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MR. JONES: I think we can all agree that last night was a happy night, I mean it was a night for celebrating first rate journalism, and Alan of course gave an outstanding talk. It was just a great occasion, as far as I'm concerned, and I want to thank all of those involved at the Shorenstein Center. This is not a simple thing to put together, as you know, and Alison Kommer especially is to be recognized for being the person who really organizes, and I can't tell you what it's like to, on paper, deal with entries from scores and scores of entries that have to be duplicated, sent out, dealt with, and so forth and so on. Alison, where are you? Are you here?

(Applause)

MR. JONES: And I want to also thank the entire Shorenstein staff, they just have done an outstanding job and always do. As I say, a wonderful thing about the Shorenstein Center is that it really is a genuine team and family and I believe that everyone really pulls together, and we have a community each semester with our Fellows and visiting faculty, our regular faculty, our staff that seems to work in a special way. And sometimes we even get old family members, like Marvin Kalb, dropping in to see us, so we are very glad to have you all here with us.

This morning's conversation is an opportunity for each of the finalists and each of our guests, and Alan as well, to talk briefly about a particular aspect of challenge or difficulty in the work that they did on their particular project. Investigative reporting is a challenging thing at all times, it is the most important kind of journalism and it also is the most difficult. So the idea this morning is to give them all a chance to speak briefly and then to have a conversation, which will include you.

I would like to start with Alan in the sense that I would like to ask when it comes to covering news organizations, I was the press reporter at *The New York Times* in the 1980's and early `90's and I know from personal experience that there is no one more sensitive than a publisher of a newspaper when it comes to journalistic coverage. My sense is that in these times of resource restriction, one of the things that have gone by the

board, and perhaps rather conveniently, is serious coverage of the media.

We spoke briefly about this last night at dinner, but why -- I want you, if you would, frame the issue of the difficulty of covering another news organization and your strategies for simply trying to, one; do it and, two; find allies that will also engage.

MR. RUSBRIDGER: Well, thanks, Alex. I mean I just have to describe the flavor of the British press a bit because talking in the bar, over far too many glasses of red wine last night, I think there's a special context there. It's a small country, a lot of newspapers, highly competitive, and you have to understand, as I tried to describe last night, the dominance in a country in which one man owns 40 percent of the press, so he's got the two up market titles and he's got the two down market titles, and he's got the broadcaster.

I mean he was very close to doubling size of the broadcaster, so there's something very intense, claustrophobic and almost incestuous about this. It's a very tight and competitive field and there are, in Britain, these big people, Murdoch, Lord Rothermere, the Barclay Brothers, Richard Desmond, this former pornographer who now owns the *Daily Express* titles, and it is a kind of proprietors club. And one of the things that Lord Leveson's require is peeling back the degree to which there was an understanding between the titles that they wouldn't look at each other and the closest that anyone has got to making that explicit was between Lord Rothermere and Richard Desmond.

So Richard Desmond was this sort of big, tough man from a completely different world, he comes in, *The Mail* attacks him, calls him a pornographer and Desmond just does back to *The Mail* what *The Mail* does to him and starts digging the dirt on the private lives of people in *The Mail* and suddenly there's a truce and nobody ever does that again. They just stop writing about each other, and I think these agreements existed all over the place. So that was the context for *The Guardian*, this outsider coming in and deciding that you couldn't not write about this stuff.

And looking back, in retrospect, going through this period in which *News*

International completely lied about what we were saying and then within three days the story was dead because the police had come out and said the same thing. And then within a few weeks the regulator had said the same thing. This was a story that was not about the press. I mean it started off as a story about the press, but it turned out to be a much bigger story about the extent to which the press had corrupted the organs of state, the sort of the structures of the state.

And so I now -- this probably came up last night that I'm now passionate that the press absolutely needs the kind of scrutiny that we would turn on oil companies, or banks, or governments or police services and so, whatever the obstacles, I think it's our duty as journalists to forget all this dog eats dog stuff and anxieties about washing dirty linen in public and all that. We get all that, we get the accusation that we threw journalists out of work, we closed down newspapers, that we are finishing off the tabloid press. I think it's all rubbish.

I think it was Rupert Murdoch who decided to close down *News of the World*, not *The Guardian*. And it was years of criminal behavior and hiring criminals to do behavior that has led to the crisis in the British press and not *The Guardian*, but that's the card they throw at you, but I think it's absolutely vital that we do it.

MR. JONES: And how would you characterize the BBC's aggressiveness in terms of covering this institution of power, the media?

MR. RUSBRIDGER: Well, it comes back to that, somebody else had a question last night about the British press versus the American press and it occurred to me we are sort of a mirror image of each other. So in America you have a highly opinionated broadcast medium, media, and a press that has an attachment to objectivity. In Britain it's the other way around, the broadcast press is highly regulated and it's the press that is a bit like the Wild West, and that presents problems for the BBC.

There's a very familiar tactic on the right, which is to accuse the BBC of being liberal. So the BBC, on the first day, covered the story and then almost immediately the

right wing press said there it goes again, the BBC is hand in glove with *The Guardian*, the BBC practically is *The Guardian*. And you can see that having an effect on the BBC, and the BBC backed off the story and that was why for about 18 months it was a very lonely path to tread because, in a way, that's how the news cycle works in the U.K. The press does the work and then the BBC sort of amplifies it.

If the press does the work and the BBC is totally silent about it, then it's quite difficult to get the story airborne. The BBC has laterally done some good work, particularly after *The New York Times*'s intervention, but the short answer to your question is the BBC I think didn't really -- it wasn't as aggressive as it should have been.

MR. JONES: Which also brings up the question of your invitation to *The New York Times* to come into the story, that is very unusual, and what was your thinking? Did you just need an ally to be with you on pursuing the story?

MR. RUSBRIDGER: So this was February, 2010. There had been odd moments along the way where I just -- I couldn't believe what was happening. So in November, 2009, this man, Andy Coulson, who had edited *The News of the World*, had resigned, had been taken on by David Cameron and was almost certainly going to be in the heart of government. The Press Secretary to the Prime Minister, it's almost like being Deputy Prime Minister. Many people thought Cameron was extremely ill judged to do this, but there it was, he was going in and nobody was touching him.

Those of you who follow British politics, the nearest equivalent was a man called Alastair Campbell, who did it for Blair, who was a national figure and loathed by the right wing papers. But he was certainly a big figure in public life, so Coulson was the nearest thing to that. In November, 2009, there was an employment tribunal case against Coulson about his period at *The News of the World*, which resulted in a finding of bullying against Coulson and a reward of 800,000 pounds, so that's $1.3 million or something. So really a fine and finding against this man who was about to walk into Parliament.

I thought that was a story and *The Guardian* ran it and no other British paper

thought that was a story, just total silence. The same thing had happened when we gave evidence to the Common Select Committee and Nick had produced all these documents, these e-mails which proved that the there were other *News of the World* reporters involved. A packed hearing, and this was nothing in the next day's papers, so this very odd feeling of things that were happening in public which on any sensible news values you would write about and nobody was writing about them.

So we got to February and this axe man emerges, a very menacing private detective called Jonathan Reese, who was in league with corrupt policemen, had spent seven years in jail for planting cocaine on a woman, came out of jail and went back to work for Coulson, for Coulson's paper, and that was shocking. And more shocking was the fact that he was now on remand for a very famous unsolved murder, the murder of Daniel Morgan, a man who was found with an axe in the back of his head.

And to the British media laws, which are curious things, and under British media laws you can't name somebody who is on remand for a crime. If I wanted to do this piece about Coulson hiring this man, I couldn't name him because it would have prejudiced his trial, which was coming up, so all I could do was to do a huge piece and call him Mr. A. And so once again it went into a vacuum, nobody covered the story. I was at a loss to know what to do about this. This was ten weeks from Coulson going into power and nobody would touch it.

