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**ARE AMERICA AND “OLD EUROPE” RECONCILED
AFTER THE WAR IN IRAQ, AND DOES IT MATTER?**

An Examination of US and European Reporting of the Outcome of
the Presidential Election.

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Are America and “Old Europe” reconciled after the war in Iraq, and does it matter? An examination of US and European reporting of the outcome of the Presidential Election.

By Shorenstein Fellow, Jacqueline Jones.

Has the most important election in living memory left the transatlantic alliance stronger or shattered? As the votes were cast a European spectator could only hope that the outright winner would be America. The victor will need all his courage and resolution to defend the free world against the political and economic ruin threatened by international terrorism.

The spreading Muslim phobia to America has fuelled the evil of Osama bin Laden and presented the President with an international in-tray dominated by the tragedy of Iraq, the growing nuclear menace in Iran and North Korea, the Middle East, and the emergence of China as a looming economic superpower.

As America’s popularity in the world waned President Bush invested in massive military spending. Did this fall from international grace matter to the US electorate? In late Summer a Pew poll showed 67 percent of Americans said that the US had become less respected in the world, and 43 percent thought this was a problem.¹ Polls like this supported the Democrats decision to campaign on the importance of building alliances in the world. The row over the war in Iraq had left

relationships with many of America's traditional allies in tatters. The Republicans retaliated with Senator Mitch McConnell's vicious charge that, "Kerry wants to outsource our foreign policy to Paris and Berlin."

A QUARREL AMONG FRIENDS

The new century had a brutal baptism on 9/11. America and Europe faced a new crisis. The knee jerk reaction of all of Europe was to stand shoulder to shoulder with America in its plight. Le Monde on September 13th 2001 carried the headline "Nous sommes tous Americains" (We are all Americans).²

The western alliance, drawn together so tightly by the shock of 9/11 and the history of the Second World War and the Cold War that followed, united to back President Bush's attack on Afghanistan and its Taliban leaders. The successful elections in Afghanistan in October 2004 could perhaps be used as a pointer to the value of that joint action, which still has German troops patrolling on the streets of Kabul.

But once President George W Bush decided to wage war on Iraq, France and Germany decided that sympathy dividend was spent. A rift began to open that had been festering since the end of the Cold War. The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 had changed the relationship between Europe and America. The presence of a common enemy had glued the continents together through NATO. Europe, led by France and Germany, had a new self image and sense of community. Jacques Chirac will never accept George W Bush's unipolar view of the world. President Chirac aspires to lead a "Gaullist" Europe.

This was captured by Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro in their book *Allies at War*: France and Germany “were not prepared to allow decisions about global war and peace to be decided unilaterally in Washington, especially when presented by the Bush administration as part of a doctrine of military pre-emption that could set precedents for other regions and states. Europe’s internal divisions over Iraq, in this sense, had much more to do with different countries’ attitudes towards the United States than the different views of what to do about Iraq.”³

To be fair the French President, Jacques Chirac, also believed that the strategy of all out war on Iraq was flawed. In an interview with Time magazine in early 2003 he said that it ran the risk of creating “a large number of little bin Ladens.”⁴ In America there was an overwhelming sense of ingratitude by the French. The US had saved them in two world wars. Just weeks before the 2004 US election I spoke to a German born woman in her sixties who was attending a rally for George W Bush in Marlton, New Jersey. She spoke of her shame during the early months of 2003. And she spoke for many when she said it was as if France and Germany had forgotten their debt of gratitude to America for rescuing them from Hitler.

For Germany the choice was more pragmatic. Chancellor Schroeder was trailing the polls with an election looming. Once again Gordon and Shapiro claim insight into why Bush would feel betrayed by Schroeder and shun all early attempts for reconciliation.

“Schroeder had told Bush after a long and friendly dinner in January 2002 that he “understood” that Bush may have to go to war in Iraq, and he advised Bush only to do so quickly and decisively..... US officials say, Schroeder pledged not to run his election campaign against a possible U.S. war in Iraq. When Schroeder ended up doing so, Bush – who aides say “believes the character of a person is known by whether he keeps his word” – felt betrayed.”⁵

A more urbane politician would have accepted that Schroeder was fighting for his political life in a country fundamentally opposed to war with Iraq. In September 2002 Schroeder’s Social Democrat-led coalition with the Green Party won a narrow victory, 306 seats over 295.

Despite Britain’s despair at a potentially divided West Tony Blair backed Bush. Blair had seen this potential struggle within the western allies from an embryonic stage. He had talked at length about Britain being a “bridge between the two continents.” While never accepting the link between Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussain he did, however, seem convinced by the “evidence” of Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction.

In Britain a million people marched to protest against the coming conflict, and Europe was conspicuously riven with angry dissent over President Bush's plans. Once Donald Rumsfeld branded France and Germany as "Old Europe"⁶ he'd opened up a new front line, this time a war of words.

On the ground and faced with the scale of the coalition forces the outcome of the war in Iraq seemed a foregone conclusion, in comparison to the diplomatic mud slinging that was going on across the floor of the UN, which showed no sign of abating. The media was fuelling the row day after day and used aggressively by both sides. The French foreign minister, Dominique de Villepin, became quite a foreign policy “superstar”. During this time, Timothy Garton Ash in his book *Free World*, says de Villepin was constantly referred to behind closed doors in Number 10 Downing Street as “the vile pin.”⁷ In *Le Monde* de Villepin maintained that he had the law on his side, saying “an action having the aim of changing the regime would conflict with the rules of international law.”⁸

French anxiety was treated with contempt by the likes of Robert Kagan.⁹ He argued in *The Washington Post* that, “when negotiations and inspections stop and the fighting begins, the American global superpower goes back to being a global superpower, and France goes back to being France.”¹⁰

The image of the United States having to go cap in hand to the United Nations Security Council did not go well with the American press. Their influence appeared to generate a racist stance being taken to French and German culture in the USA. Who can forget the US stories of boycotting French fries and quenching the thirst of New York drains with the finest Bordeaux? If journalism can play its part in setting old allies at each other's throats, what part can it play in repairing that damage?

But when groups form and exclude others - in this case France and Germany refused to join - public policy on both sides tends to emphasise what naturally divides rather than what unites. Fifty years of developing common values and value systems can be lost so very quickly unless there's a swift change of emphasis.

And that division can grow quickly. One of the world's biggest PR firms, Edelman, has done a global survey of opinion leaders for the World Economic Forum. It makes grim reading; it suggests US companies are the least trusted in Europe (38%), and French companies are the least trusted in the US (34%). Opinion leaders are also significantly less likely to trust individual US-based global corporations operating in Europe.¹¹

It goes on; the Bush Administration is trusted by only 12% of opinion leaders in Germany and 13% in France, and 21% in the UK. 66% of Germans are less likely to purchase US products because of the Bush Administration. In France 64% are less likely to buy American goods. Healthy trade between Europe and America is useful for all concerned. In the next thirty years we will see China emerge as the new economic giant. Surely it would be in all our interests economically if we resisted the views of Charles A Kupchan¹² who foresees Europe and America becoming separate, rival zones of interest.¹³

What is absolutely clear is that the new US administration will have to deal with new fronts in the war on terror. It has to be desirable that there's an

understanding within Europe and the United States that we share many ambitions and needs.

