be times that he's politically constricted. So for us, in television, it's not as easy as for you. Oh yeah, the University of Washington has got a great guy, let me just call Seattle.

MS. DRISCOLL: Right. I wasn't trying to solve your problem.

MR. SEAMANS: No, no, I know.

(Laughter)

MR. SEAMANS: In our area, and I would wager in most areas of this country, outside of these major university areas, these terrorism experts don't exist.

MR. HARTMANN: Ed?

MR. PLAUGHER: First off, I want to react to that comment about building a go team. I have a go team in my organization, they are actually strategically located around the county, and they do wear funny suits and they do go out. And it's an enormous task because we spend a huge amount of time preparing those go teams to do their job and keeping them ready.

Back to the basic question about what we can do to fix some of the issues, it's really enlightening for me to hear the press, the media and the various disciplines that are here, to talk about themselves, and what they are faced with and the issues that they are dealing with on a day and day basis.

Every minute is a news breaking story, every deadline is critical and the desire for a Pulitzer or to be recognized out of the pack of what have now been described as bees flocking around our community.

(Laughter)

MR. ADAIR: It's good to see we come out of this with as a group with a good positive image. (Laughter)

MR. PLAUGHER: But you do and I think that's the gist here is that I realize I have to do my homework on the press and the media. I really have to start building deep relationships with them because I can not be successful without a solid relationship with the media. I need to get messages to my community that do make a difference. It does matter what the press says and does in regards to incidents and situations and planning and all those types of things. And I realize the fault has been mine, I've always viewed the

press as somebody who is not necessarily out to ge me but they are always priming me for stories.

In anticipation of coming here, I just figured that, well, another three or four stories will be primed out of me for the time that I'm here and in fact that has happened. I have to admit that a couple of your colleagues have attempted to leave here with future stories from their contact with me here this weekend. But understanding that and realizing that, and then dealing with that up front, is okay because my end state, in other words, what I want for an end state is better preparedness, what I want for an end state is the ability to protect my community. It's to work building these partnerships which we found, at the Pentagon, made a huge difference in the outcome of the incident. The up front relationships paid off, paid off in lives saved, paid off in the ability to respond in a competent and efficient manner.

So, again, I think you for the opportunity to be exposed to the media and the press as well as to participate in some of these very, very probing questions about how do you go about determining what stories you are going to write? To what extent do you go to seek out the validity of the information and those types of things?

So, again, I think this is a beginning of a very, very concrete dialogue. And I am fortunate because I do have the ear of some folks within the federal government that will bring to bear some federal resources to solidify an effort down the road. Not to control the press, not to manipulate the outcome of the stories because I think that would be bad. I think that would be us indicating that the terrorists have won. But how do we build solid relationships? To be hones with you, there are several members in my press community that actually know my cell phone number and reach me seven days a week, 24 hours a day.

Some of the local TV folks, if there is a story, particularly a sensitive story about the way fire fighters are operating or something, they will call me for advice and we have built up a relationship over the years. And I am saying you shouldn't go there because what's going to happen is A, B and C. And sometimes they listen, and other times they don't and A, B, C happens, but that's another whole issue. So I think that that's critical in the process to build the relationships. So if there is a mechanism, we do have a new Virginia effort and we will let *USA Today* be part of it.

(Laughter)

MS. MESERVE: Thank you.

(Laughter)

MS. FETTERMAN: And we're in the district, will you let us be part of it?

MR. PLAUGHER: Absolutely, absolutely.

MR. SEAMANS: I want to talk to you about your budget overruns, not that you are elected.

(Laughter)

MR. PLAUGHER: Budget overruns. I'm a fire chief that's in charge of a fire department that has only had one year, of the time that I've been fire chief, that I've stayed within my budget because I feel if I make my decisions based upon an arbitrary budget number that some budget analyst had given me the prior year, I will not be effective nor will my department. (Laughter)

MR. SEAMANS: I was just kidding. (Laughter)

MR. PLAUGHER: But a lot of people do. A lot of people do make decisions on that.

MR. HARTMANN: What are you going to do over the next months? In other words, you said you have a new awareness now, so how are you going to do that and get the media, give some reaction? What are you going to do when you go back--

MR. PLAUGHER: I'm going to seek out the media.

MR. HARTMANN: What does that mean?

MR. PLAUGHER: I will consciously go around, of course, we are very fortunate in the D.C. because we do have media outlets that are pretty thick and I have actually made contacts with the assignment editors, which is what I found out prior was the people who really make the stories go. And so I will then do the follow ups with these assignment editors and actually call together, and we are going to have a think tank. We are going to have a deep rooted think tank about assignment editors, what can we do better to build a solid relationship. And I think I can actually pull this off and I think have built up enough credit points within my region to pull off some of these things. We'll see.