So I did two things, one was to go to the Prime Minister, Gordon Brown. I went to Nick Clegg and I went to David Cameron and said we can't write the full story here, but I just think you ought to know what is going on, and the story will come out in time. And that was the moment at which I lifted the phone to Bill, thinking, a; he is not going to be -- whatever this omertà is that's happening in Britain, he is not going to be bound by it, b; he is not going to be bound by the British media laws, so he will have the freedom to write this story that we can't.

And, thirdly, there was this kind of First Amendment thing, which I mentioned,

with WikiLeaks, that he would have a much greater freedom to write this story that we couldn't. So that's why I went to Bill and, as I described last night, I think the fact of Bill sending three first rate investigative reporters, led by Don Van Natta and Joe Becker, who came over. We spent about 24 hours briefing them and then they completely went their own way. I think they didn't want to be -- in any way feel that they were adopting our story, and it took them six months to investigate it completely on their own.

And they came out with the story in September and that was -- I'm so glad I did it and I've never been more glad. It was like the sort of cavalry coming over the hill because it was so clear to me that this was a crisis in British public life and it needed the intervention of first class reporting to expose it.

MR. JONES: Thank you, thank you. Next I would like to turn to the Associated Press, the winners of the Investigative Reporting Award. Matt, you and Eileen were part of a team that had to deal with a chief of police and a mayor who were absolutely adamantly denying and a very hostile environment in New York City itself about the whole issue. What were the challenges that you would name in their sort of hierarchy of importance?

MR. APUZZO: So, yeah, you're right. The first story came out in August and the police department said, on the record, this is just not true, there is no such thing as a demographics unit, this story is marked by outright fiction. We knew they were going to do that. We pitched them for weeks and weeks and weeks on having this sort of big sitdown with Ray Kelly or David Cohen, who is their intelligence chief, and they wouldn't do it. The best that they would -- I mean at this point they kind of knew what we were looking into, what we had.

The best they would do was a conference call with the communications guy, Paul Brown, who is the Deputy Commissioner of Police, and we did the interview and he sort of flatly denied everything on the record. And so we had a meeting and we said, well, okay, well, they are denying this on the record, so whatever we are going to run he's

going to have to have the police say everything you are about to read is not true. And I give AP a lot of credit, they said yeah, okay, let's do that, let's just put it up higher on the first story, Police Deputy Commissioner Paul Brown says this is totally wrong, and now we are going to drop 5,000 words on you and tell you that it's true.

(Laughter)

MR. APUZZO: And then we sort of did more and it's not true, it's wrong. And then I think we some point we just made the decision that the best thing to do would just be start publishing these documents and putting them out there for people to see. There is no demographics unit. Okay, well, here are documents stamped demographics unit and you can read for yourself if you think there's a demographics unit or not. And so, yeah, we definitely had that challenge. Any other major challenges that we should highlight or just in general?

MR. JONES: Well, how did you report it? I mean how did you get this information about this very secret organization within the New York Police Department?

MR. APUZZO: Well, it started with Adam Goldman and I, we were writing stories about intelligence and national security and in the course of that we started hearing, people were talking about the NYPD, which has -- the intelligence division is being run by a former senior CIA officer and has all these sort of murky ties to the CIA, some of which are sort of well known. And so in those conversations people would say oh, yeah, you know Dave Cohen is running NYPD's little mini CIA up there and we're like yeah, yeah, yeah.

And then they would say you should definitely ask about the rakers. Well what's a raker? I mean you do this and you know, you are in the national security world, you know the lingo and rakers was a new word for us, and so when the new word comes up, you're like well what the hell is a raker? It turns out a raker is an ethnic sort of typically Arab undercover officer whose job it is just to hang out in ethnic neighborhoods and spend the days in cafes eavesdropping on people's conversations, identifying the

ethnicities of business owners, and writing down everything they see and giving reports on the community every day.

That's all they do, and so you end up with this -- the police department ends up with this huge map, they call it mapping the human terrain of the city, which is actually mapping the Muslim terrain of the city. And so we stumble on that and it literally was we'll pull some threads on that on the side. We went to Eileen really early. Eileen covers counter-terrorism for us and knows, just has this breadth of knowledge about combating violent extremism and how policing is done, and so I think we said to her, hey, do people do this? Is this like pretty common? And she was like no, absolutely not, no, definitely not.

And so I think we knew then that there was something there and we just sort of started pulling threads kind of on the side for a long time, while we were doing other stuff. And then I would said like in -- so when was Osama bin Laden? May, right? So we did like Osama bin Laden for like a month and then I would say in June we just said we definitely have something in NYPD, focus on that, and we did that pretty much exclusively for like June, July and August. And that pretty much all we did for June, July and August.

And then we got there and then as the story started coming out and we started getting more documents we realized we definitely needed somebody in New York to help us with this. Chris Hawley, who was part of our team, just did a phenomenal job as our guy in New York and sort of came together that way.

MR. JONES: Eileen, did you feel that you got support throughout from your editors in the hierarchy at AP or was this something that had to -- I mean I know sometimes these stories, these very sensitive stories can get stalled for a while until the people in charge decide whether they in fact want to pursue it headlong, knowing that there is going to be a political cost.

MS. SULLIVAN: So I did have a lot of support from my editor, who happened to

be Matt and Adam's editor too, and he would make sure that my desk was clear of other stuff as much as possible. But then things would happen and I would have to be pulled off of that and I would just have to go back to the story, so some stories were stalled. I mean a recent one was postponed a little bit because of something else that was going on and AP has always been great about writing sensitive stories and if the government is going to cut you off, then the government is going to cut you off, and I don't care. I don't get my information from the press office, so that was never really a problem.

MR. JONES: So you felt like Tom Curley and Michael Oreskes and the people in charge were down with this story right from the start?

MS. SULLIVAN: Absolutely.

MR. APUZZO: And the best part is -- I mean the best part about AP is I have no idea what Tom Curley thinks. I mean that's like a really -- I mean seriously, like it's a problem, right? I mean if you are writing a sensitive story and suddenly you know what the feelings are in the corner office, that's sort of taking you away from the reporting, and we always knew we had Mike's support. I mean look, it's tough. We are running a story about New York City and we are running it out of Washington, and that's like the blessing and the curse.

The blessing is we don't need the New York Police Department. I don't need to call them tomorrow to ask them for help on the police involved shooting, so I don't need them for anything and that's helpful. I mean the down side to that is you are kind of outsiders, so I mean you are doing this and you are doing it outside of the New York media bubble. And I think also, internally, we have beat reporters that cover the police department, we have a New York City Metro Bureau, and I think there was like a little bit of wait, we are running this out of Washington? What's happening here?

So I mean there was that sort of thing to deal with but, frankly, the best part about this is that we just didn't have to -- that stuff didn't -- it was slight background noise, but it never interfered with the journalism, which I think is a credit to -- it's a credit to the

management.

MR. JONES: One of the questions that your work raises is whether there are similar operations in Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington, other cities.

MS. SULLIVAN: The answer is no, but one of the challenges was getting people to talk about it because whenever I would ask about NYPD, I mean I would get a reaction, people would take a deep breath and just they didn't want to talk about it. And when I pressed them, they say well look, it's NYPD, we could never do this, we don't have the resources, and NYPD absolutely has the resources to do it, but that wasn't my question, if you had the resources would you do it, and we don't -- NYPD does a great job, we don't want to get involved.

I mean the people who just wanted to stay so far away from this was unbelievable, especially as I spent years covering outreach to Muslim communities and the right way to do this, the wrong way to do this, and then this is something, this is the biggest terror target in the U.S., the biggest intelligence led policing effort ever and yet no one is talking about it. The policy makers in Washington, who are developing policies for other police departments to do intelligence led policing are staying as far away from this as possible.