EUROPE'S EXPECTATIONS

In the weeks before the US election the French and German Press published polls that illustrated once more how desperately low the Bush administration's standing had fallen in France and Germany.¹⁴

In Paris an opinion poll was carried out by the Louis-Harris Institute. 71 percent said they wanted Kerry to win against 11 percent for Bush. The rest were undecided. 82 percent regarded Bush as "having made the world more dangerous irrespective that it was Al Qaida behind the attacks of 9/11 and numerous attacks since." 66 percent believed Kerry's election would mean major policy changes from the US. 67 percent believed a Kerry victory would be a good thing for Americans from their perspective. According to Francois Miquet-Marty, the Director of Political Studies at the Louise-Harris Institute, if the French were seduced by Kerry it was because George Bush had made them afraid. That fear was of the Iraqi theatre of war spilling over into a much wider conflict between the West and the entire Muslim world.¹⁵

In Germany the media carried a poll showing 74 percent wanted a Kerry victory. Only 10 percent would have voted for Bush.¹⁶


But it was Le Monde on November 1st that grasped the nettle in an editorial. “For the sake of world progress John Kerry’s victory would be preferable so that Europe and the USA may have a chance to start afresh together.”¹⁷

In stump speeches all across America John Kerry would remind the rally that on November 2nd they were not only voting for the US President, but they were voting for “the leader of the free world.” He would remind the crowd that George Bush had “burnt the bridges so badly” with Europe that he couldn’t bring more countries to the table to negotiate about helping with Iraq. Kerry on the other hand promised to reach out with personal diplomacy to those countries on the sidelines. During the presidential debates he spoke of a summit where he would ask other countries to join the coalition in Iraq. There would be a political risk in such a high profile event as no President should ever embark on such a strategy without a guaranteed deal.

REPORTING THE RESULT

There was a huge appetite in European newspapers for stories on the US election. The significance of the result for transatlantic relations and the closeness of the race fascinated the readers. In the days and hours before November 2nd some editors across Europe, painfully aware that their dreams of a Kerry presidency were still possible, were loading their front pages with almost as many column inches of US election news as their American counterparts. Between Nov 1st and Nov 4th the Washington Post and The New York Times devoted an average of 70 per cent of their front pages to election news.

US Election % of Front Page Coverage Nov. 1st - Nov. 4th



The Guardian in Britain during the same period averaged 73 per cent of the front page. The Times, slightly out of step and tensely hedging its bets for a Bush win, lagged behind on 53 per cent. Le Figaro and Le Monde carried 65 and 61 per cent respectively. The newspapers in Germany were marginally less enthusiastic

with Die Welt averaging 51 per cent and the Frankfurter Allgemeine only carrying US election reports on 22 per cent of its front page, but then printing copious amounts of comment and editorials on the inside pages.

Europe was engaged in this election and its support for Kerry was virtually unanimous. But international support for Kerry did not apparently influence the voters back home. On the contrary, the Democrats began to play it down during the final weeks of the campaign.

The director of the Institute of International and Strategic Relations, Pascale Boniface, wrote an unrestrained commentary in Le Figaro¹⁸ stressing the importance of the US election for Europe. “Never in the history of mankind has a domestic political event prompted, beyond the borders of the country concerned, as much comment and such high feelings as the 2004 US elections. In all countries the media have accorded this election a place almost equivalent to that which they would have reserved for the process of choosing their own heads of state or government. Of course, ever since the end of World War II US elections have occupied an important place on the international plain, but this year an unprecedented level has been reached.”... “If any proof were needed of US pre-eminence on the international scene, of the unique nature of US power in the world, and the world’s perception of this power, this extraordinary focus on a national election would be enough to provide it.”

It would be fair to say that the coverage in some papers, such as The Guardian (Appendix A), reflected the papers hope that Kerry could win. On the morning of Nov 3rd when the rest of Europe, faced by an early deadline, had to opt for neutral headlines, The Guardian had optimistically clung to the leaked, and fatally flawed, first exit poll returns. This prompted the headline “Close Race Rouses America : Kerry camp encouraged by early returns in key states.” The huge half page picture of Kerry that accompanied it didn’t help matters, when later that same day Kerry conceded defeat.

The Guardian coverage wasn’t biased, but like most of Europe, it had accentuated the positives in the Kerry candidacy, its editorials expressing the belief that a change of president and a fresh start would be good for Europe and for Tony Blair who says he is committed to Britain being at the centre of Europe. On Nov 4th The Guardian devoted its whole front page to the Bush win, under the headline, “And now: Four More Years.” Le Monde on the same day, in what can only be described as an act of denial, still carried a headline on its earlier editions which read, “Bush in the lead. But not yet re elected.”

The most dramatic front page of any newspaper in Europe or the US came from a Labour supporting British tabloid, The Daily Mirror. Over a full page picture of a waving George Bush edged with stars and stripes the headlines asks, “How can 59,054,087 people be so DUMB?” The sub head at the foot of the picture says, “US election disaster: pages 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 & 11.” The boldness of the image and willingness to insult more than half the American electorate is striking as well as being an example of “shock jock” journalism. The paper is a fierce critic of

Britain's involvement in the war in Iraq and of the international legitimacy of the invasion. This headline was its revenge on President Bush, and it has been reproduced, courtesy of the internet, throughout the world. Some believe it is this type of vicious European journalism that prompted Mr Blair in mid November to speak in defence of President Bush's reputation in the press.

Throughout the whole campaign there appeared to be a disconnect between the closeness of the US election on the ground and the wishful thinking of the European press, who day after day speculated about a Kerry win. After the election this was recognised by Thomas Kielinger in Die Welt. "Once again, the result of the presidential election serves to crush illusions, not unlike 24 years ago, when Europe dreamed of Ronald Reagan's defeat while the Americans coolly prepared to vote Jimmy Carter out of office because of his obliviousness to power politics."

The European press failed to understand how America can re elect a president who has such a controversial foreign policy. But unlike Europe the US knows how to stand alone while other countries club together for shelter under treaties and international organisations like the UN. When America was attacked on 9/11 it valued European sympathy and support, but it also realised that it couldn't turn to a stronger nation to protect it. As the world's only superpower it would have to defend itself. In a country where most people don't concern themselves with the finer points of foreign affairs this one fact, self reliance in the face of an enemy, reigns supreme. George Bush never wavered on that message. Time after time he told the American people that he had the "will" to fight for America. The US

electorate obviously heard him, but the European press either had a case of selective hearing loss or failed to grasp the significance of the message. America, of course, as a relatively young immigrant nation, prizes above all else its independence and its self reliance. Europe would do well to remember that when its politicians embark on future negotiations and tailor their expectations accordingly.

Europe's disdain for Bush was more than noticed by the American press. The New York Times highlighted it in their editorial on November 4th. "Tuesday's vote came as a particular shock in places like Europe, where much of the population couldn't conceive that people would want to keep Mr Bush in power."¹⁹ On the same day the Washington Post mentioned it as well, saying that Mr Bush, "faces not only a divided country but a world in which many leaders, and much of the populations of other democracies, were rooting for his defeat."²⁰ They went on to say that, "a new term offers an opportunity for him to show allies that he is willing to take their views into account..... Deference does not equal subservience; a tone of respect for world opinion could help Mr Bush further his ambitious goals." And back in Britain The Guardian's message to the White House was as straightforward as ever; "America and the world need a handshake right now, not a clenched fist of defiance."²¹ In Germany the "shock" the New York Times had talked about fomented into anger. The front cover of Spiegel magazine carried a picture of the Statue of Liberty blindfolded and the headline, "Eyes Wide Shut." The article pulled no punches; "He's a president who likes to show who's in charge, who is trusted by naïve Americans and despised by intellectuals, a

President for half of America and against large parts of the world; derided and yet feared almost everywhere.”²²

Days after the Bush win, Europe, in its disappointment, looked for somebody to blame. The newspapers in France and Germany seized upon an exit poll finding that “moral values”²³ had been the single most important issue in the election. The myth that the election had been high-jacked by a group of fundamental Christians, mobilised by George Bush’s campaign architect Karl Rove, played well in an increasingly secular Europe. Up until this point the press had been hostile to President Bush. This searching for unflattering stereotypes among American voters extended that hostility and tainted their coverage.