MR. HARTMANN: Anybody from the media want to coach Ed a little bit in terms of--

MS. FETTERMAN: Here's my card, call me.

MR. HARTMANN: That's a good idea.

Terrence?

MR. SAMUEL: Lunch.

(Laughter)

MS. MESERVE: The only thing I would say

is that all of us want to have an exclusive and although I think we all want to establish a relationship with you, we each then want to take your information, not in a group setting, but in an individual setting. Am I right?

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$ PLAUGHER: And if I know that up front, I can deal with it.

MR. SEAMANS: Initially, what you are calling for is perfect and then you deal with that later.

MR. PLAUGHER: Understanding more about the industry called media and understanding what's driving the media will allow me to be able to better to do my job, and that's to be able to reflect what their needs are so that in fact they do stick with us as partners, so that they do help us work with the issue because the issue is too big. The issue is too critical in the success of our open society. And again, I'm not trying to preach to anybody but I will say one more time, homeland security is not about security, homeland security is how are you secure in an open society.

It's an entirely different set of questions that I think we need to be asking and the media is a critical piece of our open society. I mean

let's just face it. That is one of the things that separates us from other nations and we can't lose that, we absolutely can't.

MR. HARTMANN: Very helpful. Anybody else?

MR. LEONE: I just have a question. One thing we all know coming out of this, our antiterrorism task force here in Massachusetts is represented by all types of disciplines. And we have subgroups of the anti-terrorism task force ranging from civil rights and community groups through communication mechanisms. What I would like to do is form a subgroup that deals with the media, press, communication piece. But let me ask you, the print media, in Boston the Boston Herald and Globe come to mind, but who else do I want to be part of that subgroup?

MR. JONES: WBUR, WGBH. The main electronic television stations.

MS. MESERVE: Well the national media would want to be plugged in too.

MR. LEONE: Are there national bureaus around here--

MR. HAMILTON: Open the yellow pages and look under news, look under radio, look under TV and that will give you most of them.

MR. SEAMANS: For example, if you call the TV stations and just ask them does your network have someone here? Or who else is here? Is there a press association here perhaps that would know?

MR. LEONE: We usually try to keep these subgroups manageable and usually that means anywhere between six to ten people.

MR. SEAMANS: Well between your local TV stations and your two papers, that almost eats up the entire group so you need to maybe think a little bit larger. If the networks are here, they would definitely want to be included and they should be included, they need to be included.

MS. MCKENNA: Don't forget your local cable, New England Cable News is here.

MR. HAMILTON: Get yourself a media list and then maybe sort through that later, but you need a good calling list.

MR. SEAMANS: Do you have a PIO? That person will know who should be counted.

UNIDENTIFIED: They're in charge of not returning phone calls probably.

(Laughter)

MS. MESERVE: To be honest, there is, and Nancy and I were talking about this last night a

little, vis-à-vis the sniper thing, and there are different grades of reporters, to be frank. And you know or someone in your organization should know who is reliable, who is trustworthy, who gets it right and be selective. There are other people who, I hate to say, are not very good at what they do.

MR. HARTMANN: Nancy?

MS. DEMME: Just in terms of talking about what I got here and to bring it back, one thing I think I have to do is to educate our executive staff in general about what I got out of this gathering. But then also --. Well before I left, it was like a week or two before I left, someone from the media, and I don't recall who, I have it written down, called and said what happens if we have an emergency of bio-chem, whatever, and the phones go down? How do we get our information from you?

And at the same time, my civilian PIO had gone to a forum I asked her to go to because I couldn't and one of the things that came up, there was a crisis communication plan but it was in the private realm. So what I would like to do is take back what I have here, create a --. We have an SOP. We have a directive on what we do but that's more along the lines of normal police work, robbery, homicide, how we deal with our

media, but to create a crisis communication plan to put into place in the event that we do have a chem-bio issue.

We have a lot of forums where we meet with PIOs. In one of those forums, bring forth this communication plan, also offering up to explore our plans that we have in place. So, in other words, a give and take. Here is what we have for you but we are also saying that we have this available if you would like to have an exchange about it and what we have. Sort of expand on what we already have in place.

MR. SEAMANS: Well if I could use an example, and it doesn't really go to homeland security but it's an example of how you can develop that. When the ValueJet crash occurred in Miami, there was a company called Saber Tech that serviced the plane and sent the canisters over to be put on the plane. And the media kept saying Saber Tech put them on the plane, and they said no, we didn't.