MR. APUZZO: And I actually think that point is so significant because here we have a president who has made Muslim outreach -- I mean one of the first things he does is goes to Cairo and basically says we would like to hit restart on the relationship we have with the Muslim world. He has this whole strategy coming out of the White House on combating violent extremism and we need to -- our local authorities need to be able to be doing outreach, and then we find out that a lot of these programs are actually being -- Eileen had a story really recently that said a lot of these programs we've been writing about, the under covers, the data mining, is being paid for sort of with this really little known anti drug grant that comes directly out of the White House. So whether the White House knows this or not, they are helping fund this, and so you would think that the

White House would say yeah, yeah, we are helping fund this and this is good policing or we didn't know this is where the money was going, and we don't agree with it and we don't think it should be done.

They won't even touch this and what's crazy is that--

MS. SULLIVAN: I mean they say they have absolutely no control of how the money is spent, which is just amazing to me, and the Department of Homeland Security has been the same way, we don't know how NYPD spends the money. Well, Congress, where are you on this?

MR. APUZZO: Right, and our deal all along is like look, if this is what's necessary, this is the best way to keep America safe, to keep New York City safe, then best practices this stuff, let's get it everywhere. I mean if spying on communities is the way to do it, and that's what they are doing, then why wouldn't we do this in L.A. and Miami, and why wouldn't we do this everywhere, if this is what it takes to keep our cities safe? And if it's not good policing, if it's not the best way to keep New York City safe, then why in God's name would we want to do that in New York City, which is the biggest terrorist target? I mean when we can't get -- nobody will even address that.

MR. JONES: What about the argument that I think has been made by them, that we haven't had a terrorist attack, a successful one, in New York, since 9/11, and maybe this has had something to do with that?

MR. APUZZO: Well, first of all, two things on that, one is they say there are these -- they say these 14 terrorist plots that have been foiled, and that gets shorthanded. Ray Kelly is very smart. He says there have been 14 terrorist plots that have not come to fruition in New York City. And then the echo chamber picks that up as the NYPD has foiled 14 plots. But if you actually look at what the 14 plots are, they are taking credit for like foiling the British liquid bomb plot because the planes they were thinking about taking that they didn't ultimately take were bound -- would have been bound for New York. I mean so they are taking credit for things that they definitely did not stop.

But more importantly than that is we haven't been attacked in ten years is the exact -- we have already established under the Bush Administration that the reason we haven't been attacked in ten years was because of warrantless wire tapping, and we previously established in the Bush Administration that the reason we haven't been attacked in ten years is because of waterboarding and the Patriot Act. I mean every time a policy is questioned, we haven't been attacked, and that, look, we are sitting at Harvard, I don't need to explain causality, right?

(Laughter)

MR. JONES: Don't kid yourself.

(Laughter)

MR. APUZZO: That alone is not the sort of like persuasive, logical argument. Forget policy arguments.

MR. JONES: That's very interesting. As I say, we are going to move on. We could spend a great deal of time on each one of these projects. I want to go next to the ABC Peace Corps story. Anna, you were, my understanding is, principally the reporter on that story, is that correct? One; how did you come to it and what were the challenges?

MS. SCHECTER: How did I come to it? A guy that I worked with down in Palm Beach when I was helping Brian and Rhonda cover Madoff had been a Peace Corps volunteer in the `60's, had a good experience and was kind of disheartened with what he saw, in terms of leadership and how things were running, and was sort of part of a group that were disgruntled about that. And he met, through someone else in that group, the parents of Kate Puzey and he said why don't you -- you might want to talk to Mrs. Puzey. And this was a long time ago, this was like a year before we aired.

And I called Mrs. Puzey and it took about eight months of developing a relationship with the family. And it was just appalling to kind of just peel back the layers of this onion as to what happened to her and how, unfortunately, Peace Corps employees, even the country director and her subordinates were, by mistake, but

involved in her murder. Through that, Brian and Rhonda, who were my mentors, I mean they said well why don't you take a look at is this happening? How many deaths are there? But how much sexual abuse is there?

And I started talking to women and it was like every single woman who served in the Peace Corps that I talked to had had some kind of sexual assault, rape, sexual abuse, and even -- and a lot of them were still very gung ho about it and very positive about their experience, but a lot of them were not and their lives have been devastated, and it took months of developing those relationships. I mean there is so much shame involved with that and so to come forward on television and talk about that, for the parents of Kate Puzey to come forward and talk about their daughter's throat being slit in a village in Africa, that took a lot of courage.

So I think the challenge was to make these -- I guess to just help these people get the courage.

MR. JONES: I mean I know that this may seem like an inane question, but how did you do that?

MS. SCHECTER: Well, how did I do that? I guess a lot of compassion, I think that's what it is. And my colleague, Angela Hill, she's got experience working with rape victims, so she knows better than anybody it's really you just -- listening a lot, and I don't know, I don't know. I think everybody who was a part of this story, from the get go, there was just this -- we had this feeling like this is big, this is bigger than these individuals. And I think that got them fired up and, yeah, I'm not even sure how to answer that question.

MR. JONES: Well, one question for both of you, a television show like “20/20" is geared to a relative -- not an immediate turnaround but a pretty fast turnaround, and devoting resources, giving time, doing something that's complex, something that involves travel and a lot of research, and so forth. There was a decision made at some stage that this was something you were really going to devote time and resources to.

How did that process happen?

MS. HILL: I mean I think from the very beginning everyone was very supportive. I think, first off, we have a very supporting senior management when it comes to doing investigative reporting from our former president, David Westin, to our current president, Ben Sherwood. Everyone has been completely invested in the investigative unit. I remember Ben Sherwood, his first day on the job, came by the unit and just said, hey, look, whatever you guys need, we are here, we are really invested in doing good investigative reporting. So I think it starts at that level.

David Simone, who is the Executive Producer for "20/20", when we sat down and talked with him about the idea, was completely invested in it as well. So I think when you have different groups of people who see the vision and understand the impact that this story could have from the national perspective, as it ended up having, everyone was pretty much on board. And to get back to the earlier point that Anna was making, I think certainly to her credit and to the credit of the rest of the team, really establishing a relationship with the individuals in the story, especially the six women who came forward.

I think once they knew that they weren't alone in this process and that there were other people who were considering coming forward, I think it made it a little bit easier for them also to come and sit down with us and talk about it. So from "20/20" we break a lot of our stories on line with The Blotter, there was complete support of what we were trying to do and what we were trying to accomplish with this story from the beginning.

MR. JONES: And what about dealing with the Peace Corps itself?

MS. SCHECTER: That's a fun one. Aaron Williams doesn't really like us, I think, that was one of the big challenges. It was just incredible to watch how in 2010 and 2011 there was still this mentality, like 1950s, of not wanting to talk about what's really going on, like what the reality is. I mean we're talking with women who were raped in 2004, 5, 6, 7, and they were basically made to feel like it was their fault, they had brought it on.

They had one drink, or they didn't.

There's a video that was out, the three women featured in the video had all been drinking, yet I talked to a lot of women who had not been drinking before this happened. I mean you take an American kid alone and put them somewhere very remote, it's great. It's a great idea and it's -- there are so many wonderful things about it and that's what Peace Corps kept wanting to talk about, and I understand that, but they didn't want to sit down. And so they found out that I was going to go with Brian to Ann Arbor and try to talk to Mr. Williams and then they decided to give us the deputy, Carrie Hessler-Radelet, who really cares about this issue, but she had been on the job for four months.

So she sat down with us on camera and it was a tough interview, she didn't really know. She didn't have the information, so that was -- I mean I think they knew that we were going to do this story, we were going to try to -- we were going to hold them to account, and so Allison Price was a very excellent public affairs person who wound up actually resigning because she was not happy with how the organization handled the story. She put someone in the chair, so to her credit, absolutely to her credit.

MR. JONES: And do you think genuinely that the Peace Corps has changed its ways because of this?

MS. SCHECTER: I think I know too much. Unfortunately, I know that there are some folks at the very top who still don't want to look at it, but there is legislation now. It's the law. I mean you have to -- they retracted this video that was so -- just there was so much blame, in terms of blaming the victim, and there is more training now. I hope that things change. I don't know, so we'll see in the coming year, I keep talking to people.