A commentary in the Frankfurter Allgemeine by “Nm”²⁴ exploits this view. It says that if the voters who brought Bush his second victory were motivated by moral values, “the rift between the United States and Europe has become even deeper. Here many people consider the Bush voters as bigoted crusaders, while the Bush voters see the Europeans as godless cowards.”

To be fair to the European coverage in the immediate aftermath of the election much was made of the “moral values” issue in the US press as well. Democrats looked at the data as evidence that they desperately need to do a better job in “connecting” with traditionalists. Conservative groups claimed the survey proved that regular Americans agreed with their agenda. But what was not reported widely in Europe was the way US press and leading pollsters challenged this alleged rise of the “moral” voter.

The respected president of the Pew Research Center, Andrew Kohut, called the conclusions drawn from the “moral values” question misleading because “it was an ambiguous, appealing and catchall phrase.”²⁵ In a New York Times story on November 6th Gary Langer, director of polling for ABC News, one of the sponsors of the poll, said, “a major flaw in the question is that “moral values” is not the same sort of specific issue that taxes or Iraq are. Health care is an issue, terrorism is an issue, moral values is much more of a personal characteristic.”²⁶

The myth of the “moral values” voter was allowed to take root in Europe, as was the idea that the pro Bush evangelicals had swamped the polling stations.

Another Pew poll showed that the percentage of regular church goers who voted on November 2nd 2004 was no greater than the percentage of regular church goers who had voted in the 2000 US election.²⁷ It is as if the press in France, Germany and Britain had expected more from the American electorate. The press had expected the American people to reject a war time leader who they fundamentally approved of and understood. When the US voter failed to fall in line with the European editorial view of the world, the British press called them “dumb”, and the press in France and Germany described them as “fanatical”. Europe’s expectations of the US election and some of the reporting of the result were at worst bordering on the naïve, at best inspired by a sense of natural justice. Their weakness was to allow their prejudice against George Bush to cloud their vision of his inspired and well organised campaign. Essentially they “misunderestimated” an incumbent president who has the political skills valued by the US electorate; leadership, conviction, and strength.

How the individual countries shaped up for the task ahead will be explored next. In his acceptance speech on November 3rd President Bush said he was going to continue his fight against terrorism, “with good allies at our side”.²⁸ He has put his foreign policy to the America people and they have endorsed it. His world view has been strengthened. Meeting this administration half way may not be enough, and each concession made to Europe will need to be argued on why it’s good for George Bush and why it’s good for the American people.

BRITAIN

The car carrying Condoleezza Rice made its way through the dark streets of DC, eventually entering the impressively regal gates of the British Ambassador’s residence. Ms Rice was dressed in casual clothes, en route to a restaurant dinner with relatives. But inside were assembled the great and the good of the Washington political elite. Even the President was wearing his tuxedo making a rare appearance in black tie Washington. But tonight he wasn’t the guest of honour.

Ms Rice, the National Security Advisor, was about to walk into one of America’s best kept secrets – a surprise 50th Birthday Party. The British Ambassador, Sir David Manning, a long time friend, had in a uniquely Foreign Office way thought of every detail. He and Condoleezza are both seriously intellectual and became close during the war in Iraq, when he was her opposite number in Downing Street. Ms Rice, still inappropriately dressed, was swept away to be transformed into the

“belle of the ball”, by slipping into a red gown that had been sneaked into the residence earlier that day by one of her family.

It is moments like this, which keep the US/UK relationship so “special”. A small neutered European power, blessed by a truly inspired diplomatic core. It was a genuine act of friendship. Even the Elysee must have applauded the fortuitous timing.

Within days the world would hail Ms Rice as America’s nominated 66th Secretary of State. Colin Powell’s departure had been seen in Europe and the American press as an outright victory for the hardliners in the Bush administration who, according to the New York Times, had “chafed at diplomacy in the face of what they saw as urgent threats to national security and a perhaps fleeting opportunity to promote democracy among Arab and Islamic nations.”²⁹

In London The Times described Mr Powell’s resignation as “another setback” for Mr Blair. In an editorial it said “his leaving ... it will be implied, will be celebrated by a neoconservative faction poised to sweep all before it.”³⁰ But it also acknowledges that Mr Powell, who was seen as the Bush administration’s figure “most trusted by Europe” had himself observed in an interview the week before his resignation that “Mr Bush’s aggressive foreign policy would continue.” He also stood by the President’s view that the world’s problems “had to be dealt with by the most powerful nation in the world.”

It was in the brief interregnum between the loss of Mr Powell and the coronation of Ms Rice that Tony Blair delivered his definitive post US election foreign policy speech.

The venue, the sumptuous gilded splendour of the Guildhall in London. The audience inside the hall were the bejewelled diplomatic glitterati. Outside he was pitching at both sides of the Atlantic, not to mention his own Labour backbenchers, worried about committing Britain to any more military action. The timing, the eve of the French president's visit.

The speech, based upon his favourite conceit of Britain as a transatlantic bridge, was delivered with passion. He spoke of Britain as having a unique role "in the relationship between America and the rest of Europe". "Call it a bridge, a two-lane motorway, a pivot or call it a damn high wire, which is how it often feels, our job is to keep our sights firmly on both sides of the Atlantic, use the good old characteristics of common sense and make the argument." He said, "what we share is, in the end, of oceanic depth compared to the shallow water of any present discord."

Tony Blair cited democracy as the point about which Europe and America coalesce. But he also warned the American Government against a go it alone approach to the war on terror, stating that military action was not always the right option. "I am not – repeat not – advocating a series of military solutions to achieve it. But I am saying that patiently but plainly Europe and America should be working together to bring democratic, human and political rights we take for

granted to the world denied them.” He scolded Europe for their arrogance. “It is not a sensitive or intelligent response for us in Europe to ridicule American arguments or parody their political leadership. What is entirely sensible is for Europe to say that terrorism won’t be beaten by toughness alone.”

He also chided President Bush, who he had met in Washington only three days earlier. “Multilateralism that works should be its aim. I have no sympathy with unilateralism for its own sake.”³¹

Tony Blair spoke of a “high wire”. Walking one requires courage and balance. Reaction to the speech questioned if Mr Blair had enough of either to follow through on his laudable aims. Peter Riddell, writing in the Times, said “European leaders have seen Mr Blair more as a spokesman for Washington than for them.”³² And he quoted Sir Stephen Wall, Tony Blair’s former European policy advisor, as saying that the bridge was “a bit one way, and we are better at receiving the messages perhaps than transmitting them.”

What was inescapable for the British Prime Minister must have been the sense of relief as he realised that Mr Bush had been re elected. Such confirmation by the American people of the commander in chief who had taken them to war in Iraq, despite the casualties and scorn poured upon the cited reasons for war, must lift the burden off both Mr Bush and Mr Blair. If George W Bush had lost, Tony Blair would have felt vulnerable. Spain and America, two leading members of the coalition , would have changed government. Mr Blair would have expected to be severely punished by the British electorate in Spring 2005. He may still see his

majority drastically cut, but barring a catastrophe in Iraq should win a general election for the Labour Party.