So the trial is coming, and it's going to be a big, big media event in Miami. And some of you might know Ken Quinn, came down from Washington, a lawyer and they got a local PR firm, and they got the four or five of us who were doing that story and knew the story.

And they said the trials coming and you cover it the way you want, but let's just go over a few points here so you will remember it. We didn't put them on, we did this, we did this, it was the AP, everybody. And wow, isn't it something? Suddenly the media coverage really balanced out. It suddenly balanced out because when you don't talk, we draw conclusions. And when we draw conclusions, that means you probably look bad. And I was really impressed with that. They weren't trying to influence us, let's just make sure you have the facts straight, and what we did and what we say we didn't do.

And it was amazing, the coverage just suddenly became balanced, and more importantly, it became correct. And that you could apply to what we are talking about here too. Just give us some insight. If we are doing it wrong, say listen, come in, do what you want to do but at least get the facts straight. And if we didn't get it straight, it's because you didn't tell us.

MR. HARTMANN: Other people whom we have not heard from yet in terms of take-aways, the way your thinking, what you'll walk out the door with that you might like to share too?

Eric?

MR. FUREY: Some of the people already touched upon it but I want to encourage people to not just cover --. There is a lot of LEPCs, Local Emergency Planning Commissions or boards, that are being done, and they are springing up in a lot of the major cities, and a lot of little towns, at least across New England, which I'm familiar with. They are sometimes boring but it's a good grassroots level to start to get down to see how people are planning, both for the press and, a lot of times you'll only see a smidgen of the first responders from those communities, a lot of times it's just concerned citizens.

As far as my situation, I would love to have one of you guys come with us in a training and get suited up. You don't have to be a HAZMAT technician and you're right, it does take a lot to stay current. That's one of the reasons why the CSTs, the civil support teams, were formed because we do this seven days a week, where a lot of fire services aren't just concentrating on weapons of mass destruction seven days a week. And we'll bring you a suit, you may not stay trained, but at least, like when you see somebody do CPR and you were trained to do CPR, when you see it from afar, you'll know that when he is doing compressions in the guys chest, and you know that there

is a possibility of breaking the sternum when you are doing CPR, which is very likely, that you'll have it right because you did it once before yourself.

So maybe you won't be able to stay trained but you will be familiar about having that training at some point, and then you will realize that it is claustrophobic. I scuba dive and I get in a Level A suit, it's claustrophobic.

MR. SEAMANS: Let me ask you something, Eric. That's a great story, have you ever offered it to a media person in this town?

MR. FUREY: As a matter of fact, Monday we are going down to Channel 7, NPR and the *Boston Globe* is coming with us--

MR. SEAMANS: See we are not real smart, you've got to tell us about these things.

(Laughter)

MR. SEAMANS: And every television station in the world would jump on that story.

MR. FUREY: Well I give you a for instance, the military has a thing called professional development where we have like a two hour briefing that's usually on a topic that we need to get smart on, and it was media relations. I used to work at Channel 5, WCVB. I sent a letter to that station to a reporter

I know, and I called him first, and I said would you like to do this? Sure, just send it to my editor. And I sent it to the editor, never heard back, called back, everything went --. And we wanted to get trained by a reporter--

MR. SEAMANS: Well that's a dumb editor, I can tell you right now.

MR. HARTMANN: That's another story. I'm going to cut this off because I want to make sure there is room for everybody. Lindsey?

But thank you, Eric.

Lindsey?

MS. WOLF: The San Jose Mercury News has two news meetings a day that they open up to other groups to come in and watch. And so we take our city staff and PIOs, the executive staff, from time to time, to sit in on one of those news meetings. The one in the morning looks at things they are going to cover the next day in terms of the graphics and who is going to be on it and all of that. The one in the afternoon looks at the next cycle. So they do their meeting, it's a half hour format where they are deciding which stories they are going to cover, who is going to do it and all of that.

And then they have a time, 15 minutes

usually, for a little dialogue with whatever group has come in that day to address the specifics of what that group's interest is. So that's a reverse kind of training to help government people learn more about what you do, how you do it, what the priorities are and how you make those priorities. And that's been very helpful to us in teaching our people, beyond the media trained PIOs, what it is the reporters do, what kind of pressures they are under. I don't know whether that's a typical thing but it's a very good thing.

MR. HARTMANN: Liz?