MR. JONES: Okay, thank you. Before we go on to the "Poison Places" with the Center for Public Integrity and NPR, I have to ask Alan a question. What exactly does over-egged mean?

(Laughter)

MR. RUSBRIDGER: Give me five minutes, I'll find out.

(Laughter)

MR. JONES: "Poison Places". This was, if you recall, this is the terrific series on the Clean Air Act. The Clean Air Act I think most people would consider to be old hat almost. We have that, it's been around for two decades. How did you guys come to want to make this something that you invested the resources that you did in?

MR. MORRIS: Actually, the original Clean Air Act is 41 years old.

MR. JONES: Forty-one? Okay.

MR. MORRIS: The Clean Air Act amendments are 21 years old and the Clean Air Act amendments were supposed to -- one of the things they were supposed to do specifically was address what are known as air toxics, the worst of the worst, the really bad chemicals that come out of oil refineries and paper mills, and so forth. So I've been covering environment and public health for 34 years now and I have visited communities, like Corpus Christi, Texas, which is a heavily industrialized city south of Houston that has a really hellish place called Refinery Row, which is pretty much what is sounds like.

It's just one oil refinery after another and there are poor, mostly minority communities that abut that area. And I had been there years ago when I worked for the *Houston Chronicle*. So I went back there, I guess in October of 2010, to work on another story and I visited some of those neighborhoods I had been to 20 years earlier, and what struck me was how little had changed. People were still getting this stuff dumped on them from oil refineries, carcinogens like a benzine, just really nasty stuff.

They had gotten no relief from the EPA, they certainly had gotten no relief from the State of Texas regulators. I think that's how it sort of started and then about a year ago, about this time last year myself and my colleagues at the center started looking at EPA data, EPA enforcement data and in this particular case it's called the ECHO Database. I forget what the acronym is. You probably know, or maybe you don't.

(Laughter)

MR. MORRIS: But it's just this massive on line enforcement database that's full of twists and turns, and so forth. We started looking at that to try to identify facilities, again industrial plants, refineries, paper mills, coal fired power plants, that were sort of chronic offenders, chronic violators of the Clean Air Act. And then last spring, so we were doing that, we were trying to figure out -- we knew we needed to get out in the field. We didn't want to just do data analysis, we didn't think anybody would care about that and it would be very hard to write interesting stories about that.

So last winter and spring we were parsing the data, we were identifying communities that seemed to be getting no relief from the regulators, that had these chronic violators dumping this stuff on them. And then in the spring of last year I was reading an Inspector General's report, an EPA Inspector General's report, and I learned that there was this internal watch list that the EPA kept. It's for enforcement purposes. I guess you could call it sort of a bad guys list, although they wouldn't call it that.

And I thought, well, gee, it would be nice to have that, so I filed a FOIA request and somebody in the enforcement office called me a couple of weeks later, this would have been last June, I guess, and said we got your FOIA request, we've gotten these before, we've never granted these, this is for internal purposes only. However, we are thinking about granting yours, and I said good. He said give us 45 days to sort of clean up the data and we might give it to you. So they did and in August of last year we got this internal EPA watch list, and that really -- I think that really helped fuel the project.

MR. JONES: The Center for Public Integrity, I mean I get appeals from Bill Buzenberg, and I mean I know he is always looking for money and I know that you have to pick your targets. How does it work at the center when you have a project like this that must have taken a lot of time and money? Do you pitch ideas? Is there a committee that decides? How do you decide where to go with the resources you have and the time you have?

MR. MORRIS: Well, I mean there's really not a committee. We come up with what

we think are good ideas and in this case I think it really, really helped to have NPR as a partner.

MR. JONES: If you would talk about that too?

MR. BERKES: Well, Jim, it's all Jim's fault, he dragged us into this. He came to us with this story and really what turned out to be a series of stories. I think one of the complexities of this whole project is that some of us, my colleague Elizabeth Shogren over here and myself were working on multiple investigative stories simultaneously. Elizabeth, you were doing what, three? Three at the same time. I was doing two and the center was interested in me doing a third at the same time, which added enormously to the complexity of it.

But the center came to us with this idea to partner. They had done a lot of preliminary research and reporting and we then joined them in that process and, for me, as somebody who has done some investigative reporting in the past, but not in this kind of collaborative way, it was really astonishing the numbers of people that were involved at both organizations. On one story I had four editors, two from NPR, one from the Center for Public Integrity and we actually farmed one of our pieces to Slate, and I thought I was going to kill myself that week.

(Laughter)

MR. BERKES: But every editor, every person, I really learned a lot as a reporter going through this process and I think we really helped each other do this reporting, and it makes such sense. I don't know about other reporters but I'm frequently working on something and become friendly with another reporter working on the same thing and I keep thinking god, we would sure make a lot of headway if we worked together, but we're not supposed to, we are different news organizations.

And I know how tough collaboration can be, but I also know that we made a lot of headway on things together that we would have taken many more months, weeks, we--

MR. JONES: Can you give just like one example?

MR. BERKES: Well, that watch list that was promised to us, to CPI, at first, and then when we got involved, it was released and then we worked on it for, what, three months. And it was kind of out of date by the time we were getting ready to go to air and to go to print, and to go to the web, and so we wanted to get it updated and EPA balked. They didn't want to do it again, they didn't want to give it to us a second time. But because NPR was involved and we started pressuring them very heavily, for some reason it was a different dynamic to them and they came through.

MR. JONES: One of the things that the Center for Public Integrity is known for is creating these databases and resources that basically they make available to everybody.

MR. BERKES: Right.

MR. JONES: Have there been a lot of derivative stories from like NPR stations and--

MR. BERKES: Yeah.

MR. JONES: --places and things like that?

MR. BERKES: Yeah, and newspapers and publications not associated with us directly, but NPR stations, because of the interactive map that the data people at CPI and at NPR were able to put together with -- was it three databases?

MR. MORRIS: I think so.

MR. BERKES: Three different databases of information, never been put together in this way before. I would really encourage everyone to go to the CPI web site or the NPR web site, NPR.org, to look at this map because there are thousands of communities around the country. You put in your Zip Code, you click on your community and you come up with all this data about what's poisoning you, or maybe not poisoning you, and the records of those companies. And because of that stations and newspapers, news organizations around the country could do the same thing.

And then they started doing stories about facilities in their area and some of them discovered that there was a plant they didn't know was polluting. So it was really

extraordinary that we pulled all these resources together, editors and reporters, the two of us. There were two or three times as many people who were actually involved in this project. The center sent out a videographer who reported, sort of on her own, a video aspect of one of these stories. We had photographers that we sent out who did photo essays.

And the idea was we built a body of reporting, number one, that nobody really could challenge because it was so solid journalistically, we worked so hard on it, and, number two, was just compelling in its scope, that really built this picture. And the other, just quickly, one other example of this sort of collaboration that worked well is that Ronnie Green, who is over here from CPI, and I were working on the story in Oklahoma. Ronnie had done the early reporting on that and then we followed up and we continued to report, and Ronnie went in and looked at 20 binders of documents, hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of pages of documents.

And we felt like, okay, do we take Ronnie's word for it or should we look at these ourselves? And we realized that we needed to do that, but Ronnie shared some documents, he guided us to some, but we also went down to the Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality, poured through those hundreds of pages of documents ourselves, so we were all working from the same information. We would do interviews, I would send the transcripts to Ronnie. He would do an interview, he would send his notes to me. Sometimes we did them together. It just built to a certainty about the information we were gathering and I think we just got much further along in the reporting and what we found because we were all working together.

MR. JONES: That's great. Before we go to *The New York Times*, over-egged?

MR. RUSBRIDGER: I was shaky about the culinary grounds and it's, according to my friend, the internet, it's a complicated story because egg was actually an Anglo Saxon term which meant over-excite and in the 13th Century they didn't make puddings with eggs, they made it with animals' entrails. So the literally meaning is over-excite the

sausage, but I don't think that's what the policemen meant when--

(Laughter)

MR. RUSBRIDGER: In the 14th Century they did start adding egg to puddings in order to improve them, so what he meant was you are over-improving your pudding, you are exaggerating, you are embellishing, which was a bit ironic because actually this is one of those rare stories where the story is much worse than anything we wrote.