But it was the story that knocked Tony Blair's speech off the front pages that cast most doubt on his policy success. Jacques Chirac in Paris had said that "I am not sure with America as it is these days, it would be easy for someone, even Britain, to be an honest broker."³³ Not content with dealing such a blow to Mr Blair's veracity he also reminded Europe that despite Mr Blair's sacrifice in backing the war in Iraq, "he had won nothing in return from George Bush." President Chirac went on to say "I'm not sure it is in the nature of our American friends at the moment to return favours systematically."

FRANCE

On the first floor of the Elysee Palace, as the Paris night gathered outside the ornate windows, President Chirac greeted the British press. The 72 year old French leader was about to travel to Britain to mark the centenary of the "Entente Cordiale," a treaty that embodies the cross channel love hate relationship.

This was the setting which he chose to reiterate his mantra of an "historically inevitable, multipolar" world with Europe (led by France) bringing equilibrium to US power. "The evolution of the world towards a multipolar situation is inevitable. That is part of the evolution of human history." And he went on; "In consequence there will be a great American pole, a great European pole, a Chinese one, an Indian one, eventually a South American pole. The great poles have to live

together.”... “The second condition is that the two poles that are founded on the same values – that is America and Europe – get on together so that they can be an element of dissuasion towards poles which have another culture, other historical values. The transatlantic link is absolutely essential in this multipolar world.”

Charles Bremnar from The Times, who was there, reports that M Chirac was in a “relaxed and reflective”³⁴ mood. Pressed on his falling out with America over Iraq he said, “I do not feel at all angry towards the Americans. We have never shown the slightest bad mood to them.” But he made it clear that he was not going to reach out to President Bush as he entered his second term. And he ruled out sending French troops to Iraq.

Chirac is a master of the diplomatic put down. A man who enjoys his revenge served cold. In a reference to the US Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, he said “that nice guy – I’ve forgotten his name – who talked about Old Europe.”³⁵

The next Presidential election in France is not until 2007. M Chirac says he is undecided if he will run for a third term. There is a more US friendly alternative waiting in the wings, Nicolas Sarkozy.³⁶ But for the next three years M Chirac is centre of the European stage with no intention of using Tony Blair’s transatlantic bridge to patch up the quarrel over Iraq. Of course it hasn’t always been thus. When Jacques Chirac first met the newly elected president in December 2000, he made “an excellent impression” on the French leader. Anne Fulda, in Le Figaro recalls Jean-Pierre Raffarin, the French Prime Minister, observing the two

men together and announcing that they “are two Texans! The same direct style and same easy familiarity.”³⁷ So it wasn’t surprising that in May 2002, during a working dinner at the Elysee, M Chirac told the President in the bluntest of terms not to invade Iraq. “You are going to get stuck. You will not get out.” The US President did not heed the warning and the rest is history.

That book is closed. M Chirac has nothing to offer Mr Bush when it comes to Iraq, so he has moved on to other issues, such as the Middle East peace process. Perhaps in a multi issues world that area gives the US and France more room to manoeuvre.

48 hours after Bush was re elected Le Figaro reported, as if to steady nerves, that France despite its bellicose posture, has been careful not to close all channels of communication with the Bush administration.³⁸ “Chirac’s diplomatic advisor, Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, has been to Washington every month this year to meet his opposite number, Condoleezza Rice. Since Dominique de Villepin’s departure from the Quai d’Orsay (Foreign Ministry)... the opposition between France and the United States has grown calmer.” The article went on to highlight perceived successes such as closer working together to urge Syria to respect Lebanon’s sovereignty.

Such hedging of bets by the Chirac government may stem from the most structural fault in the president’s multipolar strategy. Europe is incapable of uniting to balance American military power, a point well made by Joseph Nye, in a Herald Tribune article written after the Presidential election. “To balance the

United States would require a doubling or tripling of military budgets in most European countries and that is just not in the cards. European societies are focused on the cost of their welfare states. The Euro-Gaullist vision of a rival superpower that will make NATO obsolete and balance American military power is an empty spectre.”³⁹

Leaving the talking to the diplomats may have another huge advantage. The personal chemistry between Bush and Blair is unmistakable. The relationship between the urbane leader of France and the frankly folksy George Bush is more complex. M Chirac’s respect for the elder President Bush for his statesmanlike orchestration of the end of the Cold War is well documented, as is his frequent references to George Herbert during meetings with his son. Are they designed to flatter or to frustrate?

GERMANY

On November 3rd Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder sent a telegram to George W Bush to congratulate him on his win. In it he wished the newly elected President “luck and success”⁴⁰ for the next four years. Contrast that with the actions of Tony Blair. Such is the intimacy and friendship between the British Prime Minister and Mr Bush, the former had called the White House at 3:30 am to congratulate the Republican leader on his victory. I suspect Mr Blair knew that if President Bush was still awake he would be eager to take the call from his British ally. Herr Schroeder’s relationship with the leader of the free world, as we have described

earlier, was mortally wounded by his decision to campaign against the war in Iraq to win his own election. The German Chancellor must have known that the chances of George Bush coming to the phone that Wednesday were slim to none existent. Surely this illustrates that the rift that has grown between Germany and the United States is not only driven by foreign policy failures on both sides but also inter personal failures by both leaders. Tackling this sense of betrayal that exists in the White House might stretch the diplomacy of the German Foreign Office, but ignoring the problem is not an option.

The ill will that exists between the leaders is spreading like a contagion into German society. Young and old are uniting under an anti American banner. Writing in *Der Tagesspiegel* during election week, Clemens Wergin, captured the poisonous atmosphere. "People in Europe do not even listen when Bush has good arguments. In the words of the New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman: "The Bush team has made itself so radioactive that it glows in the dark."⁴¹ This rot has to be stopped.

Within hours of John Kerry conceding defeat in Boston, the European Heads of State and Government Meeting was getting underway in Brussels. While other business filled the agenda it was a great opportunity for informal opinions to be compared on Mr Bush's re election and the consequences for the future of transatlantic relations. An editorial in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* summed up the reality of what everybody knew would always be a close election. "No politician in Europe will have been really surprised by the victory of the incumbent President, nor will anybody's judgment of him have changed overnight."⁴²

The conclusion for future relations between opponents of the war in Iraq and the US was equally bleak. “Chirac and Schroeder have benefited from the opposition to the United States both in elections and in domestic policy, a benefit that they can now keep. Thus nothing much will change in the transatlantic relationship – all in all.” The benefits for both leaders are real, but the option for no development in the transatlantic relationship to more neutral observers appears self defeating. Thomas Kielinger, writing in *Die Welt*, asked the reader to cast their mind back to the start of 2003. The crisis surrounding the now infamous second UN resolution was reaching its height. The British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, reminded Germany of the following formula; “The United Nations may indeed be paralysed, but the power in the United States remains.”⁴³ Was this one of the motivating forces that prompted Britain to back Bush? Recognition that an isolated US superpower would become an even greater handicap for Europe?