MS. CHANDLER: I think what Lindsey says has brought us back to the question of what's practical and what practical reality are going on in the news room. And I'm taking a shot here at Bill with him out of the room but I don't believe most journalists sit around that think is this story is going to win me the Pulitzer or how might I win the Pulitzer. That comes up once a year when you are trying to figure out if you have anything to send in. I mean the truth is --. I mean the conversations in the newsroom are around what does the public need to know, it's not about entertainment.

Now there may be some discussion about pictures and TV but it's often what does the public

need to know? And I think we need to turn to the government, in the case of a disaster, and expect responsive, hard concrete answers that will help us get the information out. Beyond that, I think the press here is all too painfully aware of the corporatization of the media. I don't know how aware everybody else is of the real financial pinch that's going on in the newsrooms across the country, this slicing of numbers of resources, reporters. It's getting harder and harder to do good investigative, in depth stories.

And so again, it's almost in partnership with people like you and your organizations, we need ways to assess whether our communities are ready for attacks, terrorism, disasters and we are not going to be able to do some of the lengthy in depth work that perhaps we have done in the past. And so I think we need to sort of jointly get together on some of those things.

MR. HARTMANN: Chuck, have I heard from you in this round?

MR. LANZA: Probably not the final answer.

MR. HARTMANN: I didn't think so.

MR. LANZA: I'm taking back some of the --. We need to continue further partnerships, at least in Miami Dade County. I know we have a good

working relationship with the local media, but the national media, not so much so. And I think that a situation that is going good at the local level, and goes south pretty quickly when the people we don't know from the national media arrive. So we need to look at a strategy to deal with that.

I just want to ask everybody that the next time that they go to a community and they are given a dog and pony show on anything that's terrorism related, go out and talk to the police officer or the fire fighter, the people that are out there staffing, or the line officers, and say tell me what you really are doing, tell me what you really have, tell me what support and training you have been given.

The message may be different at that level and they are the ones, just like the people you are trying to suit up on the go teams, that are the go teams. And if they tell you well I don't have a mask, of I have a mask and I'm not trained, that's a pretty significant assertion of something that needs to be followed up on. We used to do a media fire college where we bring in the media. If you wanted to go inside the scene on any call, you had to have the certification and we ran you through fire and just to see what it was really like to do these things.

We have an eight hour course in the basic terrorism response and I think it would probably be important for us to include the media in that, maybe on a one day thing. And if you wanted, on a real incident or even on an exercise, to come out to that, you would have to show us that you've been through the class so we can feel confident that you could come in and at least that's some basic understanding of what we were doing and why we were doing it.

By the way, we also did a division of homeland security about a year ago. We had a document and I think it lays out a lot of things that communities should be doing so you might want to use that to compare your community to what we thought would have been a standard. It has not been accepted nationally but it gives you the foundation of what the president and the senate have suggested, that's included in a single document for locals.

MR. HARTMANN: I've heard from everybody but I'm not sure I've heard people's final comments.

So I've heard from everybody except Darrel and Neal but they are probably waiting a little bit because they are also going to do some kind of summary.

Maryn, final comment?

MS. MCKENNA: I promised I would try to

come up with something a little bit more positive as my walk off. And I realized listening to people, on the law enforcement and public health side, talk about how this planning process, after 9/11 and anthrax, has forced them to talk to each other, that we haven't done that in our newsroom. And that realization comes as a surprise to me because we are a major metro paper, and we have people on the police beat, and people on the public health beat and people on the hospital beat, and we are all very well sourced on our beats.

But I realize now that we are all in silos and if there were a local event that cut across those silos, we would really be in trouble. And so I'm somewhat shamed to admit that we have to do the work that the public agencies have already been doing. That's my walk off.

MR. HARTMANN: Other final comments? Somebody who hasn't? Final?

MR. SEAMANS: Turning to what was first said last night, and I was reminded of it again reading Peter's paper in his first paragraph because it's exactly the way I think, and he pointed out in his paper the lack of public education. And what I'm hearing today is that there is lots of planning going one, nobody is saying that you are not, and you are

working hard in your own spheres and trying to get together. But I think what you need to do now is start thinking how do you get this information out to the public?

As I told you, in Dade County, we had something called the Citizens Core Council. It's never really got its word out because of turf wars and political battles that don't want the word out until we decide who gets credit. I'm very impressed with all that I hear that government is doing but this is something that you are not doing on a federal, state or local level, getting the word down to the people who would like to know. And that's what I think you need to work on.

MR. HARTMANN: Darrel, please?

MR. STEPHENS: I'd just like to comment on something.