(Laughter)

MR. JONES: *The New York Times*, did you guys run into the over-egged charge when you were doing your stuff?

MR. HAKIM: I'm still not sure I understand what it means.

(Laughter)

MR. JONES: Well, if you would, talk about your own experience because this is a serious state story but *The New York Times* only occasionally does serious state stories, in my experience.

MR. HAKIM: I run the state house bureaus.

(Laughter)

MR. HAKIM: Thank you very much.

MR. JONES: No, I get the national edition.

MR. HAKIM: Well, I think we've done pretty good reporting on Spitzer and Patterson and so I might take issue with that. But this story, it came about from a conversation or the series started, it came out of conversations I had with an advocate, Michael Carey. His son was a 13 year old autistic boy who died in the back of a state van and he's an, I think I said to somebody last night, he's an evangelist on this topic and he is an evangelist in real life. And he has been going around the state capital for years trying to tell people about these real problems at this state agency now, being super earnest and evangelist and trying to convince state house reporters in Albany that there is a story is a difficult task because we are a pretty cynical bunch.

But at some point I started to listen to him, he showed me that -- he had a document that I found kind of interesting. It was an employee discipline record that I realized was a public record I could get, so I did a freedom of information request and started getting employee discipline records, and what we found was that the state was putting abusive employees back to work, just transferring them from group home to group home after they punched a disabled person in the face and in some cases sexually abused the disabled. So that was really a sort of starting point of our whole effort.

MR. JONES: Did you run into much resistance from the state itself?

MR. HAKIM: It's funny, the way the state government works in New York is kind of crazy. I mean I put in my first--

MR. JONES: I think that is certainly true.

MR. HAKIM: We put in our first freedom of information request in March of 2010 and then we put in quite a number of requests over the next year and the governor of the state didn't find out for a year that we were investigating one of his largest state agencies.

MR. JONES: Who was that -- was Andrew Cuomo Governor by then?

MR. HAKIM: Well, Governor Patterson never knew before he left office, so for his last nine months in office he never knew we were investigating one of his largest state agencies, even though we were filing freedom of information requests with that agency. And then as soon as Cuomo found out, which was about two or three months into his tenure, he fired or he forced the head of the agency to resign.

MR. JONES: And did he do that because of what you had found or what he learned from you? I mean was that after you had published or was that before?

MR. HAKIM: It was a couple of days before we published our first story.

MR. BUETTNER: There was kind of another category of state interference that I think we didn't expect and that's that this is a system that had been entirely state run in the `70's and then had been privatized to address the serious problems that were raised by Geraldo Rivera back in `71, whatever that was. And really it started to seem like at

some point the nonprofit agencies, there are 600 of them that had performed the bulk of this work, had kind of taken over not just the providing of services but also the oversight of themselves as well.

And we found out that -- we had gotten a database of inspections of these group homes and some money databases and then we would use those to target FOIA requests for specific agencies, and we found out that they were, the state, when we followed those records, they were notifying the agencies that we had filed a FOIA request. So it's sort of like completely abdicating their oversight responsibility so when we call the place, they already knew that we had FOIA'd all their records and were coming their direction.

MR. JONES: And did you, after the stories were published, do you feel the State of New York has responded? I mean in a way that is meaningful?

MR. HAKIM: I think they have certainly changed directions, they are saying a lot of the right things. I think this is a really hard -- it's a very difficult field and a very troubled agency to really fix quickly, so I think it remains to be seen how much of a fix they've really done. I think we are still waiting to see the results.

MR. JONES: I know of course *The Times* broke the story on Spitzer and so forth. This though is a kind of different kind of investigative effort, honestly, in my sense, and I really think it's great. Do you think *The Times* is -- is this part of *The Times*' sort of -- I don't know whether this is something that Joe Abramson is involved in in a direct way. Is this something that heralds more of the same to come, do you think, at the state level?

MR. HAKIM: Well, I think it was just sort of a ground up kind of project. So it wasn't anything that was dictated from the top down. So I think *The Times*, what makes it a great paper is they are always willing to listen to broad project pitches. They pulled me off a statewide political race, the governors' race, to do this story, so I think that says a lot about their commitment to projects.

MR. JONES: I have to tell you that as a former Timesman myself, when Alan said it was like the cavalry coming over the hill, I like that. Houston, you guys did a -- your

story was a state story too, effectively, and again you met incredible resistance from the City of Houston and other parts of the upper infrastructure. Could you talk about how you went about doing this and, again, how you came upon the story in the first place?

MR. GREENBLATT: The story actually started when this guy right here, Keith Tomshe, who is the photographer and editor for the investigative unit came in one day to the office and had some questions about a water quality notice that was buried 14 pages in the back of his water bill that had a bunch of funny sounding contaminants. And there was some, he noticed, arsenic in his water supply and he said it didn't sound so good.

(Laughter)

MR. GREENBLATT: And so he decided -- he brought it in and he said let's look at this and kind of the executive producer of our team, David Razik, and I looked at it and said, well, let's obtain a database of every single water quality test in the recent history of Texas for every water system and let's just see what's in the water. And what happened was, in looking at the data, it actually appeared that there was not that much. Some arsenic, and of course you don't really want any, but there wasn't really enough I think to fairly make a big story about it and make a big deal about it.

But there was this other thing in there that I did not know at the time what it was and it was mysteriously to me coded as something called alpha, and that didn't sound so bad, other than maybe it's a fraternity that some people like or don't like.

(Laughter)

MR. TOMSHE: And the beta.

MR. GREENBLATT: And the betas, and that's actually not a joke because there was that too. But what they were leaving off in the database was the word alpha radiation. And it turns out that this is really the most energetic form of radiation that you can ingest and some of the most damaging forms to your molecular DNA when it encounters -- when it comes inside your body and it, in Texas, occurs because, we now know, we are sitting in top of something called the uranium belt, which is a geologically,

naturally very rich form of uranium and radioactive radium that's sitting under ground right next to where all the water supply is for Texas, and there's a lot of other pockets around the country that have this naturally occurring geology.

Well, the story really took off when we realized that the data that we were looking at from individual inspections and lab tests was not matching up with what was getting reported to the public on things like the water quality notice that Keith--

MR. TOMSHE: Or not on there at all.

MR. GREENBLATT: Which was something different too. And, long story short, through a series of conversations with a number of utilities who I thought initially were kind of covering up the amount of radiation that they had in their water, it turns out that we learned the State of Texas had actually given the order to literally just systematically reduce, if the lab came in saying you had this much of this alpha radiation in your water, the order had been given across the state to change the math and just simply lower it, doing things like subtracting off--

MR. JONES: How did you find that out?

MR. GREENBLATT: It was literally we were thinking about doing kind of a shorter project on this piece at first and we were already into the production stage where I was out on the ground getting ready to try to find people in an affected community that had a lot of this stuff in their water. And as I was literally getting ready to interview these people, I was comparing numbers from a database sheet that I had printed out to their actual hard copy notice that they had received in the mail and they weren't matching up, so I called the utility to essentially accuse the utility of a coverup. And they said no, it's in fact the state that actually fills out our numbers for us and we simply put it into a template.

I said, oh, so the state did this? So I called the state and I said how does your math work? And they said, well, this is what you have to do, you have to subtract all this out, and they simply explained it as if the sky is blue and this is how it works.

(Laughter)

MR. JONES: It's amazing what people will say if you simply ask, isn't it? Did they have any sort of sense that there was something a little weird about changing the numbers?

MR. GREENBLATT: Well, we later learned yes because the initial reports, we put this out there that this sort of thing was happening. We decided to do a little bit of digging to find the answer out of who gave this order and was this anything untoward truly about it? So we filed a Freedom of Information Act request with the state regulators and asked for every bit of information they had on this sort of topic, all the e-mails, interoffice memos, and they fought us very hard and it took us kind of a legal fight with the Attorney General of Texas, and the Attorney General of Texas ruled on our side and said you have to give this about 1,000 pages of documents up to KHOU.