Matthias Rueb, the excellent Washington Correspondent of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* has spoken of Germany “lacking a sense of sovereignty.”⁴⁴ Hampered by the baggage of its twentieth century history, it has failed to make its mark as a force for good in the contemporary international order. Thomas Kielinger once again in *Die Welt* captures this thought of Germany frustrated in its desire to move onto the world stage. “The ignominious gap between illusion and reality is currently filled with incessant reviews of the US performance, whereby the mistakes that even a hyper power must inevitably make are seen as reason enough for our detachment from it. It is not the quest for partnership in

power politics that motivates the Europeans, but rather the anti American obsession.”⁴⁵

This type of negative obsession gets in the way of those optimistic diplomats and politicians who are eager to plan Germany’s long term future within Europe and globally. They may hope that Mr Bush marks his second term, like Presidents Reagan and Clinton before him, with a desire for more international harmony. Even Le Figaro in an editorial on November 4th recognised that it would be sensible for Germany to seek a rapprochement with the United States, “to preserve its chances of securing a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Europe is not, or no longer merely, France and Germany. Despite the fact that Spain has rallied round and Poland has become more hesitant, Paris and Berlin no longer dictate what happens.”⁴⁶ In a new, enlarged European Union there is a greater need for consultation. The United States should not be allowed to divide Europe. The EU will only be taken seriously if it is united and focused on its goals.

Although relations between Washington and Berlin may be at an all time low, the post election anxiety expressed in parts of the German press appears impatient for at the very least an honest re examination of their aspirations to play a significant role in world affairs. This review will always be inspired or perhaps tainted by their relationship with France. Since Kohl and Mitterrand in the 1980’s both countries had used their collective might to dominate European politics. Most adventures onto the world stage have seen the Franco German alliance acting in each others mutual self interest. Could Germany have backed Bush in Iraq once Chirac had set his face against the war? Probably not. Could they have

managed the situation with more diplomacy and skill? Definitely yes; sadly returning us to the lack of trust and respect between Gerhard Schroeder and President Bush, which will hamper all future negotiations between the two men.

Once again, Clemens Wergin tackles this head on in Der Tagesspiegel; “this is as much a psychological problem as a political one. That is why Bush and Old Europe will find it difficult to dare make a new beginning with each other. But the problem nations of this world will not wait politely for domestic bliss to return to the transatlantic cottage. On the contrary; Iran or North Korea will try to exploit the division of the West for themselves.”⁴⁷

The situation between Germany and the US must not be allowed to solidify. Both Schroeder and Chirac still have their own domestic issues to juggle, not to mention the growing Muslim electorate in Germany and France, but they must not become more obsessed with their grudge against the United States than they are with containing rogue states. Perhaps Condoleezza Rice will dissuade Donald Rumsfeld from doing any more damage to the US / Franco German axis. Or in the words of Clemens Wergin, “the partners want to hear arguments, not fear mongering; they want to be convinced, not overpowered.”⁴⁸

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

There's a familiarity to the choreography that calms everybody's nerves. George and Tony stride up the red carpet leading to the White House East Room. Tony steps to one side in a sort of salsa swerve to let the Commander in Chief take the lectern to the left, and the journalists settle down to feed off the press conference.

Yassar Arafat had been buried three hours earlier amid scenes of frenzy in Ramallah, so it wasn't surprising that both men focused on the Middle East peace process. President Bush led the way. "I believe we've got a great chance to establish a Palestinian state, and I intend to use the next four years to spend the capital of the United States on such a state." "A just and peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict based on two democratic states – Israel and Palestine."⁴⁹

This must have been music to Tony Blair's ears. As we heard earlier, President Chirac had recently ridiculed him for getting nothing in return for his unflinching support for the war in Iraq. Perhaps at last this was pay back time. It had been common knowledge that Blair had hoped that in return for his role in the coalition the Bush administration would have been more engaged in a two state settlement in the Middle East. Mike Allen and Glenn Kessler in the Washington Post put it best when they said that Mr Blair had been "prodding Bush to put more energy into Middle East overtures."⁵⁰ Prodding he may have been but "Mr

Bush did not actually endorse any of the specific measures that Blair proposed – including an international peace conference and the designation of a U.S. envoy to the Middle East – but said that he would do so if he believed they were practical.”

These set piece press conferences reveal little of the intimate relationships that form between leaders, unless hijacked by irreverence. This is, however, always a risk when you invite the British press. Tony Blair is not the British head of state, and as a jobbing politician has grown up with the occasional impudence from the media. President Bush must have known that Mr Blair has paid a high price amongst his party, the British electorate and Europe as a whole for backing the war in Iraq. What he didn't expect was for a young British journalist to ask about Blair's reputation among critics back home as the President's "poodle." A flash of rage crossed Mr Bush's face removed only by Mr Blair's laughter. There then followed an impassioned defence of his partner by Mr Bush. "When he says something, he means it. He's a big thinker. He's got a clear vision. And when times are tough, he doesn't wilt." There was a hint of a raised eyebrow by Mr Blair at the use of the word "wilt". Not a verb for a chap to conjure with, even in such exalted political circles.

But the inescapable warmth of this public comment captures the genuine bond between these two men. If we cast our minds back to days after 9/11, when Blair flew across the Atlantic to convey his condolences to the America people, the President said in his distinctively blunt but sincere way; "Thank you for coming friend."⁵¹ Was it Tony Blair or Colin Powell who persuaded the President to

pursue the UN route in early 2003? The intensity of the Bush/Blair friendship is acknowledged, but what is in doubt is the influence that Mr Blair exercises over the leader of the free world. Britain's so called special relationship, the Blair "bridge", all amounts to the sum of zero without influence. Perhaps Blair is content with a walk on part on the international stage, or perhaps not? As both leaders enter or approach their final terms in office the "hand of history," which Blair once talked about, starts to weigh heavily on their shoulders. It's mooted that the President does not appreciate being told the bad news that surrounds his administration. If Mr Blair is a true friend he should be in a position to dole out some home truths to Mr Bush. Whether George Bush would welcome such tough love is dubious at best. So who does influence the President?

Some influence must have been offered to George Bush prior to the November 13th press conference with Tony Blair that persuaded him to use it as a vehicle to reach out, not only to Britain, but also to Europe, Old and New. The Washington Post described the President as opening an "aggressive White House campaign to mend ties with Europe that were strained by the US – British decision to invade Iraq over the opposition of some long time allies."⁵² This took the form of an announcement that his first foreign trip after his inauguration in January would be to Europe. The purpose of the trip, Bush said, was to "remind people that the world is better off, America is better off, Europe is better off when we work together."

At a White House briefing later, an administration official said "in the post-re-election period, we wanted to very quickly send the message that we are looking

forward to intense work with the Europeans.” “Some of that theme got drowned out in our own election cycle.”⁵³ Well, you could say that again. The Republicans during the election campaign and especially their convention went out of their way to reject the mantra of building alliances with Europe. They even went one step further at times, attacking the Kerry camp for courting support from foreign leaders.

The whole tone of US foreign policy in a Bush second term will be set by his new Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice. There is an irony that her success will be partly judged on her ability to mend the frayed relationships with European allies that were in part damaged by her in the first instance. In the spring of 2003, according to the New York Times, Ms Rice was widely quoted as telling associates and doubtless the President, “punish France, ignore Germany, and forgive Russia.” On the day that the President announced Ms Rice as his choice to succeed Colin Powell, The New York Times quoted “friends” of Ms Rice as saying that she now believed it was “critical to reach out to” those European allies. “They say that while she has often said she has no patience for diplomacy, she is capable of great charm and will spend much time after her confirmation in Paris, Berlin and London.”⁵⁴

Samuel Berger, who was President Clinton’s National Security Advisor said, “I think she will be a good diplomat.” “She has got those skills. And we’ll have a Secretary of State who foreign leaders know will be speaking for the President.”⁵⁵

Her relationship with the President will be her ace up her sleeve. She is his friend and confidante and has been embraced by the entire Bush family. Ms Rice is a frequent visitor at Camp David and his ranch in Crawford, Texas, where they are reputed to enjoy long walks together discussing matters of government. As Mr Berger suggests, this intimacy and access to the President will be an invaluable asset to Ms Rice during negotiations with foreign leaders. Unlike her predecessor, they will know she has the ear of the President.