MR. HARTMANN: Well why don't you start and then segue right into your remarks in the summary.

MR. JONES: Before he does, I would like to say what I have to say before they make their summaries if I may, it's only briefly.

MR. HARTMANN: Well let him respond.

MR. STEPHENS: I think Ike made a good point about the educational aspect. Because of the

difficulty of doing stories about planning and the pressures that the media have about what's going on right at the moment, there is actually a lot of work going on in a lot of communities trying to reach the public outside of the normal media channels. We do a lot of work on our own cable channel. It's not the highest ratings but it does as well as some of the stuff that's on TV. We reach out through our website, an enormous number of community meetings. At lunch there was a conversation about CERT, which is going on in a lot of communities and it's trying to reach out to neighborhood leaders and other people who have an interest. So in some cases, I think you might find that there is a lot more knowledge in communities about some of these issues than what is expected because of the different channels that people are using to reach out.

MR. HARTMANN: Kathleen, do you want to make your final comment?

MS. TOOMEY: I thought I was well connected with the media and I realized in listening that I'm connected to Maryn and that's about it.

(Laughter)

MS. TOOMEY: But you are the only one with my home number, I wanted you to know.

MS. MCKENNA: Did I tell you my cell phone was stolen and I don't have it anymore?

MS. MCKENNA: But all those things like getting a website in real time, being able to get that call down, getting the kind of connections that you have requires us to do it now and very immediately. Get that capacity built now.

MR. HARTMANN: Thank you.

MR. JONES: Thank you very much. I wanted to ask your forbearance about a problem that we have and our problem is how to be a value in the context of a situation that we've spent the day describing. And it occurs to me that if, hypothetically, we were able to find the money and put together an effort to create a recourse, a vehicle, a website, let's say, that would be aimed at, in the case of the Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, facilitating better coverage, better relations, preparedness planning within news organizations, for instance, and things like.

What would this website have on it? Here are some ideas that I have for something like this and I would like to get your sense, journalists and non-journalists alike, about what would be valuable. For instance, we don't know, at least I don't know, how

many journalists there are in the United States whose beat or whose partial beat is this. I think that would be valuable to find out. I think it would be valuable to let them know who each other are, if not for any other reason, just so they can talk to each other about doing this job because I think one of the things journalists don't have really have very much opportunity to do is talk to other people who do their jobs. They compete with each other, yes, but they also need to have people to talk to.

The idea of having a clearinghouse of good stories. One of the things that struck me was the idea that there aren't very many models. There are not many models for the kind of reporting that is done that is good, there are not very many models for things like plans. For instance, I don't know whether the San Jose Mercury News, which is also a Knight-Ridder publication, has a plan that would be well in advance of something in the Knight-Ridder bureau in Washington. But it would seem to me that there at least could be value in creating a series of at least access to plans for news organizations for dealing with these issues.

It seems to me that by state by state, regional, topical, whatever basis, there might be used to find sources on all of these various areas of

inquiry that we've been talking about today, including the issue of planning in and of itself. Something that, as Ike said, would not be necessarily available in every university in every town but would be something that might hypothetically be of value.

Now my question is this, I'm not looking for a way to waste my time but I am looking for something, if it's valuable, to make a contribution because the thing, the purpose of this meeting, is to try to address what we consider to be and, Peter, and I know that the other people who have been involved in this, the executive session, we all think is a very important problem and one that we want to deal with to the extent possible, before it's a catastrophe or at least one that would perhaps mitigate that catastrophe. Is that something worth doing or is it not?

MR. ADAIR: I think it's worth doing. One thing is that it really helps to talk to other reporters who cover the same thing. I do that in aviation because we don't tend to meet at the same place. Covering politics, I see all the other reporters who cover politics in the Capital, but I think you could help a lot by linking the reporters. One way to do that, I don't always have the time to check a website but an occasional e-mail, a list serve

that's not overwhelming, so many of the list serves are overwhelming, but one once week that just says here are a couple of the stories that have been written in the last week that might interest you or a small discussion group or something might be the kind of thing that is helpful but not overwhelming in a sea of information.

MS. MESERVE: It would be a little bit difficult I think. Right now, Congressional Quarterly is putting out a newsletter. Included in that is not only some original reporting of theirs but also a quick summary of what's been reported in some other papers with links to those sites. In addition, the Answer Institute also sends out a homeland security newsletter which summarizes press reports and links you to some of those articles. I did a homeland security seminar with the Council on Foreign Relations and they have a list serve where we trade articles amongst one another, so some of those things exist.