They did and sure enough there were literally e-mails that said the we know the Federal Government does not want us to subtract, but we are going to do it anyways because the commissioners and the executive director of the agency talked about this and they decided, and I'm not kidding, it says this in black and white, they decided that if we continue doing it the Texas way, we will save 40 water systems from having to say that they have radiation in their water above the federal legal limit. And therefore they won't have to inform the public. And at that point we knew we had a pretty good story.

(Laughter)

MR. TOMSHE: I'm so fortunate to be there in the back seat, the passenger seat, and some of the moments when they shut the interview down, all those kind of fun things because Mark is asking really smart questions, and their whole defense to that was that, well, they hadn't been audited. And then, well, they were audited one time and it didn't come up in that audit, so it was okay. And so the second time we got audited, well, they found that and so then, what, a year and a half, maybe two years later they finally decided to go ahead and start changing it anyways. So that evolution, it just -- it's pretty

amazing to watch.

MR. JONES: The officials who had done this, were they shamed or were they just angry?

MR. GREENBLATT: I would say that they actually were proud. Ironically, what this came down to was a political difference, not really -- more politics than science. What it's really about in the end, we got the lady, the chair of the commission, in a chair, she since retired, and she explained to us very simply that the EPA's scientists were wrong and she, even though she was not a scientist, was right. And the EPA was making far too big of a deal about this. It was a political issue, that she was a Republican who believed that regulation was bad and therefore the EPA was bad and they were wrong. And in fact she has, on a national level, helped lead a charge to try to weaken the EPA's regulatory efforts.

And I simply asked her, well, what if you are wrong? And she said, well, that would be unfortunate then, wouldn't it?

(Laughter)

MR. GREENBLATT: But I'll say this because it's worth talking about, and Keith was there for this, we then hit the streets. I just heard a few people talking about the importance of getting out of the office -- do you want to tell the story? Go ahead.

MR. TOMSHE: Well, we were joking, we were just driving around the neighborhood in fact right as he was telling the part about when he contacted the utility to find out about the numbers, and was picturing all this, sitting there. And so we said all right, well, where in the world are we going to -- where is our character? Who is going to put the face on this story for us? And how many times have you gone out and said okay, I've got to find a story about a kid who fell off one of these crazy Razor scooters and how am I going to get video of that? And you make a corner and oh, my God, there's a kid on a Razor scooter.

(Laughter)

MR. TOMSHE: So we are driving around, and school isn't out or anything, and all of a sudden down the end of this street we see this water like sprinkling, and we pull up. It's a beautiful, bright, blue day and you crank the shutter up on the camera and the water is just -- and it's these three little kids playing in this. It was like God just said here you go, and these two moms sitting out in their chairs, and it was quite a moment.

MR. GREENBLATT: There was one other one we were talking about before. We wanted to put a face also on the coverup to understand was there a true health risk problem from this coverup that had taken place. And we had seen some other documents in this trove that we received that the state's own scientists had concluded that there were certain regions in Texas where the water was so contaminated that literally just simply by drinking 1 in 400 people, an additional 1 in 400 people would come down with cancer as a result of the drinking water.

And we decided to go to that region on the ground and just start walking around and started asking people do you know about this? And we walked into this small Town of Brady, Texas, right in the central part of Texas, and the city manager walks up to us and he says, guys, I'm really glad you are here, would you like some bottled water because I don't drink the water that I give to my citizens. And I thought he was kidding, but he wasn't, and I asked him why, why is that?

And he said, well, we have a little bit of a problem in this region, and I said tell me about it, and he said well we dug up the water pipes the other -- recently and it turns out we tried to get the metal water pipes recycled at the local scrap yard but the scrap yard's Geiger counter started pegging off the charts, and they literally turned the water pipes away as radioactive waste, and he wasn't kidding. And I said, well, can you show me? And sure enough we went down to the scrap yard and we say the Geiger counter pegging.

And at the time I didn't have enough scientific knowledge or background in this, so we got some pretty heavy hitters to help us out, including a current member of the

Scientific Advisory Board of the Environmental Protection Agency and Radiation Advisory Committee who helped me understand that this was phenomenon had been discovered nationally before. And what it's called is it's called pipe scale where, over time, the metal inside of pipes will suck up contaminants, such as radioactive radium, and form this highly concentrated form of bad stuff inside the water pipes.

And the risk was any time the water company would change simply the chlorination of the water, that would cause a chemical reaction inside the pipe to let concentrated bursts of this stuff come down the line and no one would ever know this, and yet they would drink it and they were exposed. And I think it was really -- it was really an important story to get out there and after we did the reporting, local reporters in the area really started picking up on this.

MR. JONES: Mark, as some of you may know, has left the station and has now joined ABC News, so he'll be your colleague. I really hope that your station is going to continue with this though because a local TV station that does this kind of work, I wish there were a lot more of them.

MR. TOMSHE: They are.

MR. JONES: Good. Let's move on now to ProPublica's excellent piece of work on pardons. So how did you get onto it and what were the problems?

MS. LINZER: Thanks, Alex. We are at the end of the group and it's so inspiring to hear all these stories, it makes me feel so good. This was a really interesting project and we kind of backed into it and the challenges were enormous. I'll tell you a little bit about them and also ask Jen to talk a little bit about the data challenges, which were immense on this project. So basically towards the end of the Bush Administration, in November, 2008, I wrote, at ProPublica, I wrote basically a riff on presidential pardons for Slate.

It was a fun little piece about who are the kind of fun characters out there that President Bush could pardon on the way out the door? And there were people like Martha Stewart and Michael Vick, people like this, and we scored them, could they be

pardoned? It ended up being one of the most read pieces on Slate of the year. And after the piece ran, a few weeks later, after Bush did his final set of pardons, I got a call from somebody I didn't know who told me that the piece was amusing but that the real story wasn't who President Bush was going to pardon but who he had not.

And the caller said, having been in a position to observe pardon applicants, that they believed that of the 189 people the President had pardoned, only four or five were minorities, which, when I heard that, my first reaction was wow, how could that be? And then almost immediately it kind of led to ah-ha. What if very few minorities had applied? What if the minorities that applied were poor candidates? What if they had lousy applications? What if they were violent offenders or repeat offenders?

So this basically led us to kind of one conclusion, which was that we had to determine who had applied for a presidential pardon, who had been denied, and then compare them to people who received presidential pardons. And for me, I had covered national security for a long time, I was somebody who was very interested in executive power and presidential power. The pardon power is the only constitutionally unfettered power the President has and as we were examining this story, we were realizing that this one important power was basically no longer in the President's hands, that there was a gatekeeper office in the Justice Department that was determining basically who was going to receive forgiveness, which is what a pardon is about.

So then we set off to find out who these people were, who had submitted applications and why had they been denied, and this ended up being an enormously complex effort. The Justice Department, they were in the middle of a lawsuit at the time, when we first embarked on this project. The suit was a FOIA suit that the Justice Department was fighting in order to not release the identities of people who had been denied. A year, nine months into our reporting the Justice Department lost the case on appeal, which was very good luck for us, and we received the names of all the people who were denied pardons.

But those names could have been Alex Jones and that's it, so we had to go and then find the right Alex Jones.

(Laughter)

MS. LINZER: We had to find the right one and then learn everything we could about them that goes into making a determination. So for many of these cases people would commit a crime, a federal crime, 30 or 40 years ago and it was very hard to find records about them. What had they been convicted of? What was the offense? Had they ever committed another crime? What else did they have on their records? Just what kind of people were they? And we had to do this for hundreds of people, basically anyone who had never served time in prison, who was not in the Bureau of Prisons database.