Much has been made of her clash with the strong willed hawk, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld. When she took over control of the occupation of Iraq Washington soon heard her aides complaining that Mr Rumsfeld had under resourced the occupation.

Her attention to detail and forward planning could also be an asset. Even before it was announced the New York Times was reporting that she had “directed two top staff members, Elliott Abrams and Daniel Fried, to meet with European envoys in Washington to strengthen their involvement in Israeli – Palestinian negotiations, to warn Europeans away from pressing their own ideas and to try to enlist their support for Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s proposal to withdraw from Gaza.”⁵⁶ Ms Rice is never slow to seize the initiative.

Her training as a concert pianist may hold the key to her disciplined approach to life and work. A year ago in an interview about her music she spoke of her “love” of Brahms. “Brahms is actually structured.”... “He’s passionate without being sentimental.”⁵⁷ Perhaps you could read into this that she will embrace her new

job with a passion, but there'll be no sentimentality when it comes to hammering out policy.

Although repairing some of the damage caused to US / European relations in the aftermath of the war in Iraq is appealing to the State Department, her job approval with the electorate will be judged more on how she manages European engagement in the negotiations with Iran. It could be time for France and Germany to prove what they can do for America rather than complain about what America has done to them.

CONCLUSIONS

The reporting of the US Presidential election in Europe underlines a fair degree of estrangement, cynicism and misunderstanding which runs right through French and German coverage. But it re-emphasises what we mutually cherish. Perhaps there will always be a degree of turmoil between America and Europe, yet our common values of peace and prosperity for all must unite us to work for a world free of terrorism.

Values are extremely difficult to quantify, but Timothy Garton Ash in his book *Free World*⁶⁸ draws upon a survey conducted over the past twenty years by Ronald Inglehart. Mr Inglehart draws a "cultural map" by consolidating the responses of more than 120,000 people in 81 countries. Mr Garton Ash points

out that on such a difficult area the methodology and choice of criteria can be disputed, but it does appear to show that the US, Britain, France and Germany are all roughly grouped together in the top right hand quadrant of the map. We unite under several categories, Catholic Europe, Protestant Europe, and English-speaking nations.

Although there are underlying values that bind us, it is also easy to think of the many social, cultural, religious, and employment issues which define our societies. Yet it is the underlying values that come into play when we face a common threat. Timothy Garton Ash calls for both sides to rethink their positions. "Our starting-point should be what John F. Kennedy proposed more than forty years ago: a Declaration of Interdependence. In a constant dialogue, we should look to remove the remaining barriers to free commerce across the Atlantic: to ensure that NATO and the emerging military capacity of the EU don't work against each other; to develop common approaches to aid and debt relief. "If John Kerry had become President, such an ambitious plan may have been too much too soon for many, even in a Democratic White House. What Europe often fails to appreciate is that any American President will always put the interests of the American people first. Where those interests overlap with Europe, that is where the European diplomats should invest their effort.

It is the disparity of power between the two continents that makes the relationship difficult to manage. Robert Kagan's much quoted essay "Power and Weakness" captures this well. "US military strength has produced a propensity to use that strength. Europe's military weakness has produced an understandable aversion

to the exercise of military power. Indeed it has produced a powerful European interest in inhabiting a world where strength doesn't matter, where international law and institutions predominate, where unilateral action by powerful nations is forbidden, where all nations, regardless of their strength, have equal rights and are equally protected by internationally agreed rules."⁵⁹

There is an economic argument for rejecting both the American "go it alone" attitude and Europe's idyll sponsored robustly by France that the EU could become a counterbalance superpower. Amartya Sen⁶⁰ sees an inextricable link between freedom and economic development. He argues that if the West can work together, during the next two decades it could use its economic and military supremacy to end the crushing poverty in many parts of the Developing World where hardship is a recruiting sergeant for extremism and terrorism.⁶¹ The carrot and stick approach to spreading freedom may not be obsolete.

This is a golden moment for the United States, the undisputed gorilla in the global economic market. But it knows that China is gaining on it at an astonishing rate. In 20 or 30 years it may be eclipsed by China and will see its political influence decline. Britain suffered the same indignity in the early years of the last century as its Empire slipped away. As we have heard the once fearsome British lion is now seen by many as the American president's poodle. America should not delay in engaging with Iran and North Korea. The EU agrees with the United States that neither should acquire a nuclear capability. When two groups share a goal why not try to settle upon a fair package of incentives and disincentives to be implemented depending on the future nuclear conduct of both rogue states?

The Secretary-General of the European Union, Javier Solana, writing in *The Economist*, highlights the urgency of this, “the security threats of the past century came from strong states, those of the 21st century come from weak and failing ones.” He goes on to say how “international divisions have fostered instability and uncertainty. The EU has an overwhelming interest in reversing this.” His acceptance that such divisions were “regrettable” leads him to call for “early and deeper dialogue on issues of shared strategic concern,” and the strengthening of international institutions. The United States may begin to only pay lip service to both requests, but they cannot deny his main premises that the “new challenges of failing states, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction” increase the need for global interdependence if we want to enjoy global security.⁶²

It seems the ultimate hurdle to reconciliation between Europe and America will be the quest for areas of common purpose over the next four years. The death of Arafat may open a window of opportunity to revisit the tragedy of the Middle East. The international community set 2005 as a deadline for a process to be agreed to create a democratic Palestinian state. Surely the consuming threat of the growth of Islamic terrorism makes the strategic interests for America and Europe in the Middle East more or less the same. The dispute is once again how to achieve them.

Enlightened self interest should drive both transatlantic powers to tackle poverty, disease, and civil strife wherever it appears in the developing world. Such

wounds in a volatile environment can be quick to fester. There will be disagreements along the way, but neither party should lose sight of the greater goal, a prosperous, stable and secure global future.

President Bush's election mantra that he used in almost every campaign speech; "freedom is on the march" - i.e. democracy, may not be attainable in every failing nation. Democracy as we know it does not always work in a one-size-fits all form. In his second administration, financial restraints and an aversion to a military draft may prevent any further invasions. The American people would have preferred Mr Bush to have attacked Iraq with the blessing of the United Nations. The questionable legal legitimacy also lost him allies in Europe. Perhaps the appointment of Condoleezza Rice to Secretary of State will add irresistible persuasion to his undisputed military might. The more seductive and subtle "soft power"⁶³ that Joseph Nye evangelises may also become more fashionable in the White House over the next four years.

The former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, writing in Newsweek, warns President Bush that the US should not try by itself to, "organize the international system". "Over an historical period it is beyond the psychological and political capacity of even the most dominant state. The goal for US foreign policy must be to turn dominant power into shared responsibility – to conduct policy, as the Australian scholar Coral Bell⁶⁴ has written, as if the international order were composed of many centers of powers, even while we are aware of our strategic pre-eminence."⁶⁵

This collegiate approach to foreign policy may bring with it the occasional delay and frustration, but the benefits in a complex and dangerous world could enrich America. The United States will always need good allies. Britain's efforts in Iraq have all but exhausted its military potential for the next few years. America may run out of friends before it runs out of enemies, unless this new Bush administration actively seeks common ground and a degree of cooperation with other nations of substance.