In terms of listing sources, I guess I have mixed feelings. Yeah, I would like to know who the top experts were around the country who I haven't used but I don't want anyone else to know the sources I've used. Do you know what I mean? So I have a very ambivalent feeling about that.

MR. JONES: Bear in mind, this is not

necessarily aimed at you, this is aimed at the United States media world in towns all around the country. This is aimed at trying to focus attention on something and being of value. We won't put your sources in but we will put other people's. But I mean people who have recognized expertise, that's my point.

MS. MESERVE: But do then those people get totally inundated?

MR. JONES: I don't know. Obviously it would depend on how it would be done and I think you would have to be judicious about it.

MR. HARTMANN: Mindy?

MS. FETTERMAN: I was just going to say one of the things that would be valuable, and I don't know if this is in your charter, would be to hold these kinds of seminars around the country. You could get at a different level of newspaper reporter and their region. For instance, if there were seminars like this in the south, and the midwest, where the reporters are involved, the public officials are involved, the mayors and the governors are involved, could do this kind of roundtable, I bet that would be immensely helpful to the kinds of reporters who don't cover this every day.

MR. HARTMANN: Can I ask, because we are going to run out of time, could I ask that everyone

from the media get back to Alex on that? I mean, literally, you say bad idea or something like that.

MR. JONES: Or whatever. Please, I would appreciate that and that is not, certainly it's for the journalists but it's also for anyone.

MR. HARTMANN: So a frank , sort of reaction, is this something that would be helpful?

And if so, what would it look like?

Darrel, please?

MR. STEPHENS: I'll try to get to the highlights because I know we are out of time and I've sort of framed it from the perspective of things the government could do, things the press could do and there is a number of both that fit in both areas. Probably on the government side, the thing that we heard most was relationship building and sustained relationship building, all the way to Ed's idea of reaching out maybe even more than he has with relationships he has had to talk about, this specific issue and how we communicate back and forth in helping people prepare for the crisis and the crisis itself.

One of the things on the government side that Liz raised is we ought to be prepared and expect to get hard question and to provide responsive answers. Jeanne has said on several times that she didn't feel

like she was getting that from government folks and that's an obligation that we have to respond in the most effective way that we can, even when we have to acknowledge that we don't know.

The conversation about local versus national, there are a few areas of our country that national media are as prevalent as local folks, maybe not quite but there is a bigger presence. Most of the areas of the country don't have access to the national media unless you've developed a relations or a friendship or something along the way. So most of our work, on the government side, is going to be with local folks, unless you have, god forbid, that crisis that drags them in and then you don't have the chance actually to develop the relationship.

On the press side, more than one of the folks from the press mentioned and focused on what does the public need to know. And it kind of sounded like that sometimes that gets lost in reporters' minds and in some of the work they do in the press of time, and I think that's a really important issue.

I liked hearing people talk about taking away focusing more about framing the choices around the priorities that you have. Bill mentioned that several times, several other people did and Bill talked mostly

in the national context at how people were spending money on the national level. That applies to the local folks as well.

People still call the police, we still have murders, we still have robberies and there is enormous expectations that you be able to deal with those things at the same time that you are worrying about the terrorism thing. And that really applies to the mayor and the local political officials and some of the choices that they make. Good stories about where you are spending your resources on a local level could have positive impacts on what is happening in the community.

On both sides, how to tell this story in an interesting way. We have both got to figure out how to make a plan story interesting and frame it in a way that an editor might buy it. And I think reporters also have an obligation to look at some of those harder issues and say how do we frame that story so that it's useful, informative and helps people understand these issues a little bit more clearly. Getting material ready to go in advance. What you have doesn't always fit exactly but I think Mindy was absolutely right when she said that both reporters and government can put some material together that will fit nicely with a

number of different kinds of problems that we might face some time in the future.

And I think what applies to both as well is, and Don raised this, more in the context of reporters about knowing more about terrorism than what we know. That applies to government officials, it applies to the police, it applies to all of us because most of us sort of knew a little bit about it, knew it was there and knew it was something that you had to maybe spend a little bit of time with. But we all have been on a fast track of educating ourselves since September 11th in a much more direct way than some and have not done the basic homework that Don suggested, and I think he is right on.

MR. HARTMANN: Thank you Darrel.
Neal?

MR. PEIRCE: Well I like all of Darrel's points, I could stop there. I have a bunch of others that are sort of, my thoughts walking away from here today, someone said how are we going to be secure in an open society? I think that this the essential issue. And I imagine that the best defense is thinking in big picture terms to begin with, and that's not our role here today but I think we need to think about, if we want to reduce terrorism in this decade, the most

effective thing we can do is have a good foreign policy.