And, in addition to all the stuff in the public records, many of it was not in public records, especially some of the things we cared most about, such as race. And so we had an entire summer's worth of journalism graduates, who were interns, calling felons around the country asking them what their race was in order to try and figure out who these people were. So once we were able to do that, and this is for 500 people, which was one-quarter of the applicant pool, so it was a very, very large sample.

Once we were able to do that, we were then able to sort of compare them with people who had won pardons and that's kind of when the magic started happening with great, rich characters. For people who haven't looked at the series yet, two women who were identical, from Little Rock, Arkansas, both who had tax crimes, one woman who had embarked on a massive tax fraud scheme with her husband to defraud the IRS of tens of thousands of dollars using fictitious names, another woman who was accused of under-reporting her income ended up kind of cutting a plea agreement and paid a $3,000 fine.

That woman, who was African American, was denied a pardon. The woman who was part of this gigantic tax fraud scheme was pardoned. And we saw a lot of that, very, very similar cases where one person was denied and the other person wasn't. So that's

how it started. But the data part, so that was a monumental challenge. And I would also say the thing Anna talked about, getting people to go on camera talking about things that are very painful, as somebody who was covering the CIA for a long time and trying to get people to talk on those issues, I actually found that getting people to talk on the pardons series was also very, very difficult because people were incredibly embarrassed, a; that they had ever had a blemish on their record and, b; in most cases the people around them did not know that and, c; that they had been denied a pardon.

And it was very, very hard to get them to kind of talk and share their stories, but it was essential that they did in order to be able to show to people we had many, many sets of these who were so similar.

MR. JONES: Jennifer, were there any particular challenges in the data sites?

(Laughter)

MR. JONES: That's the kind of laugh that suggests--

MS. LEFLEUR: Well, when you start with no data, that's always a big challenge and having lived in Texas, which none of that surprises me at all. I had done a project there on prosecutors striking blacks from juries, so I had spent a lot of time learning the exact methodology I needed to use for this same project with a lot of experts around the country who do this kind of thing. And so we, because we knew it was almost 1,800 people that were denied we would never be able to background that many people, we pulled a valid random sample of 500 from everyone denied, which indeed is still a very large sample.

And we had to go find them all and find their crimes and their race and call them and see if they were married, see if they had bankruptcies. We needed to get every single piece of information that someone could say, oh, it's not their race, it's because blah, blah, blah. So my goal, when I start this kind of research, is to basically prove that what we think is going on is wrong and to get every piece of data I can to prove that wrong. And so when you do this kind of analysis, you plug that all into your statistics program and

say we'll put all the crimes in, we'll put their age in, we'll put all this other stuff in and try to make the effect of black go away and it just didn't. So we were left with being able to say that.

MR. JONES: Very interesting. The Bloomberg challenge it would seem to me was not exactly a database challenge but you had 29,000 pages of documents to deal with. What was your problem?

MR. IVRY: Well, part of the problem was that after three years of trying to get this information out of the Fed, we started off with a Freedom of Information Act request in May of `08. We ended up suing them to get the information, went all the way to the Supreme Court and in March, 2011, the Supreme Court -- well the Supreme Court, through not acting on our lawsuit, not overturning lower courts' decisions, forced them to release the data. So they released it in PDF form, so it was 29,000 pages in PDF's.

So it wasn't me that said this, it was one of my sources who said that the Fed was just giving us the giant middle finger by doing it that way.

(Laughter)

MR. IVRY: I wasn't really involved personally in the data, in making all that into Excel spreadsheets because I would still be working on that, and we would probably be here next year instead of this year, hopefully. But we were finally -- it took almost literally eight months, seven months, to get all the data in shape where we could release it to the public. And we were talking a little bit, I think Alan was addressing this yesterday about what has technology enabled journalists to do and I think one of the great things about technology is that we could put 29,000 pages of -- we could organize it and put it on the internet.

And then anybody who wants to do the research about what bank took how much money from the Fed at what time, anything that they want to do, particular lending programs, can do it now. So you have researchers, academics, people with axes to grind, plaintiffs' attorneys, things like that, can now have the access to the data.

MR. JONES: One of the things that occurs to me about what you all were faced with is that how did this fit into the idea of open journalism? I mean Bloomberg has lots of resources, it may be just about the only news organization in the world that really has seemingly unlimited, but there is a certain irony that Mike Bloomberg is involved with you and also involved with the Associated Press piece of the Goldsmith Awards this year. Would this have lent itself to that kind of open analysis, inviting people to do their own analysis and help you with it? I mean you've seen, I'm sure, reports of news organizations that have done things like that.

MR. KEOUN: Well, I mean part of this was a belief by our editor in chief that if the primary goal of this project was to bring transparency to the Federal Reserve, that we ourselves should be transparent about everything that we were doing. And so I mean from the very beginning, I mean we cover all of these financial markets events and company news. I mean what we are trying to give our customers is something that they can trade on, frankly, and there is a desire at Bloomberg News to be more influential.

And so I think Matt Winkler realized that this was something that we could do that would be more of a public service. And so fighting the lawsuit, which was very much approved by Mike Bloomberg personally, he was aware of this lawsuit and was fully supportive of that the entire way, even though it cost us a lot of money to sue the Federal Reserve. And, remember, it wasn't just the Federal Reserve we were suing, it was also the banks.

Ultimately, when we won at the appeals court level, the Solicitor General of the United States decided not to take it to the Supreme Court, and then it was the Association of Banks that appealed to the Supreme Court. So we were fighting J.P. Morgan, CitiGroup, Goldman Sachs, I mean companies with deep pockets and, again, Matt Winkler and Mike Bloomberg were behind that all the way.

MR. JONES: Do you think that Mike Bloomberg got phone calls from Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and so forth? I mean he is the Mayor of New York, as well as the

head or the owner of Bloomberg News--

MR. KEOUN: He's been gone a long time and I don't think people -- I'm sure they probably do, but it doesn't happen as much. I think probably more likely is people call our chairman, Peter Grauer, who is very much like a man of Wall Street, a product of Wall Street and knows all these people. I mean one of the reasons that Bloomberg News has survived is because Matt Winkler has very much, over time, established that if we don't cover our customers aggressively, then nobody is going to believe our news.

MR. JONES: We are supposed to go to 10:30, but it's 10:30 now and I don't want to -- I want to give the people in the room the opportunity to engage in this conversation, so I'm going to extend this a little bit longer. Some of you may have travel plans that interrupt, but I do want to go on just a bit longer and I would now like to open the floor to those of you who are here in the room with questions of our columnists, our panelists. I would only ask that the question be short and the response be short. Chris?

FROM THE FLOOR: Just following up on the point about residents. With the AP story, the question about how the other newspapers reacted and how it was picked up, similar to the discussion last night about *The Guardian* being ignored by the other media. So I heard someone talking about that last night, could you talk about that?

MR. APUZZO: Sure. So we were sitting here, we were sitting at the awards thing last night and we hear Alex go through all of the heads rolling and so people are getting fired before the story is even out, people get better water, and the response basically from New York City was yeah, we spy on Muslims, you're welcome.

(Laughter)

MR. APUZZO: I mean right? That's fair? And so there's not a lot of built in, sort of not baked into the cake in New York City. Two-thirds of the city completely backs the NYPD and so we -- it's not a party line. I mean we really did just go into this saying let's just tell what's going on and let people decide and at least as far as the local media in New York City, I mean their editorial pages did decide pretty vocally that we were on a

journalistic jihad in the name of "civil rights", literally in quotes.

MR. JONES: Who was that?

MR. APUZZO: I can't remember if that was *The Post* or *The Daily News* but, yeah, look, that comes with the territory. I mean you can't say you want to have a debate and then say well but, yeah, but I don't like you calling me names. I mean if you want to have a debate, you want to have a discussion, you've got to be willing to say yeah, okay, two-thirds of New Yorkers are totally fine with this and that's fine.

MR. JONES: Yes, over here?