Europe and the rest of the free world have been well served by America in recent years. Europe shares common values but lacks the military machine to impose its views. As Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the former UK Ambassador to the UN, points out in an article in *The Times*; "We have not invested in a separate capacity to look after ourselves, within the global context and it is wise to acknowledge this." He adds, "modern terrorism is drawing strength from a reaction to globalisation itself, which is increasingly polarising those who benefit and those who do not benefit from it. And all the while, the number of those feeling marginalised is growing."⁶⁶

The terrorists do not want to see a united West coalescing around important humanitarian and political issues. The horrendous tsunami disaster in South Asia was an example of how countries can work together to try to deliver aid based on need, regardless of religion or political affiliation. It was also a chance for America to rebuild its reputation in a region of the world where its standing had dropped to an all time low.

A unified West is also a more potent image to project to an emerging Chinese superpower. The German Chancellor and the French President have both made very public calls for the 15 year old arms embargo on China to be lifted. This irritates Washington. The US and some other European Union countries are concerned that arms sold to China by the EU could be used against Taiwan, and risk sucking the US into a regional conflict. Pockets of disagreement such as this between France, Germany and the US hinder progress on wider diplomatic issues. A consistent transatlantic strategic progress towards building alliances overseas could reap long term rewards for President Bush and Europe.

The first Bush administration was seen by many in Europe to fail to distinguish between the power and the authority to act. If President Bush could come to terms with this distinction in his second term, the next American strike against the forces of terrorism or a rogue state could carry the blessing and support of the international community. This would make it easier for George Bush to sell at home and to execute with the help of allies overseas.

If the West cannot agree amongst its mainly Christian nations, what a mystery we must be to Africa, the East and the Muslim world? A suffering Muslim in Darfur does not need our culture, but may still aspire to our dreams of freedom and security. By putting aside our own national ambitions for personal ascendancy within the Western block, and focusing on our collective power to help others, we may not only win friends and influence but also discover that what unites us is more significant than what sets us at odds. We should look to the future, and emphasise what to build on and where to heal.

Appendix A:

Front Page Coverage of the US Election

Date	% of Front Page	US Election Headline	Picture
Nov. 1	50%	The Shadow of Bin Laden over the American Election	Bin Laden
Nov. 2	50%	The Best for Bush and Kerry	Bush/Kerry
Nov. 3	60%	America Votes En Masse	Voters
Nov. 4	100%	The Triumph of Bush	Bush
260% = 65%			

Le Figaro

Le Monde

Date	% of Front Page	US Election Headline	Picture
Nov. 1	33%	Bin Laden Reappears in Duel Between Bush and Kerry	Cartoon (Bush & Kerry)
Nov. 2	33%	America Undecided Before an Historic Election	Uncle Sam
Nov. 3	100%	All the Key Points to the Presidential Election	None
Nov. 4	80%	Bush in the Lead; But Not Yet Elected	None
240% = 61%			

Die Welt

Date	% of Front Page	US Election Headline	Picture
Nov. 1	40%	Young, Feminine, Democratic	Kerry's women & Caroline Kennedy
Nov. 2	7%	US Presidential Election Open Race	None
Nov. 3	70%	First Legal Battle for the US Election	Bush & Kerry
Nov. 4	90%	Bush Remains in the White House	Bush
207% = 51%			

Frankfurter Allgemeine

Date	% of Front Page	US Election Headline	Picture
Nov. 1	20%	Bush and Kerry Argue Over Bin Laden	None
Nov. 2	10%	America Expects a Quick Decision	None
Nov. 3	10%	Voting-In English and Spanish	None
Nov. 4	50%	Bush Remains President, Battle for the Cultural Soul of America	None
90% = 22%			

The Times

Date	% of Front Page	US Election Headline	Picture
Nov. 1	0%		
Nov. 2	80%	Gladiators of America Prepare for Their Fate	Bush & Kerry
Nov. 3	33%	I Gave it Everything Says an Anxious Bush	Bush
Nov. 4	100%	Victor and Vanquished Bind a Nation's Wounds	Bush & Kerry
213% = 53%			

The Guardian


Date	% of Front Page	US Election Headline	Picture
Nov. 1	80%	Who Speaks for America?	Kerry
Nov. 2	66%	Let the People Decide; Frantic Finale to Historic US Election	US voters
Nov. 3	66%	Close Race Rouses America: Kerry Camp Encouraged by Early Election Returns in Key States	Kerry
Nov. 4	80%	And Now: Four More Years	Bush
292% = 73%			

Washington Post

Date	% of Front Page	US Election Headline	Picture
Nov. 1	50%	Unprecedented Efforts to Mobilize Voters Begin	Kerry & Bush
Nov. 2	66%	Election Day Dawns with Unpredictability	Bush & Kerry
Nov. 3	100%	Battleground States Live up to Name	Bush & Kerry
Nov. 4	66%	Bush Wins Second Term	Bush & Cheney
282% = 70%			

New York Times

Date	% of Front Page	US Election Headline	Picture
Nov. 1	55%	In the Last Lap, Jockeying and Hiding the Sweat	Kerry & Bush
Nov. 2	45%	Record Turnout Drives Wind Up	Florida Pre-count
Nov. 3	80%	Bush and Kerry Locked in Tight Race	Bush & Kerry families
Nov. 4	100%	Bush Celebrates Victory – A Duty to Serve All Americans	Bush & Cheney
280% = 70%			



Source: Ronald Inglehart et al. (eds), Human Values and Beliefs: A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 2004)⁶⁷




Figure 1: Daily Mirror front page November 4th 2004. Mirror Group Newspapers.

BIOGRAPHY

Jacqueline Jones is a Shorenstein Fellow (Fall 2004) at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. She's also a senior producer for BBC Television. She works on the evening news programme, and although she's based in London she also produces for the BBC overseas. In 2003 she covered the war in Iraq and also went to Gaza, Israel, Turkey, Kuwait and the USA. While international news and the politics has driven much of her career, she has also been an output editor on "Today", Britain's leading daily politics and current affairs radio program. As a teenager, she worked in Africa for a year on health and water projects in tiny villages. Educated in Britain and the US, she started as a reporter for local radio, then regional TV, before her move to the BBC's London headquarters. Jacqueline Jones examines the US and European coverage of the result of the 2004 Presidential campaign.

ABSTRACT

We stand at the start of a new century, and America and Europe are facing a new crisis, but unlike the past, not as allies. If we agree that crisis began on 9/11 – the knee jerk reaction of all of Europe was to stand shoulder with America in its plight. Le Monde on September 13th 2001 carried the headline “Nous sommes tous Americains” (We are all Americans). But once President George W Bush decided to wage war on Iraq, France and Germany decided that sympathy dividend was spent.

When Donald Rumsfeld branded France and Germany as “Old Europe” he’d opened up a new front line, this time a war of words, fought in the media. If journalism can play its part in setting old allies at each other’s throats, what part can it play in repairing that damage? Newspapers by their very nature tend to reflect public opinion and drive public policy. My discussion paper investigates this by analysing newspaper coverage in the run up to the 2004 US Presidential election, the reporting of the result and the reaction to it.

What is absolutely clear is that the second Bush administration will have to deal with Iran, North Korea and Syria’s perceived WMD threat. Even though parts of Europe cannot agree with the United States on the way forward in Iraq, they still share many ambitions and needs elsewhere in the world. Perhaps shared values will emphasise what to build on and where to heal the transatlantic alliance.