And one part of our foreign policy in my opinion would be a more balanced Middle Eastern policy, vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which might reduce the generation of terrorists from at least, if not the major source around the world, it at least has the potential of reducing the supply of terrorist attacks that might come in our direction.

And then I think we have to be considering, as we were discussing earlier, national priorities, where we are throwing our hundreds of billions of dollars. If homeland defense is part of defense, how large a part of defense should it be? And how is it viewed within the larger context of what we are spending everywhere? And then what are our most effective defense strategies?

And it was mentioned today that intelligence work was the best investment of all, and it seemed to me that was raised several times from all of you, preventing any attacks from occurring in the first place by all of the varieties of intelligence is clearly a priority, if one is interested in this area.

Then what are the basic needs for homeland security? And here the press role becomes even more,

in our communities, critical. Also, nationally. I loved the issue of smallpox and the mega costs of doing the national inoculations at the levels that have been suggested versus other types of expenditure. And I think that's one that we really need in the press to be talking about and bringing to people's attention because those major choices have to be made. And often they need to be put in terms of choices, where do we really want to put our resources? Where we think are the greatest dangers and how do we want to deal with them?

I think debating the differences between prevention and remediation, which was brought up here again and again, is important for the public to get that difference. And again, understanding that terrorism is only stoppable in its planning stage. If you let it actually happen, it's happened and there is going to be real loss involved. We may not be able to stop it all the time but stopping it in the planning stage is clearly critical.

And then I think the media as a watchdog in general, open discussion and debate to let the swarm of bees follow the story because it's going to be news for a long time with the interest of some to really disrupt, we think, parts of our system or our economy

over a long period of time. I liked some of the practical ideas that were brought ought. Darrel just went over some of them, there would be no need for me to go over all of those now. I think the public information officer relationships and structures in communities can be extraordinarily important.

I like the idea of reporters learning to work across beats and get out of their silos. When homeland security is not your beat but you have parts of it that really would be appropriate for you.

Darrel mentioned a few moments ago the websites and cable. I think the website is an example of all the unconventional ways that are now opening up of reaching the public, outside of us, who operate most of the time in what looks like mainstream media.

A final thought in a lot of ways it that I think this needs to be organized, some by state for sure, and I was interested in hearing about that new publication with the state role clearly defined, but also at the local level. And I think the local level ought to be part of our county or city but really the region needs to be the focus because that's the real organic entity that's going to deal with all of the defenses that have to brought into place when any kind of a terrorist incident takes place.

We've heard about the anti-terrorism task force in Massachusetts. And interesting model, what it's doing, or I think also the very impressive multi-agency effort in the Washington, D.C. area. I'm sure they'll have all sorts of a good hierarchy of where the best regional efforts are taking place across the United States. If you only had that website up already, I would check it right now, and sound very wise.

But I think we need to really be thinking about the organization at that level, something that came to incident command systems but broadly designed so that you are including public safety, public health and the other players that are involved, including major private sector employers. A great deal of security is in the private sector, it has been referred to frequently today in terms of chemical plants, nuclear and others.

I think the state governments really ought to be encouraging, and even requiring, something like a regional homeland security summit in each region each year. If you had one occasion each year when everybody sort of came in, and partly they would do show and tell and partly they would boast, but it would be great if you had some university people asking their pesky

questions. And maybe they can include some from the media who are willing to jump into those strange kinds of forums. And get discussion and presentation of what the homeland security readiness is, prevention and then remediation, and where others see the problems.

funds being used in a repetitive way when if they were used once --. So as to combine forces across jurisdiction, you could use them a lot better. In other words, how to really make maximum use of the resources you have, prevent overlapping. I think that that kind of a process would help to focus and encourage the ongoing media coverage. It wouldn't be called the plan, it would be called the capacity or the readiness of a region to deal with these kinds of a crises, to try and prevent them in the first place, but at least to be ready to deal with them if they do take place. And at the real level that counts, which is at the regions within states, not whole states, for the most part, in this country.

MR. HARTMANN: Thank you, Neal.

Why don't I have one minute sort of final acknowledgements from Peter, and either Arn or Juliette representing ESPD, and then Alex. One minute. It's Peter's idea to do this.

Peter?

MR. EMERSON: I was just speaking to Ike and Chuck on their way out and I have had no illusions that the issues within homeland defense, homeland security are complex. But today really confirmed my original suspicion and my experience over the years that there is nothing like bringing people together. And the humor around this table today really struck me, that I would guess that several of you doubted whether the other side, so to speak, could laugh the way they did and vice versa.