FROM THE FLOOR: I'm on a Nye Fellow for science and journalism from China and in China I am doing investigative style journalism, but my question is for water and the other of my colleagues. The situation now, the investigative journalism situation now in Thailand is there are several very popular investigative journalisms, very, very popular, but I found and some of my colleagues found they are scientifically wrong. But the logic behind these very popular investigative journalists in China is because they are assigned, sponsored by Garmin, so their conclusion can not be right because there's a widespread dissatisfaction, again, for Garmin, in China.

So I just want to ask you, any of you, how as a journalist in this situation, how we can do these things to make sure, on one hand, to make sure it's scientifically sufficient, solid? On the other hand, we must ensure that the news is very popular and find the sum part of the Garmin power abuse.

MR. JONES: Let me ask the Houston team to address this because your report required a scientific basis.

MR. GREENBLATT: I would say that what we did on anything science related or anything potentially controversial, it's a good thing to do to get a wide ranging number of opinions on what's going on and education and in this case what we did to learn was we sought out specialists who -- scientists who weren't just one expert in water quality. We found a toxicologist who really studied poisons as it related to community --

epidemiology. We found radiation experts, we found hygienists. We found people from wide ranges who would come and look at the exact same issue but look at it differently.

And you know that you are onto something when you start hearing commonalities from multiple experts who continue to start saying the same thing. So the first step is to get a good education and not depend on one source. I think we must have probably -- I mean I can't even tell you how many people we really talked to. On camera we used probably five to six scientists, on camera. Behind, that you never saw, there was a ton of people that helped educate us and inform us.

But, in telling the story, especially in a place, if there is doubt, if people are going to say is what you are reporting really true or not and if it's a heavy science-based story, the challenge is that your audience is, for the most part, not, for the most part, going to have a PHD in science, so you have to find a way to bring it home to a very average person. We got lucky in that we found radioactive water pipes pegging Geiger counters and I think that what that did for us was I think any general common sense Joe would say that's not a good thing.

And so if there's a question of science or a political debate about is something there, I think that brought it home, and so I would just say try to find, in whatever you are looking, I guess, a; a diversity of opinion in educating you as a reporter and then, b; in the actual story telling, to try your very hardest to find something visual that can -- and if not visual, just something that will be understandable, and that would be what I would encourage you to do.

MR. JONES: Yes?

FROM THE FLOOR: To the ProPublica folks, I'm curious, when you were calling people to gather your data, how did you start that conversation and what was the point where they were willing to continue that conversation with you?

MS. LINZER: Yeah, it was tricky, and also we had to contact a lot of people who did get pardons and who were a little bit uncomfortable about it as well. We basically

explained the project, and this project was a bit of a leap of faith. I mean the original tipster could have been wrong. I mean we could have spent a year building our database and there could have been no race disparity at all. It really was a giant leap of faith, so we basically explained what we were doing.

We said that we were doing the first statistical analysis on presidential pardons, trying to examine who got them and why and who didn't, and we were looking at basic information. And with each person we called, there was some amount of information on individuals that we needed. So, for example, if somebody had been in the Bureau of Prisons database, we knew a little bit more about them. Sometimes we only were missing their race, sometimes we were trying to determine marital status.

It turns out the people in the pardon office really care about marital status. If you are married, they consider you to be a stable person. If you are unmarried, that's a strike against you, so those were all factors that were important for us. Sometimes we used public records to determine, as Jen was saying, whether they had bankruptcies or liens because also the pardons office cared about financial stability. There were people who were seeking pardons in order to improve their livelihood, in order to get better jobs, and if they -- and then the pardons office would deny them because they were financially unstable or unemployed.

MR. JONES: Yes?

FROM THE FLOOR: I'm Charlie Sennott, I'm the Cofounder and Executive Editor of Global Post and we have done a fair bit of partnering with “PBS News Hour,” with “Frontline.” And I would say we would say it was a success, but I wanted to just drill down a little bit, particularly with Howard, Jim and Alan about partnering, just to sort of get a little bit more granular, a little bit more detail about how did the partnership work from a reporter's perspective. You said that it was a great success, you were able to build more of a team.

What were some of the challenges? Is this going to be the future of investigative

reporting in this time of limited resources, that we need to partner? And, Alan, some point of view from an editor presiding over partnerships.

MR. JONES: It's a great question, but I would just ask that you try to make your response short.

MR. BERKES: Susanne, do you want to tackle -- no? All right.

(Laughter)

MR. BERKES: Susanne is the investigations editor at NPR. At the moment it seems like the way we are going, partnering, we do partnering a lot with ProPublica and CPI and others. I've been working for the last couple of months with a trade publication and the mine safety world on a project and it just, as I said before, it just informs the reporting so much to reach out beyond your own sort of kind of limited experience and scope that to me it's a no brainer.

As tough as it might be, as challenging as it might be, as counterintuitive as it might be, I think our reporting is much better because we've worked with smart people and we have had editors beyond our usual realm challenging our reporting and challenging us to write differently, or whatever it is. I think we are crazy, as journalists, especially in this realm when many of our news organizations might be shrinking, it's crazy not to be working together instead of working at odds or in competition sometimes. We still need competition but, yeah.

MR. JONES: Alan?

MR. RUSBRIDGER: Well, the best example of partnership, I mean obviously phone hacking was great on WikiLeaks, where we ended up working with *The New York Times*, the *Spiegel*, *LeMond*, the *El Pais* and WikiLeaks itself, and I think it brought two things. One was the point I mentioned last night, which was bringing the First Amendment into play, that was a significant thing. And the other thing was there were just different skills.

The New York Times has got great data people working with 300 million cables, or

whatever it was. Having people who are very experienced at dealing with big databases was very useful, and also *The New York Times* knows about various regions of the world, we know about others, the Germans and the Spanish knew about others. And in a world in which we could communicate daily about the stories that we were finding and share them all, we were able to do five times the amount of work than any of us could have done alone.

MR. JONES: Maria, one last question.

FROM THE FLOOR: I have a brief comment and a question. The comment is that precisely the Center of Pubic Integrity with the Nieman Foundation, the Harvard Nieman Foundation, and more than ten years ago the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists that works from Washington, the Washington based Center for Public Integrity. And there are partnerships around the world, news organizations and journalist freelancers too. But there is a network of journalists all over the world doing investigative journalism just now with the leadership of the Center for Public Integrity.

And my question is regarding Texas, I was wondering if there was, from the health angle, a contrast between the differential of the percentage of cases of cancer in that region with the average population of the United States.

MR. GREENBLATT: The answer is yes, but it's something that -- the cancer rate actually was higher in Central Texas where this was happening, so that is true. We actually stayed away from reporting on this because statistically we could have simply reported it as true, the numbers said that. But we also know that there were some compounding factors that meant that if you, in Texas especially, if in the small towns, for instance, if you came down with cancer, the vast majority of cancer mortality data is basically just that, it's coming down with -- if you die of cancer.

So the best data that was available was tracking where people died and not necessarily where they lived when they were exposed. And so we were in the course, and this goes back to talking about how important it is to get good kind of teachers along the

way to guide you, we were strongly advised to stay away from reporting on the increased cancer rate because epidemiologists who study this say that there needs to be all kinds of extremely detailed studies before you can actually say that that's a correlation, so, as a news organization, we simply chose to sidestep that issue.

MR. JONES: The last part of this Goldsmith Awards ceremony is presenting the finalists with a plaque that we try to make look at much like a Harvard degree as we possibly can, so you can put it on your wall and perhaps fool some people. But, seriously, we are going to present you those plaques now and I would ask that the group just hold your applause until we can applaud them all.

(Whereupon, plaques were handed out.)

MR. JONES: This is a moment of pride and pleasure for the Shorenstein Center certainly to recognize this high quality of journalism and to reassure ourselves that people like these are still on the job. So I want to thank you and I invite those of us, all of us here to recognize these folks and their good work one more time. Thank you.

(Applause)

MR. JONES: And thank you all for joining us.

C E R T I F I C A T E

This is to certify that the preceding transcript is an accurate record based on the recordings of the proceedings taken before: Alex S. Jones

In the Matter of:

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Place:Cambridge, Massachusetts

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