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- ¹ The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 8-18 July 2004, "Compared with the past, would you say the US is more respected by other countries these days, less respected by other countries, or as respected as it has been in the past? Do you think less respect for America is a major problem, a minor problem or not a problem at all?"
- ² Colombani Jean Marie, "Nous Sommes Tous Americains," Le Monde, 13 September 2001.
- ³ Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War (New York, N.Y.: McGraw-Hill Inc., 2004), p. 80.
- ⁴ James Graff and Bruce Crumley, "France is not a Pacifist Country," 24 February 2003.
- ⁵ Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War (New York, NY: McGraw Hill Inc., 2004), p. 102-103.
- ⁶ In a remark at the State Department on 22 January 2003.
- ⁷ Timothy Garton Ash, Free World (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2004) p. 10.
- ⁸ "Irak: ne pas brûler les étapes," Le Monde, 1 October 2002.
- ⁹ International affairs columnist for the Washington Post.
- ¹⁰ "France's Dream World," Washington Post, 3 November 2002, B-7.
- ¹¹ 2004 Edelman Trust Barometer,
<http://www.edelman.com/events/Trust/Edelman%202004%20Trust%20Barometer%20Release.doc>.
- ¹² Senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and professor of International Relations at Georgetown University.
- ¹³ In his 2003 book The End of the American Era : U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century, (New York, N.Y.: Random House Inc.)
- ¹⁴ Pierre Rousselin, "Les Francais plebiscitent massivement Kerry," Le Figaro, October 28th 2004.
- ¹⁵ Poll by L'institut Louis Harris, France. It was a telephone poll carried out on October 25th 2004, with a sample size of 1002 of people age 18 and over.
- ¹⁶ Poll by Global Public Opinion on the US Presidential Election and US Foreign Policy. Globescan and the University of Maryland's Program on International Policy and Attitudes (PIPA). The poll was conducted in 35 countries. In Germany the polling was carried out by Ri*QUESTAGmbH between June 15 and July 2, 2004. The unweighted nationwide sample size was 1004, and it was conducted on the telephone. Question: In the upcoming US Presidential election, which candidate would you prefer to see win?
- ¹⁷ Le Monde editorial, November 1st 2004.
- ¹⁸ "French Analyst: Bush 'Must End International Isolation,'" Le Figaro web site, 5 November 2004.
- ¹⁹ "The Next President Bush," New York Times, 4 November 2004.
- ²⁰ "Mr. Bush's Victory," Washington Post, 4 November 2004, p. A24.
- ²¹ "Four more years," The Guardian, 4 November 2004.
- ²² Spiegel magazine, November 2004.
- ²³ Associated Press and the Television news networks Election Day Exit poll.

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- ²⁴ “German Commentary Sees Deeper Rift Between US, Europe After US Election,” Frankfurter Allgemeine, 5 November 2004.
- ²⁵ Maggie Gallagher, “The Rise of the Values Voters: Guns, Abortion, and Gay Marriage ‘really, really motivate people.’” National Review, 23 November 2004.
- ²⁶ Jim Rutenberg, “Poll Question Stirs Debate On Meaning of ‘Values,’” New York Times, 6 November 2004.
- ²⁷ Poll from The Pew Research Center, “Religion and the Presidential Vote: Bush’s Gains Broad-Based,” 6 December 2004. The data for this analysis are drawn from the 2000 VNS and 2004 NEP Exit Polls with one important exception. While the 2004 NEP Exit Poll included a measure of evangelical identification (“Would you describe yourself as a born-again or evangelical Christian?” [Yes, No]), the 2000 VNS Exit Poll did not include this question.
- ²⁸ Dan Balz, “Bush Wins Second Term: Kerry Concedes Defeat; Both Speak of Need for Unity,” Washington Post, 4 November 2004, A01.
- ²⁹ Richard W. Stevenson, “Bush Makes it Official, Naming Rice to State Dept.,” 17 November 2004, A-1.
- ³⁰ “Powell Departs,” 16 November 2004, p.15.
- ³¹ Philip Webster, “Blair: we in Britain are uniquely placed to bridge the transatlantic divide,” The Times, 16 November 2004, p. 8.
- ³² “This is a Balancing Act that may no Longer be Possible,” 16 November 2004, p.8.
- ³³ Charles Bremnar, “Chirac: Britain cannot be an ‘honest broker’ between Europe and US,” The Times, 16 November 2004, p. 9.
- ³⁴ “Chirac: Britain cannot be an ‘honest broker’ between Europe and US,” 16 November 2004, p.9.
- ³⁵ Charles Bremner and Philip Webster, “Backing Bush has won you nothing, Chirac tells Britain,” The Times, 16 November 2004, p. 1.
- ³⁶ Sarkozy is the former Finance Minister who recently became leader of the ruling Union for a Popular Movement party, positioning him for the Presidency in 2007. He is a political rival of Chirac’s, admires Tony Blair, and is thought of as an Atlanticist.
- ³⁷ “Bush, Chirac Have ‘Difficult’ Relationship Despite Similar Personalities,” Le Figaro web site, 5 November 2004.
- ³⁸ Luc de Barochez, “French Commentary: Chirac Likely To Be ‘at Loggerheads Again’ with Bush,” Le Figaro web site, 4 November 2004.
- ³⁹ Joseph S. Nye, “America needs a strong Europe,” International Herald Tribune, 15 November 2004.
- ⁴⁰ “Schroeder congratulates to Bush: The Federal Government wants to continue close co-operation with the USA,” Die Welt, 3 November 2004.
- ⁴¹ Clemens Wergin, “German Commentary Urges US, Europe To Attempt Reconciliation,” Der Tagesspiegel web site, 4 November 2004.
- ⁴² “German Commentary Sees Deeper Rift Between US, Europe After US Election,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 5 November 2004.
- ⁴³ Thomas Kielinger, “End of wishful thinking,” Die Welt web site, 4 November 2004.
- ⁴⁴ Personal communication.

⁴⁵ See endnote 43.

⁴⁶ “French president not to relinquish opposition to Bush policies,” Le Figaro web site, 4 November 2004.

⁴⁷ See endnote 41.

⁴⁸ See endnote 41.

⁴⁹ White House transcript: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/11/20041112-5.html>.

⁵⁰ “President Sets Goal of State For Palestinians by 2009; Bush Plans European Trip After Inaugural to Mend Fences,” 14 November 2004, A-24.

⁵¹ In his address to a joint session of Congress after the Sept. 11 2001 attacks.

⁵² Mike Allen and Glenn Kessler, “President Sets Goal of State For Palestinians by 2009; Bush Plans European Trip After Inaugural to Mend Fences,” Washington Post, 14 November 2004, A-24.

⁵³ See above.

⁵⁴ Elisabeth Bumiller, “Bush’s Tutor and Disciple: Condoleezza Rice,” New York Times, 17 November 2004.

⁵⁵ See above.

⁵⁶ David E. Sanger and Steven R. Weisman, “Cabinet Choices Seen as Move For More Harmony and Control,” 17 November 2004, A-1.

⁵⁷ See endnote 52.

⁵⁸ Timothy Garton Ash, Free World, (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 2004).

⁵⁹ Policy Review, No. 113, June/July 2002.

⁶⁰ Sen won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1998 and is currently a professor at Trinity College, Cambridge University.

⁶¹ In his 1999 book Development as Freedom, (New York, N.Y.: Anchor Books).

⁶² Javier Solana, “Jointly does it,” The Economist: The World in 2005, December 2004.

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⁶⁴ Bell is currently a Professor of International Relations at the University of Sussex.

⁶⁵ Henry A. Kissinger, “America’s Assignment: What will we face in the next four years? The former Secretary of State on the global challenges ahead,” Newsweek, 8 November 2004.

⁶⁶ “In America we trust: we have to: The free world has no choice but to depend on the US. But is it up to the job?,” The Times, 16 November 2004.

⁶⁷ Timothy Garton Ash, Free World, Penguin Books Ltd, London, 2004 p. 257.