And I think the one thing that I've learned over the years, and I'm convinced even more so today, is that if both first responders, media, whomever it is, call up the other and say I want to have an off the record drink or lunch, particularly a free lunch, that's the beginning point.

And the only other thing I wanted to acknowledge is that really without several of the people here, I wouldn't be here. This has been an idea, it was a collaborative effort that, in fact, without Juliette, I wouldn't be here at all. She was the one who invited me into homeland defense a year and a half ago when I first got here.

The great thing about Harvard is not only

its capacity to convene but its willingness. And I've never been in an environment in which people were so willing to undertake an idea and see how it went. And Arn Howitt who was supportive in the very beginning, and Alex Jones, and Nancy, and Edie, and Patty and Rebecca, an extraordinary group of people who allowed this idea to flourish and blossom, and then actually performed to it. I am very grateful to them and I so appreciate so many of you who I talked to and to finally have met who were supportive and also gave me so much information. So thank you all.

MS. KAYYEM: I have a half a point, just a quick thing because I didn't speak on the take-aways.

Picking up on what Neal said, for those of us who do study this, who don't currently hold government positions, don't work full time for media outlets or whatever, my take-away is most of us are very passive, something happens, and we get a call from a reporter, and we think it's kind of interesting and we'll talk to you. But there is a lot of issues out there that I think would be interesting to you that I should call. I mean it's so against what I think I would do but Boston is doing an interesting planning thing, or we have no idea where this money is going, or they say \$4 billion and it's actually, if you look at

the numbers, \$1.7, so that's sort of my take away too from the domestic preparedness field.

MR. HOWITT: I would just like to say a few thank yous to make sure that we have acknowledged some people who were critically involved. First of all, to all of you for coming today. All of you have incredibly busy schedules and we are really appreciative. One of Harvard's dirty little secrets, not the nice one that Peter talks about, is that we are like sponges, we get lots of interesting people to come and absorb their ideas, and reprocess them hopefully to be something other than Velveeta Cheese. And so we are very, very grateful to you for coming.

There are a number of people who were critical in staging this event who have been off stage, however. Peter played a critical role in getting it started and providing the energy for it. Patty Chang and Amy have participated in the planning and done a variety of un-glamorous chores with great good humor. Edie Holway and Nancy Palmer have stayed off stage but they were critical in many of the substantive choices that we made about how to structure this and the ideas. And none of this would have happened without the generous support of the Shorenstein Center, and Alex provided the funds for it, and a lot of the support and

the free coffee that we consumed while we were planning.

So I thank everybody who was involved in actively planning this. I left out Rebecca Storo who is a stalwart of the Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness too. And Frank, who has done a phenomenal job. He is an artist.

(Applause)

MR. HOWITT: He is a true artist in managing a meeting like this with a lot of raging egos around the table and making us all feel good about ourselves.

MR. JONES: Frank is desperate to get us out of here on time I know, so I'm not going to make this long. I do want to second only a couple of things. Everything that Arn said is exactly of course true. I especially personally want to thank Edie and Nancy who really are the one who put their lifeblood into this for the Shorenstein Center. And Peter who really came to us with this idea, we recognized it, I'm glad to say, as a very good idea and it's something that we I hope are going to be able to take further.

I also want to thank all of you for coming and participating so generously with your minds. And this is not going to be, I hope, the end of this

conversation. I really encourage you to stay in touch with us, to communicate, especially in the immediate aftermath, with your fresh thoughts and your fresh thinking. Not just about the idea of the website, that may not be a good idea, but I do very much want your ideas and your reaction and your thoughts about what we ought to do.

Now, and especially Frank, you did a superb job. One more round of applause.

(Applause)

MR. HARTMANN: Thank you.

MS. MESERVE: I think to go back to some of the things we have been talking about, Nancy will love this.

"Attorneys for sniper suspect John Allen Mohammed, Friday, raised the possibility that Mohammed may have been exposed to nerve agents or chemical weapons while serving in the US Army in 1990--''

(Laughter)

(Whereupon, at 4:03 p.m, the session was adjourned.)

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This is to certify that the preceding transcript is an accurate record based on the recordings of the proceedings taken:

Before: FRANK HARTMANN, Moderator

In the Matter of:

TERRORISM AT HOME: CHALLENGES FOR THE MEDIA

COVERING AMERICA'S SECURITY

Date: April 11, 2003

Place: Cambridge, Massachusetts

Martin T. Farley Advance Services